Creative Imagination is Stable Across Technological Media: The Spore Creature Creator Versus Pencil and Paper

T. B. Ward (1994) investigated creativity by asking participants to draw alien creatures that they imagined to be from a planet very different from Earth. He found that participant drawings reliably contained features typical of common Earth animals. As a consequence, Ward concluded that creativity is structured. The present investigation predicts that this limitation on creativity is not restricted to drawings: the use of different technology will not change creative output. To investigate this question, participants performed Ward's task twice: once using pencil and paper and once using software made to design creatures (the Spore Creature Creator). Only minor significant differences were found. This preliminarily suggests that changing tools does not affect the overall rigidity of the creative process. This lends further support to Ward's thesis on the structural rigidity of creativity. We conclude by suggesting an elaboration to Ward's thesis that will be explored in future work. We suggest that aesthetics might be one of the factors that contribute to creative constraint, in that creatures that are too unusual would be less interesting.     

You are Such a Bad Child! Appraisals as Mechanisms of Parental Negative and Positive Affect

Although parent cognitions are considered important predictors that determine specific emotional reactions and parental practices, models on the cognitive strategies for regulating parental distress or positive emotions are not well developed. Our aim was to investigate the nature of cognitions involved in parental distress and satisfaction, in terms of their specificity (parental or general) and their processing levels (inferential or evaluative cognitions). We hypothesized that parent's specific evaluative cognitions will mediate the impact of more general and inferential cognitive structures on their affective reactions. We used bootstrapping procedures in order to test the mediation models proposed. Results obtained show indeed that rather specific evaluative parental cognitions are mediating the relationship between general cognitions and parental distress. In terms of the cognitive processing levels, it seems that when parents hold both low self-efficacy and parental negative global evaluations for the self/child, this adds significantly to their distress.     

The origins of belief representation: Monkeys fail to automatically represent others’ beliefs

Young infants’ successful performance on false belief tasks has led several researchers to argue that there may be a core knowledge system for representing the beliefs of other agents, emerging early in human development and constraining automatic belief processing into adulthood. One way to investigate this purported core belief representation system is to examine whether non-human primates share such a system. Although non-human primates have historically performed poorly on false belief tasks that require executive function capacities, little work has explored how primates perform on more automatic measures of belief processing. To get at this issue, we modified Kovács et al. (2010)’s test of automatic belief representation to examine whether one non-human primate species—the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta)—is automatically influenced by another agent’s beliefs when tracking an object’s location. Monkeys saw an event in which a human agent watched an apple move back and forth between two boxes and an outcome in which one box was revealed to be empty. By occluding segments of the apple’s movement from either the monkey or the agent, we manipulated both the monkeys’ belief (true or false) and agent’s belief (true or false) about the final location of the apple. We found that monkeys looked longer at events that violated their own beliefs than at events that were consistent with their beliefs. In contrast to human infants, however, monkeys’ expectations were not influenced by another agent’s beliefs, suggesting that belief representation may be an aspect of core knowledge unique to humans.     

The “Rod and Fran Test”: Relationship Priming Influences Cognitive-Perceptual Performance

We theorized that interpersonal relationships can provide structures for experience. In particular, we tested whether primes of same-sex versus mixed-sex relationships could foster cognitive-perceptual processing styles known to be associated with independence versus interdependence respectively. Seventy-two participants visualized either a same-sex or other-sex relationship partner and then performed two measures of cognitive-perceptual style. On a computerized Rod and Frame Test, individuals were more field-dependent after visualizing a mixed-sex versus same-sex relationship partner. On a measure involving perceptions of group behavior, participants demonstrated more holistic/contextually based perception after being primed with a female versus male relationship partner. These findings support the hypothesis that activated cognitive structures representing interpersonal relationships can shape individuals’ cognitive-perceptual performance.     

Extrapolation and direct matching mediate anticipation in infancy

Why are infants able to anticipate occlusion events and other people's actions but not the movement of self-propelled objects? This study investigated infant and adult anticipatory gaze shifts during observation of self-propelled objects and human goal-directed actions. Six-month-old infants anticipated self-propelled balls but not human actions. This demonstrates that different processes mediate the ability to anticipate human actions (direct matching) versus self-propelled objects (extrapolation).     

