Multivariate thurstonian models

The recent development of probabilistic Thurstonian choice models for analyzing preference data has been motivated by the need to describe both inter- and intra-individual difference, the multidimensional nature of choice objects, and the effects of similarity and comparability among choice objects. A common feature of these models is that they focus on asingle preference judgment. It is customary, however, to ask subjects not only for an overall preference judgment but also for additional paired comparison responses regarding specific attributes. This paper proposes a generalization of Thurstonian probabilistic choice models for analyzing both multiple preference responses and their relationships. The approach is illustrated by modeling data from two multivariate preference experiments.I am grateful to James, Austin, Ingo Böckenholt, and anonymous referees for helpful comments on this research. This paper is based on research presented at the Meeting of the Society for the Multivariate Analysis in the Behavioral Sciences, Groningen, The Netherlands, December 1988.     

Beyond Social and Temporal Comparisons: The Role of Temporal Inter-Group Comparisons in the Context of Dramatic Social Change in Mongolia

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we argue that the target of comparison should be taken into consideration when evaluating the associated outcomes of negative comparisons in the context of dramatic social change. To achieve this general goal, we considered five distinct targets of comparison: social (my group versus another group), temporal (my group across time), and temporal inter-group (my group versus another group across time). We hypothesised that in times of constant social change, two points of anchors (social and temporal) are simultaneously needed to evaluate one's position. A total of 236 high school and university students from Mongolia participated in the study. We used hierarchical regression analysis to test our hypotheses. As predicted, we found that temporal inter-group comparisons are better predictor of collective esteem than their social and temporal counterparts. Moreover, the link from past and future temporal inter-group comparisons to collective esteem was negative as hypothesized. Results are discussed in terms of theoretical implications.     

More Rational or More Emotional Than Others? Lay Beliefs About Decision-Making Strategies

Research demonstrates that people utilize both reasoning and feeling in decision making and that both strategies can be advantageous. However, little is known about how people perceive their decision-making relative to others. Despite research findings and popular appeals supporting the use of affective decision processes, across a series of studies, we find that individuals believe they rely more on reasoning, and less on feelings, than others. These effects are driven by the motivation to self-enhance where, in most contexts, individuals believe the use of reasoning is superior, and self-enhancing, compared to the use of feelings. Consistent with this mechanism, beliefs that one’s decisions are more rational than others’ are as follows: (a) stronger for those who exhibit greater beliefs in the superiority of reasoning (vs. feeling), (b) attenuated when the decision context precludes motivational thinking about the self or the self is affirmed, and (c) reversed when the use of feelings is perceived as more self-enhancing. We demonstrate downstream consequences (e.g., decision delegation), rule out alternative explanations, and discuss practical implications of these lay beliefs.     

The structure and validity of directional measures of appearance social comparison among emerging adults in China

We evaluated the structure and validity of the Upward Appearance Comparison Scale (UPACS) and Downward Appearance Comparison Scale (DACS) (O’Brien et al., 2009) in Chinese samples. In Study 1, principal component analysis on an initial sample (427 women, 123 men) and confirmatory factor analysis on another sample (447 women, 121 men) found that a 15-item, two component model had the best overall fit. Derived components had moderate correlations with most conceptually related measures and low correlations with less conceptually related indices. Study 2 participants (310 women, 201 men) completed the UPACS and DACS as well as measures of disordered eating, fatness concern, and negative affect; they were re-assessed one year later. Baseline UPACS scores predicted changes in disordered eating for women and fatness concerns for men, independent of initial disturbances, but DACS responses were not related to outcomes. Findings highlighted the potential utility of derived UPACS and DACS within a Chinese context.     

Children's attributions for peer victimization: A social comparison approach

A social comparison framework was used to examine the relations between children's attributions for victimization and adjustment. In Study One, 192 nine-to ten-year-old children were asked why someone may pick on them. Results revealed attributions reflecting five causes of victimization that could be reliably sorted by direction of social comparison: (a) jealous peer (downward), (b) mutual antipathy (horizontal), (c) being different from each other (horizontal), (d) personal behavior (upward) and (e) being uncool (upward). Children's responses were used to create an attribution measure that was administered to 206 eight-to eleven-year-old children. Results were consistent with the social comparison hypothesis such that peer jealousy was uniquely associated with lower levels of loneliness and greater acceptance whereas personal behavior and not being uncool were correlated with greater loneliness and lower perceived acceptance and self-esteem. Findings supported the usefulness of a social comparison framework for understanding associations among attributions and adjustment.     

