Neurodynamics of time consciousness: An extensionalist explanation of apparent motion and the specious present via reentrant oscillatory multiplexing

This paper situates an original model of reentrant oscillatory multiplexing within the philosophy of time consciousness to argue for an extensionalist theory of the specious present. I develop a detailed differential latency model of apparent motion to show how the ordinality of experiential content is isomorphic to the ordinality of relevant brain processes. I argue that the theory presented has resources to account for other key features of the specious present, including the representational discreteness between successive conscious moments as well as the phenomenological continuity between them. This work not only shows the plausibility of an extensionalist philosophical theory, it also illustrates the utility of differential latency views in squaring temporal illusions with empirically supported neurodynamics.     

冲突与消融:认知心理学与精神分析视界融合的新式

尽管看起来精神分析和认知心理学似乎并不相关,但它们之间也有一些明显的通路,使得精神分析有助于认知心理学,反之亦然。通过对经典的意识建构论的回溯,清理了精神分析与认知心理学视界融合的短暂历史,然后提出一种新的可能范式——意识与潜意识的两套转换机制,试图超越信息加工学派遭遇的深重困境;同时运用非线性动力学观点比较了弗洛伊德学派与联结主义范式在心理模型建构上的同构关系;最后将之提升到哲学层次对传统的科学与非科学的二元分裂式结构进行了解构主义的批判。     

Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content

Sydney Shoemaker has given a sophisticated theory of phenomenal content, motivated by the transparency of experience and by the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion (1994, 2000, 2001, 2002). It centers on the idea that color experiences represent what he calls “appearance properties”. I consider the different sorts of appearance properties that Shoemaker has suggested might enter into phenomenal content – occurrent appearance properties, dispositional appearance properties, and higher-order dispositional appearance properties – and argue that none of them are plausibly represented by color experiences. I argue that Shoemaker's theory faces a dilemma – either it makes misperception too difficult, or it does not truly accommodate veridical spectrum inversion. I then examine some alternative Russellian theories of phenomenal content that might be consistent with Shoemaker's motivations, including a different sort of proposal recently suggested by Shoemaker (forthcoming). I argue that these views are also lacking, for similar reasons as the appearance property view. Finally, I conclude that in order for a representationalist theory to properly accommodate spectrum inversion without illusion, phenomenal content must include an indexical element. Such a view requires the adoption of a broadly Fregean theory of phenomenal content, according to which sameness of phenomenal character does not entail sameness in extension. What phenomenally identical experiences have in common is not what they represent, but how they represent.     

自我欺骗的研究现状与展望

西方哲学、心理学等领域对"自我欺骗"开展了有影响力的研究。早期的理论家关注自我欺骗的意识特征。弗洛伊德通过指出意识和无意识可以由动机推动,开创了自我欺骗研究的新阶段。众多研究者采纳了弗洛伊德的思想,解释了为什么自我欺骗在自我服务偏向、社会称许性、进化等行为中起重要作用。自我欺骗作为一种个体普遍经验到的心理现象,其可能是自我服务偏向的本质所在。文章最后分析了心理学界开展自我欺骗研究的意义和未来研究的方向。     

无意识的意识本性

就精神分析的无意识而言,无意识实际上是由意识创建而来的。不是无意识派生了意识,而是意识派生了无意识。无意识是意识的一种变体,它恰恰体现了意识的塑造能力和它自身的可塑性。弗洛伊德在《意识与什么是无意识》中对意识和无意识的关系问题做了集中的论述。该文借助对这篇论文的全面解析进行阐述。     

康德关于纯粹实践理性方法论的思想

文章立足于分析康德对“客观的德性法则如何在主观上也成为实践的”这一问题的回答,梳理了康德的纯粹实践理性的方法论思想,提出了两个步骤的理论：判断力的练习与自由的意识;并分析了方法论与实践理性批判的分析论在方法上的统一。康德认为这一方法论思想对道德生活与道德培育具有重要的意义,尤其是自由的意识以及对自己的敬重是道德教育的立足点,因为它们也是人在内心防止心灵的腐败与堕落的惟一守卫者。     

Some differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s conceptions of transcendental philosophy