Experience with malleable objects influences shape-based object individuation by infants

Infants’ ability to accurately represent and later recognize previously viewed objects, and conversely, to discriminate novel objects from those previously seen improves remarkably over the first two years of life. During this time, infants acquire extensive experience viewing and manipulating objects and these experiences influence their physical reasoning. Here we posited that infants’ observations of object feature stability (rigid versus malleable) can influence the use of those features to individuate two successively viewed objects. We showed 8.5-month-olds a series of objects that could or could not change shape, then assessed their use of shape as a basis for object individuation. Infants who explored rigid objects later used shape differences to individuate objects; however, infants who explored malleable objects did not. This outcome suggests that the latter infants did not take into account shape differences during the physical reasoning task and provides further evidence that infants’ attention to object features can be readily modified based on recent experiences.     

Expert athletes activate somatosensory and motor planning regions of the brain when passively listening to familiar sports sounds

The present functional magnetic resonance imaging study examined the neural response to familiar and unfamiliar, sport and non-sport environmental sounds in expert and novice athletes. Results revealed differential neural responses dependent on sports expertise. Experts had greater neural activation than novices in focal sensorimotor areas such as the supplementary motor area, and pre- and postcentral gyri. Novices showed greater activation than experts in widespread areas involved in perception (i.e. supramarginal, middle occipital, and calcarine gyri; precuneus; inferior and superior parietal lobules), and motor planning and processing (i.e. inferior frontal, middle frontal, and middle temporal gyri). These between-group neural differences also appeared as an expertise effect within specific conditions. Experts showed greater activation than novices during the sport familiar condition in regions responsible for auditory and motor planning, including the inferior frontal gyrus and the parietal operculum. Novices only showed greater activation than experts in the supramarginal gyrus and pons during the non-sport unfamiliar condition, and in the middle frontal gyrus during the sport unfamiliar condition. These results are consistent with the view that expert athletes are attuned to only the most familiar, highly relevant sounds and tune out unfamiliar, irrelevant sounds. Furthermore, these findings that athletes show activation in areas known to be involved in action planning when passively listening to sounds suggests that auditory perception of action can lead to the re-instantiation of neural areas involved in producing these actions, especially if someone has expertise performing the actions.     

Is motor knowledge part and parcel of the concepts of manipulable artifacts? Clues from a case of upper limb aplasia

The sensory-motor theory of conceptual representations assumes that motor knowledge of how an artifact is manipulated is constitutive of its conceptual representation. Accordingly, if we assume that the richer the conceptual representation of an object is, the easier that object is identified, manipulable artifacts that are associated with motor knowledge should be identified more accurately and/or faster than manipulable artifacts that are not (everything else being equal). In this study, we tested this prediction by investigating the identification of manipulable artifacts in an individual, DC, who was totally deprived of hand motor experience due to upper limb aplasia. This condition prevents him from interacting with most manipulable artifacts, for which he thus has no motor knowledge at all. However, he had motor knowledge for some of them, which he routinely uses with his feet. We contrasted DC’s performance in a timed picture naming task for manipulable artifacts for which he had motor knowledge versus those for which he had no motor knowledge. No detectable advantage on DC’s naming performance was found for artifacts for which he had motor knowledge compared to those for which he did not. This finding suggests that motor knowledge is not part of the concepts of manipulable artifacts.     

Rotating With Rotated Text: A Natural Behavior Approach to Investigating Cognitive Offloading

Determining how we use our body to support cognition represents an important part of understanding the embodied and embedded nature of cognition. In the present investigation, we pursue this question in the context of a common perceptual task. Specifically, we report a series of experiments investigating head tilt (i.e., external normalization) as a strategy in letter naming and reading stimuli that are upright or rotated. We demonstrate that the frequency of this natural behavior is modulated by the cost of stimulus rotation on performance. In addition, we demonstrate that external normalization can benefit performance. All of the results are consistent with the notion that external normalization represents a form of cognitive offloading and that effort is an important factor in the decision to adopt an internal or external strategy.