Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis

Abstract

In this paper I explore Plato’s reasons for his rejection of the so‐called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistēmē) is non‐propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, I argue that Plato held that belief (doxa) is only possible for the sort of being capable of knowledge. This is because self‐reflexivity is necessary for infallible knowledge and self‐reflexivity is only possible if the intellect is immaterial. This capacity for self‐reflexivity is also essential for belief, since beliefs are, paradigmatically, not dispositions but self‐reflexive mental states.     

A temporally sustained implicit theory of mind deficit in autism spectrum disorders

Eye movements during false-belief tasks can reveal an individual’s capacity to implicitly monitor others’ mental states (theory of mind – ToM). It has been suggested, based on the results of a single-trial-experiment, that this ability is impaired in those with a high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (ASD), despite neurotypical-like performance on explicit ToM measures. However, given there are known attention differences and visual hypersensitivities in ASD it is important to establish whether such impairments are evident over time. In addition, investigating implicit ToM using a repeated trial approach allows an assessment of whether learning processes can reduce the ASD impairment in this ability, as is the case with explicit ToM. Here we investigated the temporal profile of implicit ToM in individuals with ASD and a control group. Despite similar performance on explicit ToM measures, ASD-diagnosed individuals showed no evidence of implicit false-belief tracking even over a one-hour period and many trials, whereas control participants did. These findings demonstrate that the systems involved in implicit and explicit ToM are distinct and hint that impaired implicit false-belief tracking may play an important role in ASD. Further, they indicate that learning processes do not alleviate this impairment across the presentation of multiple trials.     

Knowledge of Memory Aging Across the Lifespan

ABSTRACT. The authors examined knowledge of normal and pathological memory aging in a lifespan sample of 198 individuals who ranged in age from 13 to 88 years. Participants completed the Knowledge of Memory Aging Questionnaire (Cherry, Brigman, Hawley, & Reese, 2003). The authors hypothesized that high school students would be less knowledgeable about memory aging issues than college students, middle-aged, and community-dwelling older adults. Consistent with this hypothesis, response accuracy was lower for high school students compared to their older counterparts. Follow-up analyses revealed that high school students’ responses to a subset of questions that tap ageist views of adult cognition were less accurate than the other age groups, implying a response bias toward stereotypical images of memory aging. Implications for research and the design of instructional materials to increase people's knowledge about normative changes in adult cognition are discussed.     

Low-Income Preschoolers' False-Belief Performance

A group of 72 preschoolers (36 African Americans, 36 European Americans) enrolled in Head Start programs and other preschools serving low-income children were asked 3 variations of false-belief questions across 3 scenarios and given a language and cognition subtest. Children's performance varied across the questions and tasks, but after covarying for children's language and cognitive scores, those effects were no longer found to be significant. Age effects were still significant even after differences in children's language and cognitive abilities had been accounted for. Although no language and cognitive differences were found among European Americans and African Americans, the European Americans still outperformed African Americans on 1 of the task scenarios. Those results demonstrate (a) the importance of considering testing procedures and language and cognitive abilities when assessing children's social cognitive skills and (b) that age-related changes in false-belief understanding are associated with social cognitive conceptual changes that are independent of language and cognitive skills.     

The Construction of Symmetry in Children and Adults

The development of the concept of symmetry is important to an overall understanding of cognitive development in children and to spatial cognition in particular. Age differences in the construction of the 3 types of symmetry (bilateral, translational, and radial) were investigated in children and adults engaged in block construction. Children 2–4.5 years old produced bilateral symmetry in low frequencies independent of their precise vertical alignment of blocks. Children 4–12 years old and adults produced all 3 types of symmetry. The hypothesis predicting the sequence and frequency of the 3 types of symmetry based on an analysis of spatial complexity was partially supported. Bilateral symmetry was produced at significantly higher frequencies than the other 2 types across all age groups. Children 5–12 years old produced adult levels of bilateral symmetry while children 9–12 years old reached adult levels of construction of translational and radial symmetry.     

Observational Learning and the Role of Confinement in Pigeons: Suppression of Learning as a Function of Observing the Performance of a Conspecific

Observational learning of a successive discrimination problem by pigeons was studied using conspecifics as models responding for either contingent or noncontingent reinforcement. We found that observation of these models was associated with poorer performance on subsequent testing than was shown by a control group that learned without first observing conspecifics' performance. No significant difference was found between subjects without observational experience and another control group that was confined in the observation apparatus and observed an empty chamber only.     

The Intelligence of White Foreign Born Criminals

Children's understanding of cognition increases greatly between early childhood and adolescence. This increase provides a developmental bridge between young children's understanding of mental states to adolescents' and adults' epistemological reflection. The author presents a framework for describing developmental changes in children's understanding of cognitive activities. He distinguishes 4 aspects of children's understanding of cognition: (a) knowledge of mental states, (b) knowledge of occurrence of particular activities, (c) knowledge of organization of cognitive activities, and (d) epistemological thought. He discusses phenomenological awareness of cognitive activities and social experience as influences on children's concepts of cognition.     

Development of the deontic advantage in reasoning: Reply to Cummins

In response to Cummins’s report that comments on our article (Dack & Astington, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 2011, Vol. 110, pp. 94–114), this article clarifies our perspective on what constitutes the deontic advantage, and notes similarities and differences between Cummins’s perspective and our own. Like Cummins, we believe that young children are capable of deontic reasoning and that methodological factors alone cannot explain this ability. However, we maintain that it is important to be precise about methodology in order to facilitate investigation of how the deontic advantage changes over developmental time, and this question is our main interest, although as yet incompletely answered. Contrary to Cummins, we do not think that existing data can speak to the issue of the potential innateness of deontic reasoning. We also disagree with Cummins’s perspective on norm versus normative proposition and with some of her comparisons between deontic and epistemic phenomena.     

The Influence of Confirmation Bias on Memory and Source Monitoring

Two experiments were conducted to examine whether recognition memory for information and/or its source are influenced by confirmation bias. During Phase 1, subjects were shown a summary about the issue of gun control and asked to indicate a position on the issue. During Phase 2, 12 abstracts (Experiment 1) or social media posts (Experiment 2) were shown, one at a time. Posts in Experiment 2 were associated with either friends or strangers. Participants indicated whether they wanted to read a more extensive version of each abstract (Experiment 1) or post (Experiment 2). Phase 3 was the memory phase. Thirty-two abstract titles (Experiment 1) or posts (Experiment 2) were shown one at a time. Participants indicated yes or no, and whether they recognized the titles/posts from the last phase. Recognition memory for information that supported the participants' viewpoint was higher than that for opposing information.