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91.
ERNEST SOSA 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(2):203-213
Abstract: Susana Nuccetelli discusses critically my account of Moore's Proof of the External World. Noah Lemos takes up my views on skepticism and my distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Otávio Bueno focuses on my treatment of dream skepticism. In this article I offer replies to my three critics. 相似文献
92.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):107-109
This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium. 相似文献
93.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):137-147
Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views
on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith
focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and
how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
相似文献
Ernest SosaEmail: |
94.
Matthew William McKeon 《Synthese》2009,167(1):163-182
An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional
account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism
of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical
and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional
accounts fail to reflect that the former knowledge is basic, i.e., independent of knowledge derived from other sciences. Appealing
to Russell’s pre-Principia logic, I defend conditional accounts against this criticism by sketching a rationale for thinking
that there are infinitely many logical objects. 相似文献
95.
REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM 下载免费PDF全文
Timothy D. Hackenberg 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2009,91(3):391-402
An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science. 相似文献
96.
97.
98.
Jan Woleński 《Studia Logica》2007,86(3):479-497
This paper proposes a formal framework for the cognitive relation understood as an ordered pair with the cognitive subject
and object of cognition as its members. The cognitive subject is represented as consisting of a language, conequence relation
and a stock of accepted theories, and the object as a model of those theories. This language allows a simple formulation of
the realism/anti-realism controversy. In particular, Tarski’s undefinability theorem gives a philosophical argument for realism
in epistemology.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson 相似文献
99.
John Greco 《Synthese》2007,158(3):299-302
I take issue with two claims that Duncan Pritchard makes in his recent book, Epistemic Luck. The first concerns his safety-based response to the lottery problem; the second his account of the relationship between
safety and intellectual virtue. 相似文献
100.
Guy Axtell 《Synthese》2007,158(3):363-383
This essay extends my side of a discussion begun earlier with Duncan Pritchard, the recent author of Epistemic Luck.Pritchard’s work contributes significantly to improving the “diagnostic appeal” of a neo-Moorean philosophical response to
radical scepticism. While agreeing with Pritchard in many respects, the paper questions the need for his concession to the
sceptic that the neo-Moorean is capable at best of recovering “‘brute’ externalist knowledge”. The paper discusses and directly
responds to a dilemma that Pritchard poses for virtue epistemologies (VE). It also takes issue with Pritchard’s “merely safety-based”
alternative. Ultimately, however, the criticisms made here of Pritchard’s dilemma and its underlying contrast of “anti-luck”
and “virtue” epistemologies are intended to help realize his own aspirations for a better diagnosis of radical scepticism
to inform a still better neo-Moorean response. 相似文献