This article compares the differences between Kant’s and Husserl’s conceptions of the “transcendental.” It argues that, for Kant, the term “transcendental” stands for what is otherwise called “metaphysical,” i.e. non-empirical knowledge. As opposed to his predecessors, who had believed that such non-empirical knowledge was possible for meta-physical, i.e. transcendent objects, Kant’s contribution was to show how there can be non-empirical (a priori) knowledge not about transcendent objects, but about the necessary conditions for the experience of natural, non-transcendent objects. Hence the transcendental for Kant ends up connoting a philosophy that claims to show how subjective forms of intuition and thinking have objective validity for all objects as appearances. By contrast, Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy takes a different set of problems for its starting point. His quest is to avoid the uncertainty of empirical knowledge about all kinds of objects that present themselves to us as something other than, something transcendent to, consciousness. Transcendental or reliable knowledge is made possible through the phenomenological reduction that focuses strictly on consciousness as immediately self-given to itself—reflection upon “pure” consciousness. The contents of such consciousness are not the same for everyone and at every time, so they are not necessary and invariant in the way that Kant’s pure forms of subjectivity are. Since Husserl however also claims that the all objects, as intentional objects, are constituted in and for consciousness, an investigation into the structures of pure subjectivity can also be called “transcendental” in a further sense of showing the genesis of our knowledge of objects that are transcendent to consciousness. Moreover, since Husserl’s philosophical interest is precisely upon the structures of that consciousness, he also concentrates on necessary conditions for the constitution of these objects in his philosophical work. Hence, there ends up being a great deal of overlap between his own transcendental project and Kant’s in spite of the differences in what each of them means by the term “transcendental.”

Defining Death for Persons and Human Organisms

This paper discusses how alternative concepts of personhood affect the definition of death. I argue that parties in the debate over the definition of death have employed different concepts of personhood, and thus have been talking past each other by proposing definitions of death for different kinds of things. In particular, I show how critics of the consciousness-related, neurological formation of death have relied on concepts of personhood that would be rejected by proponents of that formulation. These critics rest on treating persons as qualitative specifications of human organisms (Bernat, Culver, and Gert) or as identical to human organisms (Capron, Seifert, and Shewmon). Since advocates of the consciousness-related, neurological formulation of death are not committed to either of these views of personhood, these critics commit the fallacy of attacking a straw man. I then clarify the substantive concept of personhood (Boethius, Strawson, and Wiggins) that may be invoked in the consciousness-related, neurological formulation of death, and argue that, on this view and contra Bernat, Culver, and Gert, persons have always been the kind of thing that can literally die. I conclude by suggesting that the discussion of defining death needs to focus on which approach to personhood makes the most sense metaphysically and morally.     

Intraminority solidarity: The role of critical consciousness

A central question in the growing field of intraminority relations is how best to promote solidarity among marginalized groups. The current article reviews existing social psychological theories of intraminority relations, with a focus on barriers to, and facilitators of, intraminority solidarity. In particular, we explore the roles of competition and identity threats in eroding solidarity, and examine how similarity perceptions, a common identity of stigma, and structural and historical attributions generate solidarity. We then suggest that critical consciousness, a theory of sociopolitical development prominent in the developmental and community psychology literatures, can integrate disparate findings and extend our understanding of solidarity among marginalized groups. Borrowing from the critical consciousness literature, we outline new theoretical predictions for fostering intraminority solidarity. This exploration furthers existing theoretical work on intraminority solidarity and intergroup relations more broadly.     

The glow of Telesphoros: a brief enquiry into the sense of the term ‘mana personality’ and the dynamic of experiences behind it

In this article, I begin by outlining the qualities and attributes associated with experiences of mana, focusing particularly on the way the term ‘mana’ was used by C.G. Jung in his published work. I note that Jung associated mana with the accumulation and transfer of psychic energy (libido), with the appearance and appropriation of elemental fire, and by extension, with the metamorphic experience of constellating consciousness. In this context, informed by Jung’s accounts and modes of expression, the term mana personality becomes a provisional designation for a recurrent dynamic of archetypal experiential configurations whose telos appears to be the reorientation of consciousness to its origin.