Concerning Paul Edwards' “Heidegger on Death”: A Criticism

For Husserl, noetics is the most fundamental science and the centrepiece of a phenomenological epistemology. Since in his major works Husserl does not develop noetics systematically but uses its main ideas and achievements often in apparent isolation without clarifying their systematic unity, the significance of noetics is often overlooked. Although Husserl has repeatedly stressed the importance of a phenomenological epistemology, what the concrete theses of such an undertaking are supposed to be often remains obscure. We shall see that the best way to clarify this is by providing a detailed account of Husserl’s noetics as it is developed in Husserl’s lecture courses “Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge” (1906/07) and “Logic and General Theory of Science” (1917/18). This is the main aim of the present paper. We will shed light on the significance, systematic unity, and concrete theses of noetics. Furthermore, I shall show in what way the main theses of noetics are present in Husserl’s other works, even if the term noetics does not even occur. Finally, we will see that some basic ideas of Husserl’s noetics play an important role in current analytic epistemology and we will indicate how a phenomenological epistemology could enrich current debates.     

Analytic Phenomenology (or “What It Is Like”) vs. Husserlian Phenomenology

I begin this paper by outlining two senses of “phenomenology.” First, the “what it is like” or “analytic tradition” sense: the verbalization of qualitative states of consciousness of which we are aware. Second, the “Continental” sense: the rigorous study of the structures of consciousness. I outline the ways in which these two senses diverge. First, Continental phenomenology involves a diversified account of consciousness, states of awareness, and the human person. The phenomenologist articulates this account not by introspection but via acts of phenomenological reflection concerning eidetic intuitions about essential structural features. Second, via the method of “sense explication,” the phenomenologist can articulate an account of passive and subconscious states which we are not strictly “aware” of. The conclusion shows these divergences of senses are sometimes overlooked, leading to equivocation. Zahavi and Gallagher must be employing the “what it is like” sense when they make certain “phenomenological” arguments concerning social cognition, yet Spaulding’s ensuing critique of phenomenology is directed at Continental phenomenology. Also, it is only phenomenology in the “what it is like” sense which cannot contribute to subpersonal psychology. Genetic Continental phenomenology describes the lawful relations amongst the precursors and preconditions which give rise to conscious experience, constituting a type of (non-causal) subpersonal explanation.     

解释现象学分析在中国的运用：系统评价及指南

作为一种质性研究方法, 解释现象学分析在心理学及社会科学的其他领域中逐渐兴起。目前在中国, 运用解释现象学分析的研究质量参差不齐, 对这些研究进行系统评价, 可以为将来的研究提供指导。通过对中英文数据库的检索及筛选, 最终纳入49篇期刊文章。根据Smith (2011)为解释现象学分析提出的4个标准对这些文章进行评价, 结果显示, 26篇研究明确提及了解释现象学的理论原则, 33篇文章的资料收集及分析过程清晰透明, 大部分研究(n = 40)条理清晰、言之成理, 但只有约1/4的研究(n = 13)提供了足够强的证据来支持其提取出来的主题。只有4篇全部达到质量标准, 11篇基本达到标准, 大部分文章没有达到标准。最后, 本研究尝试提出一份解释现象学分析的使用指南, 供将来的研究参考。     

明见性:相即感知与自我--再论胡塞尔的"直观"理论

在《逻辑研究》中具有本源性奠基意义的胡塞尔意义上的内感知,实际上是一个歧义两可的概念：作为对真理、本质的相即感知,它实现了直观的明见性理想,但其对象性感知的自然意识特征使其无法作为现象学考察的根基,而实际上它又并不具有对象性感知的意向构造性;只有作为“自身给予”（明见性）意义上的自身意识：才可以在起源的意义上真正实现现象学反思以至本质直观的切实意蕴。而这种意识一体验的时间性本性又使得明见性坐落于作为其根源的“自我”的问题域中。由此,自身意识与反思的含义、关系及其发展脉络才能真实呈现,明见性从相应性向绝然性的逐步过渡才能被理解。