The influence of intentional and incidental learning on acquiring spatial knowledge during navigation

In order to study the influence of intentional and incidental learning conditions on route learning, young adults walked a route through a university building. Half of the participants focused their attention on the route (intentional learning condition), while the other half did not (incidental learning condition). Five tests of spatial knowledge were employed: a route-length-estimation, landmark recognition, landmark ordering, map-drawing and navigation task. The intentional group performed better than the incidental group on the map-drawing and navigation task. No difference between the intentional and incidental group was found on the landmark-recognition and landmark-ordering task. Moreover, the intentional group overestimated the walking distance, while the incidental group underestimated it. These results suggest that route knowledge (landmark recognition and landmark ordering) requires less effortful processing than survey knowledge (developing a map-like representation and actual navigation).     

Consciousness of the self (COS) and explicit knowledge

Starting with distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge and the traditional philosophical distinction between COS (the consciousness of self) as an object and COS as a subject, we suggest a triple classification of COS experience into three modes, each corresponding to a different state of consciousness. When one acts automatically COS is totally embedded within the representation of the environment. When one monitors or attends to one's experience, the self is implied by an explicit representation of one's attitudes, consistent with Descartes' cogito insight 'I think therefore I am' (1641,1984). However, a reflexive thought, e.g., 'I know fact x,' requires an explicit representation of the self. This analysis highlights the existence of an intermediate mode of COS as a subject and suggests its possible connection to monitoring one's behavior.     

What counts as knowing? The development of conceptual and procedural knowledge of counting from kindergarten through Grade 2

The development of conceptual and procedural knowledge about counting was explored for children in kindergarten, Grade 1, and Grade 2 (N = 255). Conceptual knowledge was assessed by asking children to make judgments about three types of counts modeled by an animated frog: standard (correct) left-to-right counts, incorrect counts, and unusual counts. On incorrect counts, the frog violated the word-object correspondence principle. On unusual counts, the frog violated a conventional but inessential feature of counting, for example, starting in the middle of the array of objects. Procedural knowledge was assessed using speed and accuracy in counting objects. The patterns of change for procedural knowledge and conceptual knowledge were different. Counting speed and accuracy (procedural knowledge) improved with grade. In contrast, there was a curvilinear relation between conceptual knowledge and grade that was further moderated by children's numeration skills (as measured by a standardized test); the most skilled children gradually increased their acceptance of unusual counts over grade, whereas the least skilled children decreased their acceptance of these counts. These results have implications for studying conceptual and procedural knowledge about mathematics.     

Women's knowledge of prenatal ultrasound and informed choice

This study evaluated women's understanding of prenatal ultrasound in terms of meeting the requirements for informed choice. A cross-sectional survey was conducted to evaluate (1) how information is provided, (2) women's perceived value of the information received and, (3) their understanding of ultrasound in relation to the principles of informed choice. Women (n = 113) completed a questionnaire prior to their 18-week ultrasound. Fifty-five percent stated they received no information from their care provider. Only 31.9% considered health care providers as a very helpful source of information. Yet, 69.0% stated their care provider gave them information that facilitated their understanding. Gaps were identified in women's understanding of ultrasound. Specifically, 46.0% did not view ultrasound as a screen for anomalies; some were uncertain about the safety (18.6%), diagnostic capabilities (26.5%), and limitations of testing (37.2%). These results suggest that women's understanding of ultrasound does not meet the requirements of informed choice.     

Preschool teachers' pedagogical content knowledge predicts willingness to scaffold early science learning

Background

The importance of diagnostic and scaffolding activities for early science learning has been shown consistently. However, preschool teachers scarcely engage in them. We developed an instrument to assess preschool teachers' willingness to engage in diagnostic and scaffolding activities in science learning situations and examined its relation with teachers' knowledge, beliefs and practice.

Aims

We validate an instrument to assess willingness to engage in scaffolding and diagnostic activities and study the interplay between willingness, learning beliefs, content knowledge (CK) and pedagogical content knowledge (PCK) in the context of science learning, particularly block play.

Sample(s)

A total of N = 151 preschool teachers from 41 kindergartens in Germany participated in our study.

Methods

Preschool teachers completed a questionnaire, which took approximately 1 hour of time. We drew a subsample of N = 73 teachers and observed their practice during a 30 min block play episode.

Results

With our instrument, we were able to distinguish between preschool teachers' willingness to diagnose and to scaffold. Preschool teachers' co-constructivist beliefs and PCK predicted willingness to engage in diagnosing, PCK also predicted willingness to engage in scaffolding. Associations between learning beliefs and practice were inconsistent.

Conclusions

Our study highlights aspects of the association between preschool teachers' PCK and their willingness to engage in diagnosing and scaffolding. However, we found inconsistencies between preschool teachers' beliefs and practice, which call for further clarification.     

Empirical indistinguishability: From the knowledge structure to the skills

Recent literature has pointed out that the basic local independence model (BLIM) when applied to some specific instances of knowledge structures presents identifiability issues. Furthermore, it has been shown that for such instances the model presents a stronger form of unidentifiability named empirical indistinguishability, which leads to the fact that the existence of certain knowledge states in such structures cannot be empirically tested. In this article the notion of indistinguishability is extended to skill maps and, more generally, to the competence-based knowledge space theory. Theoretical results are provided showing that skill maps can be empirically indistinguishable from one another. The most relevant consequence of this is that for some skills there is no empirical evidence to establish their existence. This result is strictly related to the type of probabilistic model investigated, which is essentially the BLIM. Alternative models may exist or can be developed in knowledge space theory for which this indistinguishability problem disappears.     

Memory belief is weak

Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds.