When Good Things Feel Closer and Bad Things Feel Farther: The Role of Perceived Control on Psychological Distance Perception

Prior research has found that people perceive positive objects and locations as physically closer than negative ones. Yet, other work has found the opposite to be true for perceptions of temporal distance, where negative future events feel closer than positive ones. Motivated by this seeming discrepancy, we propose that (a) feelings of control can differentially influence how far away valenced (i.e., positive or negative) targets feel in space and time and that (b) the difference in perceived control over space versus time can account for these opposite findings. First, across four studies, we show that high (vs. low) control makes positive targets feel closer and negative targets feel more distant in both physical space (Studies 1 and 1a) and time (Studies 2 and 2a). Then, in Studies 3 and 4, we simultaneously examine perceptions of spatial and temporal distance and show that baseline differences in perceived control between these domains can explain the prior discrepant findings. Finally, a within‐paper meta‐analysis offers further support to these findings.     

Editorial: The role of reasoning in mathematical thinking

ABSTRACT

Research into mathematics often focuses on basic numerical and spatial intuitions, and one key property of numbers: their magnitude. The fact that mathematics is a system of complex relationships that invokes reasoning usually receives less attention. The purpose of this special issue is to highlight the intricate connections between reasoning and mathematics, and to use insights from the reasoning literature to obtain a more complete understanding of the processes that underlie mathematical cognition. The topics that are discussed range from the basic heuristics and biases to the various ways in which complex, effortful reasoning contributes to mathematical cognition, while also considering the role of individual differences in mathematics performance. These investigations are not only important at a theoretical level, but they also have broad and important practical implications, including the possibility to improve classroom practices and educational outcomes, to facilitate people's decision-making, as well as the clear and accessible communication of numerical information.     

Probability and conspiratorial thinking

Conspiracy theories as alternative explanations for events and states of affairs enjoy widespread popularity. We test one possible explanation for why people are prone to conspiratorial thinking: We hypothesize that conspiratorial thinking as an explanation for events increases as the probability of those events decreases. In order to test this hypothesis, we have conducted five experiments in which participants were exposed to different information about probabilities of fictional events. The results of all experiments support the hypothesis: The lower the probability of an event, the stronger participants embrace conspiratorial explanations. Conspiratorial thinking, we conclude, potentially represents a cognitive heuristic: A coping mechanism for uncertainty.     

Why should we try to think like scientists? Scientific reasoning and susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases

This paper examines whether scientific reasoning skills predict people's susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases. We used the recently developed Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS) because it measures the ability to read and evaluate scientific evidence. Alongside the SRS, 317 participants aged 18–30 years completed measures of thinking dispositions and cognitive ability to ascertain whether the SRS contributes specifically to susceptibility to epistemically suspect beliefs and cognitive biases. Scientific reasoning correlated positively with dispositions towards analytic thinking and cognitive ability and negatively with dogmatism, epistemically suspect beliefs, and susceptibility to cognitive biases. Most importantly, it emerged as a significant predictor, contributing to susceptibility to both cognitive biases and epistemically suspect beliefs over and above the other cognitive predictors. These results provide the first empirical evidence that scientific reasoning ability is an important factor in protecting against epistemically suspect beliefs and in aiding better decision making among the non-scientific population.     

Effect of racial bias on composite construction

We investigated how prior bias about a face's racial characteristics can affect its encoding and resultant facial composite construction. In total, 61 participants (24 Europeans, 18 Indians living in India and 19 Indians living in Europe) saw a racially ambiguous unfamiliar face and were led to believe it was either European or Indian. They created a composite of this face, using EFIT6. Two groups of independent raters (one Indian, the other European) then assessed the apparent race of each composite. A different two groups (one Indian, one European) assessed each composite's degree of resemblance to the target face, to determine whether this was influenced by the constructors' initial categorisation of the target face as “own-race” or “other-race.” Composites appeared significantly more “Asian” or “European” according to the bias induced in their creators, but there was no evidence of any own-race bias in the resemblance ratings for the composites.     

Interpreting Silent Gesture: Cognitive Biases and Rational Inference in Emerging Language Systems

Natural languages make prolific use of conventional constituent‐ordering patterns to indicate “who did what to whom,” yet the mechanisms through which these regularities arise are not well understood. A series of recent experiments demonstrates that, when prompted to express meanings through silent gesture, people bypass native language conventions, revealing apparent biases underpinning word order usage, based on the semantic properties of the information to be conveyed. We extend the scope of these studies by focusing, experimentally and computationally, on the interpretation of silent gesture. We show cross‐linguistic experimental evidence that people use variability in constituent order as a cue to obtain different interpretations. To illuminate the computational principles that govern interpretation of non‐conventional communication, we derive a Bayesian model of interpretation via biased inductive inference and estimate these biases from the experimental data. Our analyses suggest people's interpretations balance the ambiguity that is characteristic of emerging language systems, with ordering preferences that are skewed and asymmetric, but defeasible.     

