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741.
Contemporary studies in unconscious cognition are essentially founded on dissociation, i.e., on how it dissociates with respect to conscious mental processes and representations. This is claimed to be in so many and diverse ways that one is often lost in dissociation. In order to reduce this state of confusion we here carry out two major tasks: based on the central distinction between cognitive processes and representations, we identify and isolate the main dissociation paradigms; we then critically analyze their key tenets and reported findings. 相似文献
742.
Robert L. Woolfolk 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):79-87
This article offers a critique of research practices typical of experimental philosophy. To that end, it presents a review of methodological issues that have proved crucial to the quality of research in the biobehavioral sciences. It discusses various shortcomings in the experimental philosophy literature related to (1) the credibility of self‐report questionnaires, (2) the validity and reliability of measurement, (3) the adherence to appropriate procedures for sampling, random assignment, and handling of participants, and (4) the meticulousness of study reporting. It argues that the future standing of experimental philosophy will hinge upon improvements in research methods. 相似文献
743.
K. Svozil 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(1-4):523-532
Complementarity games are explorative games between two players. The deterministic rules of the game are known to both players. The first player freely chooses among a finite number of states of the game but tells nobody of this decision. The second player accesses the game only by primitive, symbolic input‐output interfaces. The task of the second player is to find out the unknown state by input‐output experiments. The logic resulting from this scenario resembles‐ quantum logic in many aspects. It is the empirical logic of choice for virtual realities. 相似文献
744.
ALBERT LOW 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(6):455-463
Life, and therefore evolution, is a creative process; creativity is not an attribute of a few gifted people. The way we think obscures this truth. Three ways of dealing with a problem are creativity, calculation, and choice. Creativity can occur when a single idea is held in two contradictory frames of reference. Thus to be creative we have to put aside our usual ways of thinking, which are based on either/or. When we put aside this way of thinking we will see that things do not change: they are change. 相似文献
745.
Bob Hodge 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(3-4):209-222
This article uses an autobiography as an object of research, to both illustrate some principles of chaos theory in analytic practice, and give those ideas a personal and social context, thereby producing a unique but explanation-rich history of chaos theory and recent intellectual history of transdisciplinarity and social research in the West. The ideas from Chaos Theory it uses and illustrates include: three-body analysis (Poincaré); fractals (Mandelbrot); fuzzy logic (Zadeh); and the butterfly effect (Lorenz). 相似文献
746.
Charlotte Baumann 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(6):1132-1152
ABSTRACTMany interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being. 相似文献
747.
748.
In this paper we argue that hybrid logic is the deductive setting most natural for Kripke semantics. We do so by investigating hybrid axiomatics for a variety of systems, ranging from the basic hybrid language (a decidable system with the same complexity as orthodox propositional modal logic) to the strong Priorean language (which offers full first-order expressivity).We show that hybrid logic offers a genuinely first-order perspective on Kripke semantics: it is possible to define base logics which extend automatically to a wide variety of frame classes and to prove completeness using the Henkin method. In the weaker languages, this requires the use of non-orthodox rules. We discuss these rules in detail and prove non-eliminability and eliminability results. We also show how another type of rule, which reflects the structure of the strong Priorean language, can be employed to give an even wider coverage of frame classes. We show that this deductive apparatus gets progressively simpler as we work our way up the expressivity hierarchy, and conclude the paper by showing that the approach transfers to first-order hybrid logic.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the fifth conference on Advances in Modal Logic (AiML 2004) in Manchester. We would like to thank Maarten Marx for his comments on an early draft and Agnieszka Kisielewska for help with the proof reading.Special Issue Ways of Worlds II. On Possible Worlds and Related Notions Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and Stig Andur Pedersen 相似文献
749.
Maxwell J. Cresswell 《Studia Logica》2006,82(3):307-327
The possible-worlds semantics for modality says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in some possible world. Given
classical prepositional logic, one can easily prove that every consistent set of propositions can be embedded in a ‘maximal
consistent set’, which in a sense represents a possible world. However the construction depends on the fact that standard
modal logics are finitary, and it seems false that an infinite collection of sets of sentences each finite subset of which
is intuitively ‘possible’ in natural language has the property that the whole set is possible. The argument of the paper is
that the principles needed to shew that natural language possibility sentences involve quantification over worlds are analogous
to those used in infinitary modal logic. 相似文献
750.
Petr Hájek 《Studia Logica》2006,84(1):51-62
Important works of Mostowski and Rasiowa dealing with many-valued logic are analyzed from the point of view of contemporary mathematical fuzzy logic.A version of this paper has been presented during the conference Trends in Logic III, dedicated to the memory of A. MOSTOWSKI, H. RASIOWA and C. RAUSZER, and held in Warsaw and Ruciane-Nida from 23rd to 25th September 2005. 相似文献