KINDS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT IT IS LIKE TO BE SOMETHING?

Abstract: In this article I distinguish the notion of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of creature from that of there being something it is like to have a certain kind of experience. Work on consciousness has typically dealt with the latter while employing the language of the former. I propose several ways of analyzing what it is like to be a certain kind of creature and find problems with them all. The upshot is that even if there is something it is like to have certain kinds of experience, it does not follow that there is anything it is like to be a certain kind of creature. Skepticism about the existence of something that it is like to be an F is recommended.     

论医务人员在医疗事故技术鉴定过程中的法律地位

世界上究竟有没有“心”、“心”是什么、心与身的关系如何,这一直是医学与心理学的基本问题。随着科学的发展和认识的深化,经由语言学的心灵剥离、科学主义的心灵放逐、实证科学的心灵祛魅,古老神秘的灵魂不断地“祛魅”,心理的本质得到了还原与澄清,灵魂问题亦演变为心理问题、心脑问题,而心灵哲学也正朝着自然化的方向重建。     

医患认知差异的因素分析与调适研究

医患认知差异是指医生与患者在诊疗过程中对同一事实和现象的认知之间的差异、矛盾与对立,它是导致医患冲突的深层次诱因。从传统生物医学模式的制约、医忘双方社会角色意识的差异以及医患个体心理特征的差异三方面分析了医患认知差异产生的原因,并从转变角色意识、相互理解和配合、有效的双向沟通以及尊重双方的人格和权利几方面提出了化解矛盾、认知趋同的措施。     

学前儿童道德责任意识的发展研究

该文通过个别访谈的方法,考察了96名3～5岁幼儿依据允许性、可变性、权成依赖性以及规则依赖性四种判断标准对同伴、以及成人主人公的道德行为判断及其归因。结果显示,多数学前儿童都能根据不同的判断标准对主人公行为做出符合道德规则的判断,表现出较强的道德责任意识,且这一意识在3～4、5岁之间获得了较为显著的发展,尤其是在权威依赖性标准上。归因分析显示近1／4的幼儿明确采用相应的道德规则对主人公的行为作出解释。这些结果支持认知发展的领域特殊论,揭示出学前儿童很早就发展起来的道德责任,这对当前的道德教育和公民教育实践具有一定启示意义。     

Types of body representation and the sense of embodiment

The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body is usually like, are relatively stable and are constructed from online representations. This distinction is supported by an analysis of phantom limb—the feeling that an amputated limb is still present—phenomena. Initially it seems that the sense of embodiment may arise from either of these types of representation; however, an integrated representation of the body seems to be required. It is suggested information from vision and emotions is involved in generating these representations. A lack of access to online representations of the body does not necessarily lead to a loss in the sense of embodiment. An integrated offline representation of the body could account for the sense of embodiment and perform the functions attributed to this sense.     

Analytical psychology and Daoist inner alchemy: a response to C.G. Jung's 'Commentary on The Secret of the Golden Flower'

Abstract :  This paper provides a historical, religious-philosophical context for the study of the Daoist text known as  The Secret of the Golden Flower . An updated study is conducted into the controversy over the source of the text including the editions translated by Richard Wilhelm and Thomas Cleary. The main teachings of the text and the basics of two major denominations of Daoism are introduced to ground later critiques of Jung's commentary. The psychodynamics of analytical psychology, especially those concerned with integration of unconscious contents and the realization of the self (individuation) are compared with the psycho-spiritual dynamics of integration in Eastern spirituality based on the Golden Flower text. The paper concludes that it was amiss for Jung to have equated the Western 'unconscious' with states of higher consciousness in Eastern meditation practices, although his claim that Eastern higher consciousness is characterized by a nebulous state of non-intentionality does raise questions about the appropriateness of calling Eastern meditative states 'consciousness'. A new concept is required to characterize the special qualities of this psychic state shared generally by Eastern spiritual traditions and a more meaningful comparison may be found in Jung's concept of the self.     

道德本能与道德判断

Human beings’ moral life can be divided into two forms, one based on moral instincts and the other on moral judgments. The former is carried on without deliberation, while the latter relies upon valuations and judgments. The two can ultimately be viewed as man’s innate moral nature and acquired moral conventions. Theoretically, preference for the former will lead to naturalism and for the latter to culturalism, but this is the reality of man’s moral life. Moreover, there may be a parallel relation between the moral structure of human life and the grammatical structure of human language. Translated by Yu Xin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2007, (12): 72–78     

The Significance of the Emergence of Language and Symbol in the Development of the Young Infant

In this paper I have suggested that the mother–child dyad is the foundation for integrity between the psychic self and the physical self, and the capacity of these to relate to the external environment. I have also argued that the development of language and symbol are creative agents in the development of consciousness in the young infant, and that the emergence of language and symbol are an expression of the opening of a potential space which allows differentiation from the mother and facilitates the infant’s ability to distinguish fantasy from fact and self from other. Sharn Waldron is a psychotherapist residing and working in Suffolk, England and is a registered member with the UKCP through the Forum for Independent Psychotherapists. She has contributed numerous papers for international psychotherapeutic journals, is a contributor to Pear’s Cyclopedia and writes freelance for Penguin and the National Health Service in the United Kingdom.     

The predicting brain: Unconscious repetition, conscious reflection and therapeutic change

Neuroscience indicates that 'repetition' is fundamental to brain function. The brain non-consciously predicts what is most likely to happen and sets in motion perceptions, emotions, behaviors and interpersonal responses best adapted to what is expected-before events occur. Predictions enable individuals to be ready 'ahead of time' so reactions occur rapidly and smoothly when events occur. The brain uses past learning as the guide for what to expect in the future. Because of prediction, present experience and responses are shaped by the past. Predictions from early life can be deeply encoded and enduring. Predictions based on the past allow for more efficient brain function in the present, but can lead to mistakes. When what is predicted does not occur, consciousness can be engaged to monitor and correct the situation. But if a perception or emotion seems reasonable for the situation, a person might not notice an error, and a maladaptive 'repetition' may remain unchanged. The author discusses how predictions contribute to psychological defenses and transference repetition, and how conscious self-reflection facilitates therapeutic change. The neuroscience of prediction indicates why, in certain cases, active engagement by the analyst may be necessary. The author makes the argument for use of a 'neuroscience interpretation'.     

Animal Minds,Cognitive Ethology,and Ethics

Our goal in this paper is to provide enough of an account of the origins of cognitive ethology and the controversy surrounding it to help ethicists to gauge for themselves how to balance skepticism and credulity about animal minds when communicating with scientists. We believe that ethicists’ arguments would benefit from better understanding of the historical roots of ongoing controversies. It is not appropriate to treat some widely reported results in animal cognition as if their interpretations are a matter of scientific consensus. It is especially important to understand why loose references to “cognitive ethology” by philosophers can signal ignorance of the field to scientists who are more deeply immersed in the relevant literature. Understanding the variety of approaches to cognitive phenomena in animals is essential if such capacities are to form the foundation of scientifically-informed ethical reasoning about animals.