Moral Learning,Rationality, and the Unreliability of Affect

James Woodward and John Allman [2007, 2008] and Peter Railton [2014, 2016] argue that our moral intuitions are products of sophisticated rational learning systems. I investigate the implications that this discovery has for intuition-based philosophical methodologies. Instead of vindicating the conservative use of intuitions in philosophy, I argue that what I call the rational learning strategy fails to show philosophers are justified in appealing to their moral intuitions in philosophical arguments without giving reasons why those intuitions are trustworthy. Despite the fact that our intuitions are outputs of surprisingly sophisticated learning mechanisms, we do not have reason to unreflectively trust them when offering arguments in moral philosophy.     

An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis

This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics of conceptual analysis are similar to those in other interesting areas of scholarship, and so hypotheses generated by it are of the right form to be applicable to diverse areas. The article shows that the explanationist criterion in epistemology was developed and applied in this way. The epistemic value of conceptual analysis is oblique because it contributes not towards the main purpose of conceptual analysis but towards the reliable development of epistemically valuable hypotheses in philosophy and scholarship.     

THE ABSTRACT SUBLIME: Life as information waiting to be rewritten

We report here on a series of interaction-intensive, interdisciplinary workshops to foster collaboration among those who teach, study, and engage with the public about scientific developments and social change—the New England Workshop on Science and Social Change. We include one line of thinking that fed into the workshops and present an analysis of how they contribute to participants developing their interest and skills in collaboration. Workshop evaluations suggest that people are moved to develop themselves as collaborators when they view an experience or training as transformative. Four R's—respect, risk, revelation, and re-engagement—point to the important conditions for interactions among researchers to be experienced as transformative. Three considerations lie behind the focus on the process side of the workshops, not the specific workshop topics: (1) how best to fill in for readers what they missed out on by not being there; (2) workshops and meetings are a ubiquitous part of the culture of science and technology studies (STS) so it is valuable to examine this aspect of our own culture with a view to promoting positive changes; and (3) in some scientific fields organized multi-person collaborative processes form a highly valorized aspect of the culture of science, so reflection on experiences of participation and collaboration in STS might inform our analyses of fields that emphasize collaboration and group processes. Indeed, the authors' own involvement in the workshops extends our own STS work on actor networks and ‘heterogeneous engineering’, that is, the mobilization of a variety of resources by diverse agents spanning different realms of social action.     

Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.     

Two Objections to Moran’s Transparency Account

Abstract

Gareth Evans and others have argued that our intentional attitudes are transparent to facts in the world. This suggests we can know them by looking outwards to the world rather than inwards to our minds. Richard Moran uses this idea of transparency in his account of self-knowledge. Critics have objected to his account on several counts. For example, Jonathan Way has argued that irrational attitudes can give ordinary self-knowledge when they are not transparent and that there are rational attitudes that are not transparent. I argue here that these objections fail because Way does not fully consider the two different kinds of self-knowledge, ‘ordinary’ and evidence-based, that differentiate the two stances that Moran claims a subject can have towards his attitudes. It is the differences between these two stances and the implications of these that motivate Moran’s account, rather than whether the formed attitude is rational or irrational, as long as the subject avows it from the deliberative stance, focuses on the attitude’s object and conforms to the transparency condition as Moran sets this out.     

Authority in Relationships

Abstract

Authority consists in having standing to make a claim on another person’s actions. Authority comes in degrees: persons have the authority to make moral demands on each other, but if they participate in close relationships, such as friendships or love relationships, their authority over each other is greater, compared to the authority of strangers to make demands, as participants in personal relationships can demand more from each other than can strangers. This paper discusses the phenomenon of a relationship-dependent greater authority on a conceptual level. It thereby fills a gap in the literature on the proper theory of authority: while being a common part of our moral practice, relationship-dependent authority has mostly been neglected in this context. It is even doubtful whether the most influential contemporary accounts of authority can accommodate it. As will be argued, neither Joseph Raz’s service conception nor Stephen Darwall’s second-personal conception of authority are able to. The triggering-reasons account of authority, as recently developed by David Enoch, is better suited in this regard: according to this conception, relationship-dependent authority stems from special conditional reasons that are implied by relationships and that can be triggered by the authoritative demands of their participants.     

Relationship Between Mother,Father, and Peer Attachment and Empathy With Moral Authority

We explored the relationship between mother, father, and peer attachment security, empathy, and moral authority in order to clarify certain problems of previous empirical research on such relationships. A sample of 202 Persian-speaking undergraduate students completed questionnaires pertaining to these constructs. The results revealed that mother and father attachment were significantly correlated with family, society welfare, and equality sources of moral authority, whereas peer attachment security was related only to society welfare and equality sources of moral authority. Out of the empathy subscales, only empathic concern was associated with moral authority sources. Empathic concern was also related to mother, father, and peer attachment, whereas perspective taking was correlated with mother and peer attachment. The combination of empathic concern and mother, father, and peer attachment predicted significant amount of variance of “principle source of moral authority” (including society welfare and equality sources). Findings support existence of a strong relationship between attachment security and the content of moral thought of adolescents, and findings redress an empirical imbalance in research literature on the relation of attachment and morality.     

Philosophical Sensitivity

Although much has been written about the nature of philosophy and how the discipline can be defined, little attention has been paid to the ways we develop the facility to reflect philosophically or why cultivating this ability is valuable. This article develops a conception of “philosophical sensitivity,” a perceptual capacity that facilitates our awareness of the philosophical dimension of experience. Based in part on Aristotle's notion of a moral perceptual capacity, philosophical sensitivity starts with most people's natural inclinations as children to reflect about life's fundamental mysteries; when this capacity is cultivated with training over time, our attentiveness to the philosophical features of ordinary life becomes almost second nature. In much the same way an aesthetically sensitive person notices certain qualities of experience not readily perceptible by others, philosophical sensitivity involves the development of a particular way of seeing the world.     

Kant's Neoplatonism: Kant and Plato on Mathematical and Philosophical Method

Both Plato and Kant devote much attention and care to deliberating about their method of philosophizing. And, interestingly, both seek to expand and explain their view of philosophical method by one selfsame strategy: explaining the contrast between rational procedure in mathematics and in philosophy. Plato and Kant agree on a fundamental point of philosophical method that is at odds with the mathematico‐demonstrative methodology of philosophy found in Spinoza and present in Christian Wolff. Both reject the axiomatic approach with its insistence on fundamental truths postulated from the outset. Both alike insist that philosophizing—unlike mathematics—is an exercise in theorizing where the questions of basicness and foundations come into view only after the inquiry has gone on for a long, long time—and certainly not at its start.     

Introduction

This introduction presents the project of a one‐day meeting on the future of philosophical research, hosted by the Institute of Philosophy, School of Advanced Study, University of London, on 13 January 2012. The meeting brought together several distinguished philosophers and scholars in their roles as journal editors and publishing experts, in order to clarify and discuss the future of philosophical research. This symposium in Metaphilosophy collects a selection of the papers presented at the meeting and some invited articles.