Causal Inference from Descriptions of Experimental and Non-Experimental Research: Public Understanding of Correlation-Versus-Causation

The human tendency to conflate correlation with causation has been lamented by various scientists (Kida, 2006; Stanovich, 2009), and vivid examples of it can be found in both the media and peer-reviewed literature. However, there is little systematic data on the extent to which individuals conflate correlation with causation. In three experiments, we presented people with one of four research vignettes generated from the combination of two independent variables: whether the vignette described an experimental or non-experimental design, and whether it revealed a positive or negative association. Upon reading their vignette, participants selected inferences that could be drawn from the findings. Participants drew causal inferences from non-experimental vignettes as often as they did from experimental vignettes, and more frequently for causal statements and directions of association that fit with intuitive notions than for those that did not. We discuss our findings in relation to other biases in human thinking.     

Cognitive processes as mediators of the relation between mindfulness and change in social anxiety symptoms following cognitive behavioral treatment

The present study examined whether pretreatment mindfulness exerts an indirect effect on outcomes following cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). Cognitive processes of probability and cost bias (i.e., overestimations of the likelihood that negative social events will occur, and that these events will have negative consequences when they do occur) were explored as potential mediators of the relation between mindfulness and social anxiety symptom change. People with higher levels of mindfulness may be better able to benefit from treatments that reduce biases because mindfulness may aid in regulation of attention. Sixty-seven individuals with a primary diagnosis of social phobia identifying public speaking as their greatest fear received eight sessions of one of two types of exposure-based CBT delivered according to treatment manuals. Participants completed self-report measures of mindfulness, probability bias, cost bias, and social anxiety symptoms. Mediation hypotheses were assessed by a bootstrapped regression using treatment outcome data. Pretreatment mindfulness was not related to change in social anxiety symptoms from pre- to posttreatment. However, mindfulness had an indirect effect on treatment outcome via its association with probability bias, but not cost bias, at midtreatment. These findings were consistent across three metrics of social anxiety symptoms. Mindfulness may play a role in response to CBT among individuals with social phobia through its relation with probability bias – even when the treatment does not target mindfulness.     

No Time to Waste: Restricting Life‐Span Temporal Horizons Decreases the Sunk‐Cost Fallacy

In three studies, we examined the influence of restricted and expansive temporal horizons on the sunk‐cost fallacy. The sunk‐cost fallacy occurs when prior investments instead of future returns influence decisions about future investments. When making decisions about future investments, rational decision makers base decisions on future consequences, not already‐invested costs that are “sunk” and cannot be recovered. In Study 1, we restricted young adult college students' temporal horizons by instructing them to imagine that they did not have much longer to live; this manipulation decreased the sunk‐cost fallacy. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 and also found that the consequences of manipulating temporal horizons were most pronounced for prior investments of time and that prior investments of time and money had different implications for the sunk‐cost fallacy, depending on the social or nonsocial decision domain. In Study 3, we manipulated temporal horizons by instructing students to imagine their time as a college student was coming to an end. Results were mostly similar to Study 2 but also suggested that focusing on one's mortality may have unique consequences. Implications of the three studies for understanding age differences in sunk‐cost decisions, interventions to improve sunk‐cost decisions, and the situations in which interventions might be most needed are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining Autobiographical Memory Content in Patients with Depression and Anxiety Disorders

The purpose of this study was to move beyond the traditional specificity model of autobiographical memory (ABM) and to examine the content of memories with a focus on disorder and schema-relevant content. The sample (N = 82) included 25 patients with major depressive disorder (MDD), 24 with social phobia (SP), and 33 with panic disorder with agoraphobia (PDA) who were referred to a large outpatient clinic for group treatment of depression or anxiety. Participants completed the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) and Beck Depression Inventory–II as part of the clinical intake process. Responses to the AMT were coded for disorder-specific content based on diagnostic criteria for each disorder as well as for schema-relevant (sociotropy vs. autonomy) content. A repeated measures multiple analysis of variance demonstrated significant differences in disorder-specific content, with patients in the MDD group reporting more depressotypic ABMs than those in the PDA group but not the SP group. Similarly, in the analysis of schema-relevant content, significant differences were found between MDD and PDA regarding the presence of autonomy-based ABM ratings. Study results provide partial support for the cognitive specificity hypothesis with ABM content. The results are discussed in relation to the cognitive models of depression and anxiety.