Group cycling safety behaviours: A systematic review

BackgroundThe popularity of cycling in a group is longstanding and increasing. Compared to riding as an individual, many cyclists feel safer when riding in a group as they have better personal security, potential support in case of mishaps, safer wayfinding and are more visible to other road users. However, further to the safety challenges shared with individual cyclists, group cyclist safety is impacted by rider proximity, the larger space taken up on roadways, potentially higher speeds, and social norms that could increase risky behaviours. Despite these unique safety considerations, the practice of cycling in groups has received little academic attention and group cyclist safety behaviours have not been analysed by road safety researchers.ObjectiveTo identify, describe, categorise and conceptualise within a teamwork framework, safety related behaviours of groups of cyclists as mentioned in academic literature.MethodsThree academic databases (Google Scholar, Proquest, and Scopus) were searched for peer reviewed literature that mentioned safe or risky behaviours of groups of cyclists. A total of 32 papers met the inclusion criteria. Relevant group cyclist behaviours were described and categorised using a conceptual teamwork framework.ResultsGroup cyclists’ safety behaviours are governed by a comprehensive but informal and adaptable set of rules. These rules are safety critical and are often strictly controlled within groups. Many groups of cyclists may ride in a safer manner than individual cyclists due to teamwork factors, particularly shared mental models, team orientation, and adaptability.ConclusionGroup cyclists take safety seriously. Teamwork factors may make behavioural interventions to decrease risky behaviours easier to implement with group cyclists compared to individual cyclists. Investigation of group cycling safety behaviours may inform safe system interventions to increase road safety.     

Normative indications for Xhosa speaking unskilled workers on the Rey–Osterrieth Complex Figure Test

The aim of this study was to establish normative indications for the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure (RCF) copy, incidental recall and delayed recall tasks, administered in English on a non-clinical population of Xhosa, unskilled workers (N?=?33) (females n?=?21; males n?=?12), with a background of relatively disadvantaged quality of education up to Grades 11 and 12. The sample was stratified into two age groupings (18 – 29 years, n?=?17; 30 – 40 years, n?=?16), equally distributed for sex and level of education. Within group statistical analyses compared subgroup test performances for sex and age within the total sample. Between group analyses were used to compare the performance of the present sample with age equivalent data derived from a meta-analysis of US normative data on the RCF task. There was an age effect in favour of the younger group for both the immediate and delayed recall tasks. The local data for all RCF tasks were significantly lower than the US normative data, with the indication that higher levels and/or quality of formal school education might advantage performance on this complex visuoperceptual copy and recall task.     

A Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts and The Problem of a Regress of Norms

ABSTRACT

According to the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the application of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the norms governing its application. But this view faces some serious objections. In particular, according to Rosen, Glüer and Wikforss, this view leads to a vicious regress of norms. The purpose of this paper is to defend a version of the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against this objection. I argue that we can deal with this problem along the lines of a coherentist account of justification.     

Normative Influences on Secondary Disturbance: The Role of Social Expectancies

A “new wave” within psychotherapy has introduced the concept of acceptance into people's emotional repertoires. Accepting unpleasant emotional states has been demonstrated as an important pathway towards reducing secondary disturbances and improving emotional and psychological functioning. What is often overlooked, however, is whether this move towards acceptance is reinforced within the social and cultural contexts in which people experience their emotional states. Our research has begun to explore the contribution that normative influences make to secondary disturbance, specifically the perception that feeling happy is a desired state, and that experiencing and expressing negative emotions is undesirable and unacceptable to others. We review evidence here that these perceived “social expectancies” are associated with increased negative emotionality and depression, and reduce well‐being. Furthermore, we highlight that the effects of social expectancies are more apparent in Australia than Japan, consistent with the view that a higher premium is placed on happiness within Australia. We also review experimental evidence that social messages that reinforce these social expectancies serve to increase secondary disturbances. The implications of taking a social perspective on emotion regulation and dysfunction, and specifically implications for promoting happiness and acceptance in the field, are discussed.     

Deontic and epistemic reasoning in children revisited: Comment on Dack and Astington

Dack and Astington (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 110 2011 94–114) attempted to replicate the deontic reasoning advantage among preschoolers reported by Cummins (Memory & Cognition 24 1996 823–829) and by Harris and Nuñez (Child Development. 67 1996 572–1591). Dack and Astington argued that the apparent deontic advantage reported by these studies was in fact an artifact due to a methodological confound, namely, inclusion of an authority in the deontic condition only. Removing this confound attenuated the effect in young children but had no effect on the reasoning of 7-year-olds and adults. Thus, removing reference to authority “explains away” young children’s apparent precocity at this type of reasoning. But this explanation rests on (a) a misunderstanding of norms as targets of deontic reasoning and (b) conclusions based on a sample size that was too small to detect the effect in young children.     

The effects of smoking norms and attitudes on quitting intentions in Malaysia,Thailand and four Western nations: A cross-cultural comparison

This research investigated the influence of smoking attitudes and norms on quitting intentions in two predominantly collectivistic countries (Malaysia and Thailand) and four predominantly individualistic Western countries (Canada, USA, UK and Australia). Data from the International Tobacco Control Project (N = 13,062) revealed that higher odds of intending to quit were associated with negative personal attitudes in Thailand and the Western countries, but not in Malaysia; with norms against smoking from significant others in Malaysia and the Western countries, but not in Thailand; and with societal norms against smoking in all countries. Our findings indicate that normative factors are important determinants of intentions, but they play a different role in different cultural and/or tobacco control contexts. Interventions may be more effective if they are designed with these different patterns of social influence in mind.     

Attitudinal and normative processes in health behavior

Abstract

Given the importance of the distinction between attitudes and subjective norms for a variety of theories and interventions in social cognition and in the psychology of health, the present article presents a review of the relevant literature. Criticisms raised against the distinction include conceptual arguments, large correlations between attitudes and subjective norms, crossover effects, and methodological issues. Points in favor of the distinction include discriminant validity data, individual differences in the weights placed on attitudes and subjective norms, experimental manipulations of attitudes and subjective norms, and cognitive clustering of the beliefs presumed to underlie attitudes and subjective norms. Finally, implications of the distinction for recent research on interventions, social identity theory, and the self are considered.