Carving Intuition at its Joints

A central metaphilosophical project seeks to evaluate the reliability of the types of evidence that figure in philosophical arguments and, relatedly, the justificatory status of relying on those types of evidence. Traditionally, metaphilosophers have approached this project via an analysis of intuition. This article argues that the category picked out by “intuition” is both too broad and too heterogeneous to serve as the appropriate target for metaphilosophical inquiry. Intuition is a gerrymandered and disjunctive kind, undeserving of the widespread attention it receives in the literature. Instead, metaphilosophers should examine more finely grained mental states. Three promising strategies for parsing intuitions more finely are proposed: by their causal origins, by their context of employment, and by the exoticism of their content. This more narrow focus may significantly alter the dialectic in three prominent metaphilosophical arguments: the argument from calibration, the argument from self‐defeat, and the argument from intuitional sensitivity.     

Myriad Philosophical Methodologies

This article offers an overview of philosophical methodologies. In an attempt to avoid a certain circularity, the article itself tries to avoid consciously or solely deploying and engaging with any current standard notion of what constitutes a philosophical method or philosophy itself. It hopes to find some of the possible places in which philosophy occurs, and this turns out to include (at least) such endeavours as literature, art, poetry, and linguistics. From here it considers how almost anything—for example, conversation, everyday life, and love—can also be philosophy. An attempt is made to identify some characteristic feature of philosophy as it occurs in all such forms. In the end, the simultaneous enacting of a peculiar optimism and particular humility both, in the search for knowledge, is put forward as potentially sufficient to at least begin to identify philosophy across its many guises.     

两宋史事易学的演变与发展特征

援史释《易》成为宋儒解《易》的常用方式,虽然此种注《易》方式并不始于宋代,但大量用史在宋代易学阐释中表现的尤为突出。究其原因,当与宋代儒学复兴、史学发展以及宋代士人的政治观念有着密切的联系。北宋与南宋的史事易学又呈现出明显的不同,北宋援引史事是出于解说义理的需要,而南宋则用史事解证卦爻辞,直接将《周易》视为一部极具历史借鉴及指导意义的经典。南宋卦卦有史的《周易》阐释并不是一朝一夕形成的,而是北宋援引史事以证易理的继承与发展。     

Moral Foundations Theory and the Psychology of Charitable Giving

Moral foundations theory proposes that intuitions about what is morally right or wrong rest upon a set of universal foundations. Although this theory has generated a recent surge of research, few studies have investigated the real-world moral consequences of the postulated moral intuitions. We show that they are predictably associated with an important type of moral behaviour. Stronger individualizing intuitions (fairness and harm prevention) and weaker binding intuitions (loyalty, authority, and sanctity) were associated with the willingness to comply with a request to volunteer for charity and with the amount of self-reported donations to charity organizations. Among participants who complied with the request, individualizing intuitions predicted the allocation of donations to causes that benefit out-groups, whereas binding intuitions predicted the allocation of donations to causes that benefit the in-group. The associations between moral foundations and self-report measures of allocations in a hypothetical dilemma and concern with helping in-group and out-group victims were similar. Moral foundations predicted charitable giving over and above effects of political ideology, religiosity, and demographics, although variables within these categories also exhibited unique effects on charitable giving and accounted for a portion of the relationship between moral foundations and charitable giving. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology,Moral Intuitions,and Worldview Among Swedish Voters

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.     

The Significance of Contingency and Detours in Hans Blumenberg’s Philosophical Anthropology

Although time was a predominate theme in Continental philosophy for the first half of the twentieth century, philosophical attention has increasingly shifted to space. This paper contributes to the phenomenology of space through Hans Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology. Blumenberg elucidates the significance of phenomenological distance for the contingent existence of humans. Spanning from the experience of early human ancestors to history and epistemology, Blumenberg’s work reveals how contingency pervades human existence. Blumenberg understands names, myths, rhetoric, and metaphors as cultural techniques that function as means of self-preservation by distancing an overwhelming and disorienting reality and managing the felt contingency of human existence. Developing upon Blumenberg’s insights into human contingency and distance, the paper argues that detours offer a way to address the contemporary, existential issues posed by the increasing rate of technological change and environmental problems.     

循证医学论争的哲学分析(上)

首先,我们认为EBM的支持者对EBM的定义过于宽泛,甚至是空洞的,这正是当前的有关讨论不明朗的原因;对此我们提出了一种更明晰的解释,重新阐述EBM的含义及与其他医学方法的关系.第二,EBM的支持者通常依据ThomasKuhn的哲学著作来说明EBM是一种Kuhn式的"范式转化";我们认为,这种说明是一种严重的错误,并且使有关EBM的争论过度的偏离常轨.第三,我们建议以W.V.Quine的信仰之网的哲学观念来理解EBM及其与其他医学方法的关系,这是一种更富有成果的理解方式.基于这种理解,我们认为EBM是一种与其他的医学有着重大差异的医学方法.     

西方伦理学研究视野和考察视角的滚动式拓展

西方伦理学的研究视野和考察视角随其历史的演进而滚动式地拓展。在希腊罗马伦理学中 ,只有哲学视野 (含存在论、认识论、人性论、生存论等视角 )。在中世纪基督教伦理学中 ,神学视野 (含神性论、神人关系论、灵魂论等视角 )统辖哲学视野。在近代西方伦理学中 ,哲学视野是脊梁 ,心理学视野 (以情感论视角为主 )和神学视野为两翼 ,而其他诸视野———如政治学的、历史学的、生物学的视野———充当侧肢。在现代西方伦理学中 ,哲学视野 (在原有视角之外新增价值论等视角 )、语言学视野 (含语义学、语用学等视角 )、心理学视野 (在原有视角之外新增潜意识论、发生认识论、需要—动机论、环境—行为论等视角 )和神学视野四强争雄的格局呈现出来 ,其他诸视野———生物学的、人类学的、经济学的、政治学的、历史学的、社会学的视野———则扮演配角。研究视野和考察视角的不断拓展为西方伦理学的发展提供了广泛的可能性。     

本易理以诂易辞 由易辞以准易象——试论尚氏易学的特色及其对易学史的贡献

本文认为,本易理以诂易辞,由易辞以准易象,这是尚秉和先生注解《周易》的基本原则,也是他独辟蹊径所发明的注易新方法。依据此一原则和方法,尚先生一扫东汉以来易家注易迂曲立说、穿凿附会之风气,穷究易理,广搜易象,以易解易,以易证易,其对《周易》经、传的诠释,"六通四辟,若合符契"。由此不仅纠正了千百年来易家注易的诸多流弊和错误,而且也牢固地确立了尚秉和先生在易学史上的大师地位。     

The Problem of Peer Review is the Most Important Philosophical Problem

As philosophers we should have as one of our aims to produce as much philosophical knowledge as possible. A lot of potential philosophical knowledge is lost because of the flaws of the peer review system, and so a lot of philosophical knowledge would be gained were the system improved. Accordingly, as authors we should write papers about how to fix peer review, and as editors we should accept such papers if they are good. This paper presents some familiar problems with peer review, elaborates on and motivates the argument just given, and replies to some objections to it, making the case that fixing peer review is both a philosophical problem and one that admits of a solution.