Speaking of pain in Greek: Implications for the cognitive permeation of emotions

ABSTRACT

Although item-memory for emotional information is enhanced, memory for associations between items is often impaired for negative, emotionally arousing compared to neutral information. We tested two possible mechanisms underlying this impairment, using picture pairs: 1) higher confidence in one’s own ability to memorise negative information may cause participants to under-study negative pairs; 2) better interactive imagery for neutral pairs could facilitate associative memory for neutral pairs more than for negative pairs. Tested with associative recognition, we replicated the impairment of associative memory for negative pairs. We also replicated the result that confidence in future memory (judgments of learning) was higher for negative than neutral pairs. Inflated confidence could not explain the impairment of associative recognition memory: Judgements of learning were positively correlated with associative memory success for both negative and neutral pairs. However, neutral pairs were rated higher in their conduciveness to interactive imagery than negative pairs, and this difference in interactive imagery showed a robust relationship to the associative memory difference. Thus, associative memory reductions for negative information are not due to differences in encoding effort. Instead, interactive imagery may be less effective for encoding of negative than neutral pairs.     

Looking down and ramping up: The impact of status differences on effort in intergroup contexts

This paper examines how the status of an out-group impacts effort in intergroup settings. The results provide evidence that people work harder when their individual performance is compared to a lower, as opposed to higher, status out-group member. Moreover, comparisons to a lower status out-group were found to elicit motivation gains as these participants worked harder than participants in the control (Studies 1-3) or in-group comparison conditions (Studies 2 and 3). In Study 4, evidence for the role of threat as an underlying mechanism was provided as gains in effort for those compared with a lower status out-group member were eliminated when participants self- or group-affirmed prior to comparison. Finally, Study 5 shows that both social identity threat and self-categorization threat underlie increases in effort for participants compared to a lower status out-group member. We detail a theoretical basis for our claim that performance comparisons with lower status out-group members are especially threatening, and discuss the implications for this research in terms of social identity and self-categorization theories as they relate to effort in intergroup contexts.     

Experimental Tests of Risk Ladders in the Elicitation of Perceived Likelihood

Risk ladders have the potential to improve numeric judgments of low‐likelihood events by providing information about the likelihoods of comparison risks, thereby letting respondents make risk estimates “in context.” However, to date this tool has been studied systematically only in communication of risk, not in elicitation of perceived likelihoods. In three studies, we evaluated the benefits of risk ladders on the consistency, validity, and mean‐level accuracy of elicited likelihood judgments. When estimates for low‐likelihood hazards were elicited using different numeric response scales (e.g., “1 in x” and “x in 100,000”), scale type had a strong effect on the magnitudes of the elicited estimates, and viewing a risk ladder (Experiment 1) or comparison risks (Experiments 2 and 3) did not attenuate this effect of scale type. Similarly, we found no evidence that risk ladders or comparison risks improved the convergent validity of numeric estimates, as measured using correlations with risk ratings made on alternative scale types. Finally, viewing comparison risks tended to reduce gross overestimation of rare events, with relatively less change in estimates for mid‐likelihood and high‐likelihood hazards. This suggests that comparison risks can spread responses to cover a wider range of values but do not ameliorate scale effects. In the elicitation of numeric risk estimates, how you ask matters, even if you let people make estimates “in context” through the use of comparative risk information. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reading Proficiency and Comparability of Mathematics and Science Scores for Students From English and Non-English Backgrounds: An International Perspective

The purpose of this research is to examine the comparability of mathematics and science scores for students from English language backgrounds (ELB) and non-English language backgrounds (NELB). We examine the relationship between English reading proficiency and performance on mathematics and science assessments in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The findings indicate a strong relationship with reading proficiency accounting for up to 43% of the variance in mathematics and up to 79% in science. In all comparisons, ELB students either outperformed NELB students or performed at the same level. However, when statistical adjustments were made for reading proficiency, in both mathematics and science, the score gap between the groups became statistically non-significant in three out of the four countries. These findings point to differences in score meaning in mathematics and science assessments and limitations in comparing performances of ELB and NELB.     

Psychophysics without physics: extension of Fechnerian scaling from continuous to discrete and discrete-continuous stimulus spaces

The computation of subjective (Fechnerian) distances from discrimination probabilities involves cumulation of appropriately transformed psychometric increments along smooth arcs (in continuous stimulus spaces) or chains of stimuli (in discrete spaces). In a space where any two stimuli that are each other's points of subjective equality are given identical physical labels, psychometric increments are positive differences ψ(x,y)-ψ(x,x) and ψ(y,x)-ψ(x,x), where x≠y and ψ is the probability of judging two stimuli different. In continuous stimulus spaces the appropriate monotone transformation of these increments (called overall psychometric transformation) is determined uniquely in the vicinity of zero, and its extension to larger values of its argument is immaterial. In discrete stimulus spaces, however, Fechnerian distances critically depend on this extension. We show that if overall psychometric transformation is assumed (A) to be the same for a sufficiently rich class of discrete stimulus spaces, (B) to ensure the validity of the Second Main Theorem of Fechnerian Scaling in this class of spaces, and (C) to agree in the vicinity of zero with one of the possible transformations in continuous spaces, then this transformation can only be identity. This result is generalized to the broad class of “discrete-continuous” stimulus spaces, of which continuous and discrete spaces are proper subclasses.