Ramseyan humility: the response from revelation and panpsychism

David Lewis argues for Ramseyan humility, the thesis that we can’t identify the fundamental properties that occupy the nomological roles at our world. Lewis, however, remarks that there is a potential exception to this, which involves assuming two views concerning qualia (i) panphenomenalism (contemporary panpsychism): all instantiated fundamental properties are qualia and (ii) the identification thesis (revelation): we can know the identities of our qualia simply by being acquainted with them. This paper aims to provide an exposition, as well as an assessment, of this response to the humility thesis.     

人文社会医学教育应纳为继续医学教育的重要内容

从人文社会医学的概念、现状及加强人文社会医学继续教育的重要性,阐述了应将人文社会医学教育纳为继续医学教育的重要内容的现点.指出加强人文社会医学继续教育应统一认识,加强领导;强化培训,纳入正规;注重实践,回归社会.     

从语言到思想:基于指称问题考察分析哲学的范式转移

本文通过追溯当代内容理论的语言哲学和现象学起源,以指称性概念和意向性概念为核心,简要刻画了指称理论和内容理论的发展线索。在此基础上,本文试图借助语言指称问题和心理指称问题的平行关系,为当代分析哲学的主流从语言哲学到心灵哲学的范式转移的动机和方法勾勒出一个考察纲要。     

Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra

Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties.     

Intentionalism and Change Blindness

According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character.

Threat in dreams: an adaptation?

Revonsuo's influential Threat Simulation Theory (TST) predicts that people exposed to survival threats will have more threat dreams, and evince enhanced responses to dream threats, compared to those living in relatively safe conditions. Participants in a high crime area (South Africa: n=208) differed significantly from participants in a low crime area (Wales, UK: n=116) in having greater recent exposure to a life-threatening event (chi([1,N=186])(2)=14.84, p<.00012). Contrary to TST's predictions, the SA participants reported significantly fewer threat dreams (chi([1,N=287])(2)=6.11, p<.0134), and did not differ from the Welsh participants in responses to dream threats (Fisher's Exact test, p=.2478). Overall, the incidence of threat in dreams was extremely low-less than 20% of dreams featured realistic survival threats. Escape from dream threats occurred in less than 2% of dreams. We conclude that this evidence contradicts key aspects of TST.     

Shooting the messenger won’t change the news

Malcolm-Smith, Solms, Turnbull and Tredoux [Malcolm-Smith, S., Solms, M., Turnbull, O., & Tredoux, C. (2008). Threat in dreams: An adaptation? Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1281–1291.] conducted a rigorous study that sampled two populations differentially exposed to threat in real life, and found that critical predictions from the Threat Simulation Theory of dreams [Revonsuo, A. (2000a). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 877-901.; Revonsuo, A. (2000b). Did ancestral humans dream for their lives? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 1063–1082.] were not supported. Specifically, we found no evidence of increased realistic threats to physical survival or enhanced threat avoidance in the dreams of those from the exposed population. Revonsuo and Valli’s [Revonsuo, A., & Valli, K. (2008). How to test the threat simulation theory. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1292-1296.] commentary on our study argues that the methods we used are so flawed as to render the results meaningless. In this response article, we address the criticisms raised in their commentary.     

In Defence of Non-conceptual Content

In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative concepts that have the same fine grainess of non-conceptual contents while having conceptual structure. In what follows I will argue that, first, that the notion of demonstrative concept is not viable and, second, that there is an epistemological role for non-conceptual content.