Memory and mineness in personal identity

Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols (2012) describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols’ characterization of R.B.’s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise.     

Determinants of pro‐environmental consumption intention in rural China: The role of traditional cultures,personal attitudes and reference groups

This study aimed to identify social‐psychological predictors of pro‐environmental consumption intention in rural China. To this end, a proposed conceptual model was tested by analyzing the survey data derived from 972 rural respondents in Jiangxi province in south‐eastern China. Results showed that the endorsement of traditional cultures (man–nature orientation and collectivism) was linked with pro‐environmental consumption behaviuor, but was mediated by intentions. Personal attitudes (environmental cognition and environmental affect) and reference groups influenced both intention and behaviour. The results also provided good evidence of the intention–behaviour relationship. These findings provided a better understanding of the process in which Chinese rural residents developed their pro‐environmental consumption behaviours.     

Ease‐of‐retrieval effects on procedural justice judgements under conditions of informational and personal uncertainty

This study tests whether individuals' reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval processes when forming procedural justice judgements are moderated by informational and personal uncertainty. In Studies 1 and 2 we examined the predicted effects of informational uncertainty. Results indicated that participants in information‐uncertain conditions relied on ease‐of‐retrieval, whereas those in information‐certain conditions relied on content information to make procedural justice judgements. In Study 3 we examined the combined effects of informational uncertainty and personal uncertainty on reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval when forming procedural justice judgements. The findings of Study 3 indicated that personal uncertain participants who were in informational certain conditions based their procedural justice judgements on content information, whereas all other participants based their procedural justice judgements on ease‐of‐retrieval. This is the first paper to demonstrate that the joint effect of informational uncertainty and personal uncertainty on reliance on ease‐of‐retrieval is different from the two uncertainties acting alone.     

Dissociative identity disorder and ambivalence

While many theorists have argued that dissociative identity disorder (DID) is a case of multiple selves or persons in a single body, I maintain that DID instead should be understood as involving a single self who suffers from significant disruptions to self-consciousness. Evidence of overlapping abilities and memories, as well as the very logic of dissociation, supports the claim that DID results from internal conflict endured by a single self. Along these lines, I will maintain that alter-formation should be understood as the result of extreme emotional ambivalence. While it is true that subjects with DID exhibit volitional conflict, as Frankfurt [1988. The Importance of What We Care About. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1999. Necessity, Volition, and Love. New York: Cambridge University Press] maintains, I argue that these incompatible volitions have a deeper source: conflicting desires and affective stances concerning basic emotional needs that are not easily abandoned. A single subject turns to different alter-personalities as a way to cope with pervasive inner conflict while at the same time hiding contradictory impulses from herself.     

人格智力:一种被“冷落”的“热智力”

人格智力(PI)是指个体在对人格及其相关信息推理的基础上,利用这些信息提高一个人的思想、计划和生活经验的能力,包括识别人格信息、形成人格模型、引导个人选择以及系统化计划和目标等相关领域。作为一种新兴的“热智力”,PI并没有像当年情绪智力(EI)那样受人关注。文章从PI的范畴、领域及其局限性等角度分析了这一新能力遭遇“冷落”的原因,指出了PI在整合以人为中心的智力过程中存在概念宽泛、界限模糊、测量的科学性及其形成与发展等诸多值得反思的问题。     

Clinical implications of The Red Book

This presentation stresses the uniqueness of both the therapist's and patient's personal experience in clinical work and relates this to the significance of The Red Book as Jung's personal odyssey and for me personally as an analyst. I consider The Red Book's enduring relevance alongside recent psychological theories, neuroscience and early mystical writings, and conclude with a clinical vignette of a patient's response to a piece of choral music and subsequent use of active imagination.     

Shame and Guilt—Do They Really Differ in Their Focus of Evaluation? Wanting to Change the Self and Behavior in Response to Ingroup Immorality

Shame and guilt are often theorized to differ on a self versus behavior focus. However, we propose that this is not true when taking a group perspective. In our field study, 196 communal participants were confronted with historical ingroup immorality. Results showed that participants who were old enough to have understood what happened in that time-period felt more guilt and shame than did those who were too young. Partly due to their ingroup anger, shame motivated an intention to change the ingroup self and behavior. In contrast, partly due to personal anger, guilt motivated an intention to change personal self and behavior. This suggests that the distinction between shame and guilt are not as clear-cut as previous research have assumed.     

Hylemorphism,remnant persons and personhood

Animalism is the doctrine that we human beings are – are identical with – animals. Hylemorphism is a form of animalism. In this paper, I defend hylemorphism by showing that while other forms of animalism fall prey to the problem of ‘Remnant Persons,’ hylemorphism does not. But hylemorphism's account of personhood seems to have some very implausible implications. I address one of those implications, and argue that it isn't nearly as objectionable as it might at first appear.     

Will it be me? Identity,concern and perspective

Self-reflexive or egocentric concern has been taken to present a serious problem for reductionist and eliminativist metaphysical accounts of personal identity. Philosophers have tended to respond in one of three ways: by continuing the search for a metaphysical account of identity that (prudentially if not morally) justifies egocentric concern; by accepting that egocentric concern can hold between persons who are not numerically identical; or by advocating the abandonment of egocentric concern altogether. All these approaches, however, distinguish between metaphysical ‘facts’ and affective responses to them. Exploring a well-known example from Bernard Williams, I argue that egocentric concern presents itself as irreducibly first-personal and as making its own set of numerical personal identity claims on the phenomenal level. Williams' example also points to the need to complicate the first/third person schema by factoring in a further distinction between present-tense and implicitly atemporal perspectives on the self. Once this move is made, we can see that the identity claims figured in first-person present-tense experience and those arrived at through metaphysical deliberation need to be distinguished. We should resist the temptation to privilege one perspective over the other in all instances, or to collapse them into a unitary account of selfhood.