The Morality System with and without God

What I set out to do is to cast some doubt on the thesis that, in Bernard Williams's words, any appeal to God in morality either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and (sometimes) for the agent costly obligations, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not sit easily with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project which is neutral towards theism and atheism fails in giving a satisfying account of such obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory might succeed where non- and atheistic accounts seem to founder.     

The acquisition of complex predicates in japanese specifically language-impaired and normally developing children

Japanese exhibits two different types of morphological processes. Some morphologically complex predicates are generated within the domain of the lexicon, whereas others are generated outside the domain of the lexicon. An elicited production task involving both types of complex predicates was administered to six Japanese children with specific language impairment (JSLI) and six children with normal language development (JNLD). The JSLI children experienced significant difficulty forming the lexicon-external complex predicates but much less difficulty with the lexicon-internal complex predicates while the performance of the JNLD children exhibited no such asymmetry. These preliminary results suggest that the deficit of SLI affects the ability to construct implicit procedural rules for morphology that are generated outside the lexicon while their lexical operations for morphology that are generated within the domain of the lexicon remain relatively unimpaired.     

Morally Relevant Features

This article summarizes the account of morality presented in Morality: Its Nature and Justification (Oxford, 1998), with emphasis on that aspect of morality that deals with justifying violations of the moral rules. Such justification requires a two-step procedure; the first is describing the situation using only morally relevant features. I list these features, noting how diverse they are, and describe their characteristics. The second step is estimating the consequences of publicly allowing a violation with the same morally relevant features, that is, allowing a violation when everyone knows that it is allowed to violate the rule in the same circumstances, and comparing this to the estimated consequences of not publicly allowing that kind of violation. I then explain why fully informed, impartial rational persons can sometimes disagree about whether a violation should be publicly allowed and note that such weakly justified violations are the controversial cases.     

Toward a New Concept of Global Morality

The human community faces today the most serious challenges ever to have confronted the planet in the areas of health, environment, and security. Science and technology are essential for responding to these challenges. More is needed, however, because science is not equipped to deal adequately with the values dimensions and the political issues that accompany the challenges. For an adequate response, there must be cooperative effort by scientists and statespersons, informed for moral leadership by the religious wisdom that is available. The religious communities can provide this spiritual dimension, thereby fulfilling their traditional role, but it will require their coming to terms with the character of the scientific and technological base of contemporary culture. The paper lays the conceptual groundwork for understanding these issues.     

The relevance of attachment theory to a contemporary Jungian view of the internal world: internal working models, implicit memory and internal objects

In this paper I examine the various meanings of the term 'internal object' and the differences between various theoretical models for the formation of internal objects. I suggest that the idea in attachment theory of 'internal working models' emphasizes the internal world as one consisting of unconscious internalized patterns of emotional relationships. The term 'internal object' lacks this clarity and the different meanings it carries within differing theoretical frameworks are a source of confusion. I describe the role implicit memory plays in the formation of 'internal working model's and suggest that these offer us an alternative explanation for unconscious fantasy and for object relationships to that of instinctual drives. This model is then brought to bear on contemporary Jungian concepts of the internal world, with a suggestion that, seen in this light, Jung's formulation of the concept of the complex has many features in common with the 'internal working model' of attachment theory.     

An Ecological View of School Counselor Ratios and Student Academic Outcomes: A National Investigation

The effect of student‐to‐school‐counselor ratios on academic outcomes has been widely studied, yet few researchers have taken a multilevel approach. Using the nationally representative High School Longitudinal Study: 2009 dataset, the authors found ratios were significantly associated with student grade point average (GPA) and graduation. Attending a Title I school also was associated with students’ GPA, advanced placement/international baccalaureate credits earned, and postsecondary course taking. The authors discuss implications for advocacy and practice, contextualizing their findings within an ecological framework.     

The end of analysis for the analyst (Translated by Ann Kutek)

This paper is an account of an analyst's personal exploration to make conceptual sense of the delicate closing stages of an analysis. Jung's theory of complexes provides a model of the functioning of the analytic relationship as an integral whole which itself is the locus of the process that brings an analysis to completion. Clinical vignettes are used to illustrate this.     

What Is Legal Philosophy?

This article delineates some of the main issues that are debated by philosophers of law. It explores the connections between legal philosophy and other areas of philosophy, while also seeking to specify the distinctiveness of many of the concerns that have preoccupied philosophers of law. It illustrates its abstract points with examples focused on the separability of law and morality, the nature of the rule of law, the nature of rights, justifications for the imposition of punishment, and the identification of basic legal entitlements.     

“Loving Nature” Nature’s Way: Exploring Radical Participation With Nature Through the Metaphor of Complex,Dynamic Self-Systems

The Western metaphor of self-as-identity—as a static, inherently exclusive entity—has been instrumental, historically, to our radical separation from nature, and still hampers a reviving of genuine participation with nature. Suggesting an alternative to this metaphor (informed by literacy as technology), I explore the more nature-informed metaphor of dynamic, complex self-systems, involving both natural and human subsystems. Through this latter metaphor, I re-vision radical participation with nature: in the process of perception, in epistemology/ontology, and in the ways of indigenous, oral cultures. This systems metaphor also sheds contrasting light on literacy-informed, Western ways.     

TRUST: ON THE REAL BUT ALMOST ALWAYS UNNOTICED,EVER‐CHANGING FOUNDATION OF ETHICAL LIFE

Abstract: Following the lead of Annette Baier, this essay argues that trust relations provide the ethical substance of everyday living. When A trusts B, A unreflectively allows B to approach sufficiently close so as to be able to harm A. In order for this to be possible, A practically presupposes that B perceives A as a person and will hence act accordingly. Trust relations are relations of mutual recognition in which we acknowledge our mutual standing and vulnerability with respect to one another. A robust account of trust assumes: first, trust relations are primary and practical, and while monitored by reason, they are not rationally constituted; second, trust can sustain its practical primacy over moral reason because it is developmentally prior to reason; and third, trust relations can be the bearers of our worth and vulnerability because they are the developmental products of first love.