What kind of discipline is psychoanalysis?

Current controversies involving clinical, conceptual and empirical research shed light on how psychoanalysis confronts its nature and its future. Some relevant debates in which Wallerstein, Green, Hoffman, Eagle and Wolitzky, Safran, Stern, Blass and Carmeli, and Panksepp have participated are examined regarding the characteristics of their argumentation. Agreements and disagreements are explored to find ways that could have allowed the discussion to progress. Two foci are highlighted in these debates: (a) whether a clinical common ground exists in psychoanalysis and what kind of procedure could contribute to further clarification; (b) complementation of in‐clinical and extra‐clinical evidence. Both aspects are scrutinized: the possibility of complementing diverse methodologies, and the nature of the shared clinical evidence examined in clinical discussion groups such as those promoted by the IPA Clinical Observation Committee. The importance of triangulation and consilience is brought to bear regarding their contribution to the robustness of psychoanalysis. So as to strengthen a critical perspective that enhances the discipline's argumentative field, psychoanalysis should take into account arguments from different sources according to their specific merits. By doing this, psychoanalysis increases its relevance within the current interdisciplinary dialogue.     

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).