Disentangling boundary extension and normalization of view memory for scenes

Boundary extension (BE) is a memory error for close-up views of scenes in which participants tend to remember a picture of a scene as depicting a more wide-angle view than what was actually displayed. However, some experiments have yielded data that indicate a normalized memory of the views depicted in a set of scenes, suggesting that memory for the previously studied scenes has become drawn toward the average view in the image set. In previous studies, normalization is only found when the retention interval is very long or when the stimuli no longer appear to represent a spatial expanse. In Experiment 1, we examine whether normalization can influence results for scenes depicting a partial view of space and when the memory test occurs immediately following the study block by manipulating the degree of difference between studied close-up and wide-angle scenes. In Experiment 2, normalization is induced in a set of scenes by creating conditions expected to lead to memory interference, suggesting that this may be the cause of view normalization. Based on the multi-source model of BE, these scenes should be extended during perception (Intraub, H. (2010). Rethinking scene perception: A multisource model. Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 52, 231–265). In Experiment 3, we show that BE is indeed observable if the same scenes are tested differently, supporting the notion that BE is primarily a perceptual phenomenon while normalization is a memory effect.     

The accidental transgressor: morally-relevant theory of mind

To test young children’s false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an “accidental transgressor” task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (MoToM). Children who did not pass false belief ToM were more likely to attribute negative intentions to an accidental transgressor than children who passed false belief ToM, and to use moral reasons when blaming the accidental transgressor. In Experiment 2, children (N = 46) who did not pass false belief ToM viewed it as more acceptable to punish the accidental transgressor than did participants who passed false belief ToM. Findings are discussed in light of research on the emergence of moral judgment and theory of mind.     

Minimally Creative Thought

Creativity has received, and continues to receive, comparatively little analysis in philosophy and the brain and behavioural sciences. This is in spite of the importance of creative thought and action, and the many and varied resources of theories of mind. Here an alternative approach to analyzing creativity is suggested: start from the bottom up with minimally creative thought. Minimally creative thought depends non‐accidentally upon agency, is novel relative to the acting agent, and could not have been tokened before the time it is in fact tokened, relative to the agent in question. Thoughts that meet these three conditions—agency, psychological novelty, and modal—are what may be called cognitive breakthroughs. Even if such breakthroughs are not necessary to or definitive of richer creativity, they are indeed central to much of creativity. The minimal analysis provides a more workable explanandum for theories of creativity of varied motivation and method.     

加法运算中数学知识和语义知识的整合

采用语义启动数字匹配任务及其变式, 探讨在中文背景下“和效应”和语义系统的类比一致性及其产生机制。结果发现, 中国学生对“和”目标数字的反应时显著长于对中性目标数字, 表明“和效应”是人类的一种强烈的认知倾向; 人类通过类比映射方式整合数学知识和语义知识; 影响语义加工的因素同样影响数学认知。研究还发现, 被试对中性目标数字的抑制难度受语义匹配任务性质的影响, 在完成类别不一致的探测词匹配任务时, 拒绝中性目标数字的反应时显著长, “和效应”消失, 表明“和效应”不仅源自于对“和”目标数字的激活, 也源自于对中性目标数字的抑制。     

道德直觉背景下的道德决策：影响因素探究

以往对道德直觉的研究表明了情绪因素在道德决策中的重要作用, 研究者提出道德决策中存在有意识认知和无意识情绪两种加工过程, 二者之间不能够完全分离与孤立。针对这种认知—情绪过程解释、经典电车和人行桥困境中的道德判断差异等问题, 近年来大量研究通过对道德行为者和道德判断者自身原因、道德情境等主客观因素的深入考察, 试图从不同角度来揭示认知—情绪过程解释的合理性及道德决策差异背后的其他原因, 形成了道德直觉背景下相关领域诸多新的关注点。未来研究有必要针对道德决策研究的方法学、情境的扩展及认知—情感系统内部交互等问题作进一步探讨。     

Perceptual simulation in developing language comprehension

We tested an embodied account of language proposing that comprehenders create perceptual simulations of the events they hear and read about. In Experiment 1, children (ages 7–13 years) performed a picture verification task. Each picture was preceded by a prerecorded spoken sentence describing an entity whose shape or orientation matched or mismatched the depicted object. Responses were faster for matching pictures, suggesting that participants had formed perceptual-like situation models of the sentences. The advantage for matching pictures did not increase with age. Experiment 2 extended these findings to the domain of written language. Participants (ages 7–10 years) of high and low word reading ability verified pictures after reading sentences aloud. The results suggest that even when reading is effortful, children construct a perceptual simulation of the described events. We propose that perceptual simulation plays a more central role in developing language comprehension than was previously thought.     

Improving spatial abilities through mindfulness: effects on the mental rotation task

In this study, we demonstrate a previously unknown finding that mindful learning can improve an individual’s spatial cognition without regard to gender differences. Thirty-two volunteers participated in the experiment. Baselines for spatial ability were first measured for the reaction time on the mental rotation task. Next, the participants were randomly assigned to either a mindful or mindless learning condition. After learning, the mental rotation task showed that those in the mindful learning condition responded faster than those in the mindless learning condition. This study provides promising evidence for applying mindful learning to education.     

A commentary on Rönnberg's distinction between perception and cognition

In a commentary on a note by Rönnberg (Rönnberg, J. On the distinction between perception and cognition. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology , 1990, 31 , 154–156), it is argued that one of Rönnberg's criteria for theoretically distinguishing perception from cognition, that of different biological purposes, is invalid. Congruent with a broad definition of perception and cognition which most researchers agree upon, Rönnberg's two other criteria essentially state that how internally represented information is processed distinguishes between perception and cognition. However, the more strict criterion of whether explicit retrieval of information from memory is necessary is too dependent on a particular, rather limited theoretical framework. A third, less theory-dependent criterion of whether the information available in the stimulus is sufficient to account for comprehension may be useful in research which investigates hypotheses about similarities between perception and cognition.     

内部动机、外部动机与创造力的关系研究

本研究以277名文科三、四年级的大学生为被试,综合考察在故事、连线和命名任务下,内部动机,外部动机对创造力表现的影响。多变量方差分析发现,对于三个测验的共同部分,内部动机和外部动机的主效应均显著,但交互作用不显著。分别对每个任务进行方差分析发现,对于连线任务而言,内部动机和外部动机的主效应均显著;对于命名任务而言,外部动机的主效应显著,内部动机的主效应不显著;对于故事任务而言,内部动机和外部动机的主效应不显著。内部动机与外部动机之间在三个任务中均不存在显著的交互作用。多重回归分析发现,对于不同的任务,内部动机与外部动机的贡献显著不同。     

Simulation, projection and empathy

Simulationists have recently started to employ the term “empathy” when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler’s classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding—in particular the understanding of emotional expressions—that are not explicable in terms of simulation-plus-projection routines.