A Challenge to Brink's Metaphysical Egoism

Those who subscribe to aprudential conception of practical reason do not believe that there is a conflict between other-regarding and self-regarding norms as the former are held to be founded on the latter. Moral conduct, they maintain, is always rationally justifiable. The reasons we should fulfil the demands of other-regarding norms are the same as those we have for fulfilling self-regarding norms. David Brink has put forth an interesting and novel account of this approach to practical reason which he calls‘metaphysical egoism’. Metaphysical egoism requires that we modify our pre-theoretical understandings of self-interest on metaphysical grounds. I critically assess Brink’s argument and claim that metaphysical egoism does not adequately function as a motive or guide for action. It is susceptible to many of the same problems which strategic egoism faces. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Autonomy,Sanity and Moral Theory

The concept of autonomy plays atleast two roles in moral theory. First, itprovides a source of constraints upon action:because I am autonomous you may not interferewith me, even for my own good. Second, itprovides a foundation for moral theory: humanautonomy has been thought by some to producemoral principles of a more general kind.This paper seeks to understand what autonomyis, and whether the autonomy of which we arecapable is able to serve these roles. We wouldnaturally hope for a concept of autonomy thatis value-neutral rather than value-laden. Thatis to say, we would want the judgement that Iam autonomous to depend wholly on, say,structural features of my psychology, and in noway to require us to make ethical judgements, orother value judgements. Being value-neutral isperhaps desirable in a concept of autonomyserving the first role, and plausiblyindispensible in one playing the second. Ishall argue, however, that value-neutral conceptionsof autonomy are impoverished and out of linewith our intuitions; set out and defendan explicitly value-laden conception ofautonomy; and explore the implications of such a view for theability of autonomy to play the rolesmentioned above.     

简论道德的发展变化

自古以来,道德的发展变化就是一个辩证运动的过程,也是一个善恶矛盾运动的过程。道德的发展变化按研究的不同视角及其范围和方向,可以分为道德演变、道德变易与道德流变。辩证地认识道德的发展变化规律,有利于人们更好地止恶从善,弃恶扬善。     

关于伦理道德与智慧

伦理道德与智慧的关系是一个有着重要的理论和现实意义的课题。伦理、道德与智慧都有联系,但本身都不是智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧相通,但两者不是同一种意义上的智慧。伦理智慧与道德智慧具有多方面的社会价值,提倡伦理智慧和道德智慧有助于当代中国的社会改革和全面进步,为此需要对中国传统伦理思想和道德价值进行批判性的反思。     

柏拉图和亚里士多德的经济伦理思想比较

经济是城邦的基础,德性却是引导经济运行和发展的必要条件,这是柏拉图和亚里士多德的共同点。然而,私有制和公有制是两实现经济与道德和谐关系的不同手段,这种差别在某种意义上是其平等现不同的结果。     

"The Plague Of Blood": HIV/AIDS and Ethics of the Global Health–Care Challenge

In this essay I explore the heuristic value of the concept of ethics of complexity, chaos, and contingency by applying its framework to the analysis of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Everyday human moral choices are outcomes of a moral impulse, and such an impulse is grounded in moral competence shaped by moral literacy. This literacy is constructed on the basis of a body of knowledge of culture, social context, environment, and the universe. It also includes the knowledge of religions and religious and secular ethical codes. I also distinguish between the social and cultural aspects of ethical systems. Both societies and cultures provide resources and constraints for the development of literacy and competence. An intentionally developed multifaith and multidisciplinary coalition may help us move away from various forms of social speciation and toward sociological mindfulness. This could help us remake the world into one that has more courage to care.     

Bocheński on Morality and Ethics

Studies in East European Thought - What are the main results of Bocheńskiinvestigations in ethics and moral philosophy?In his own view, he contributed to threematters: his treatise on miltary...     

孟子对传统天命报应论的创造性转化--兼论性善论的价值合理性

在建立以性善论为核心的道德天命观过程中,文化根基的问题观照和传统文化的资源借续是孟子的理论立足点。通过以性善言天善、以心性的价值合理性印证天命的价值理性和“德福合一”的新解释,孟子重建了人的道德信仰,完成了对天命报应论的全新构想。心性的价值合理性与天命的价值理性之间的相互印证,是孟子性善论及其天命观中最有创意的理论运思。     

Expanding the traditional user versus non‐user dichotomy amongst ecstasy users

Differences in the drug use characteristics and psychosocial variables in the use and non‐use of ecstasy within 845 16–25 year‐olds in the UK was examined. Based on levels of ecstasy use and intentions, two groups of non‐users (resistant and vulnerable), three groups of users (light, moderate and heavy) and an ex‐user group were identified. It was found that there is predictive utility in this way of expanding the widely employed ‘user versus non‐user’ dichotomy. Resistant non‐users were more likely to be younger, female, and were characterized by lower levels of use of four other drugs (amphetamine, cannabis, cocaine and LSD). Those ‘at risk’ of using ecstasy reported more frequent use of amphetamine, LSD, and cannabis than resistant non‐users. Heavy user groups reported using amphetamine, cocaine and LSD more frequently than all the other groups. Having ecstasy using friends increased the odds of being an ‘at risk’ non‐user or an ecstasy user. Normative influence also differentiated between the three user groups (light, moderate, and heavy). Beliefs about ecstasy use being immoral, ecstasy offers being difficult to resist, ecstasy use making one feel guilty and ecstasy being readily available differentiated between user and non‐user groups. These factors could usefully inform the content of health education materials designed to change ecstasy use. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MORAL DECISIONS ABOUT HUMAN GERM-LINE MODIFICATION

Technologies for human germ-line modification may soon enable humanity to create new types of human beings. Decisions about use of this power entail an unprecedented combination of difficulties: the stakes are immense, the unknowns are daunting, and moral principles are called into question. Evolved morality is not a sure basis for these decisions, both because of its inherent imperfections and because genetic engineering could eventually change humans’ innate cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, consensus is needed on moral values relevant to germ-line modification. These values could be based on characteristics of human beings that would remain constant regardless of revised genomes.