The current studies were conducted to examine two questions regarding the development of an ethic of care versus an ethic of justice, where the former is associated with being female and the latter is associated with being male. First, does gender role orientation in adolescence predict the ethical orientation one adopts better than gender itself does? Second, does adolescents' ethical orientation predict their volunteering behavior? To answer these questions, two studies were conducted. In Study 1, adolescents completed Bem's Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) and Jensen's World View Questionnaire (WVQ) which assesses ethical orientation. Girls and individuals high in femininity were higher on the ethic of care than were boys and individuals high in masculinity. In addition, individuals with a feminine gender orientation received higher care scores than individuals with an androgynous orientation. Regression analyses indicated that gender orientation accounted for more of the variance in the ethic of care than did gender. In Study 2, older adolescents completed Jensen's WVQ and were subsequently asked to volunteer in one of two settings: a personal setting or an impersonal setting. Individuals high in the ethic of care were more likely to volunteer and volunteered for more hours, but volunteered equally often in the two types of settings. Individuals who “apologized” for being unable to volunteer were higher on caring. The results are discussed in the context of Gilligan's theory of socialization to morality.
Abstract. I emphasize the importance of broadening behavioral, ecological, and conservation science into a more integrative, interdisciplinary, socially responsible, compassionate, spiritual, and holistic endeavor. I stress the significance of studies of animal behavior, especially ethological research concerned with animal emotions in which individuals are named and recognized for their own personalities, for helping us to learn not only about the nonhuman animal beings with whom we share Earth but also about who we are and our place in nature. We are best understood in relationship with others. To this end I develop the notions of “minding animals” and “deep ethology.” Animals are sources of wisdom, a way of knowing. We are all citizens of Earth, members of a global community in which intimate reciprocal and beneficent peaceful relationships are mandatory. A world without cruelty and with boundless compassion, respect, grace, humility, spirituality, and love would be a better world in which to live. We have compelling responsibilities for making Earth a better and more peaceful habitat for all beings. It is essential that we do better than our ancestors. We must reflect and step lightly as we “redecorate” nature. Time is not on our side. I plead for the development of heartfelt and holistic science that allows for joy and play. Science need not be suspicious of things it cannot fully understand. We must not avert our eyes or other senses from the eyes and voices of other beings who urgently need our uncompromising and unconditional aid and love. We can do much more than we have done for animals and the Earth. 相似文献
I first offer some reflections on the term religious naturalism. I then outline how moral thought might be configured in the context of religious naturalism. It is proposed that the goal of morality is to generate a flourishing community and that humans negotiate their social interactions using moral capacities that are cultivated in the context of culture. Six such capacities are considered: strategic reciprocity, humaneness, fair–mindedness, courage, reverence, and mindfulness. Moral capacities are contrasted with moral susceptibilities, fueled by self–interest, and brought to the fore in times of stress and humiliation. The essay is in two parts. I first respond to Jerome Stone's query as to the nature of religious naturalism. This is followed by the text of my presentation at the 2001 AAR meeting. 相似文献
Abstract: Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, the country has embarked on a so‐called war on terrorism. This essay argues that so‐called war on terrorism has used the pretext of responding to terrorist attacks in the U.S. in September 2001 to wage wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have objectives other than stamping out terrorism. It further argues that war requires a moral justification that cannot be provided for either the war in Afghanistan or the war in Iraq. 相似文献
Prosociality and morality are critical to the functioning and flourishing of society. There is, however, great variation in the degree to which individuals help or hinder one another, or adhere to ethical standards of “rightness.” One way to understand this variation is by drawing on theories and models within personality psychology, which may illuminate the basic individual characteristics that drive a wide range of other-regarding tendencies. In this review, we provide a snapshot of three research strands addressing these themes. The first concerns how personality traits map onto prosocial preferences for fairness and cooperation, as studied using classic social decision-making tasks called economic games. The second concerns the robust associations between personality traits and indicators of inter-group prejudice (e.g., authoritarian ideology). The third concerns the emerging concept of moral exceptionality, and the personality traits that may characterise individuals at the forefront of moral progress. These examples demonstrate the core role that personality psychology is playing in the study of prosocial and moral behaviour, as well as the critical mass emerging in the Australian context around these themes. 相似文献
It is commonly said that some standards, such as morality, are ‘normatively authoritative’ in a way that other standards, such as etiquette, are not; standards like etiquette are said to be ‘not really normative’. Skeptics deny the very possibility of normative authority, and take claims like ‘etiquette is not really normative’ to be either empty or confused. I offer a different route to defeat skeptics about authority: instead of focusing on what makes standards like morality special, we should focus on what makes standards like etiquette ‘not really normative’. I defend a fictionalist theory on which etiquette is ‘not really normative’ in roughly the same way that Sherlock is ‘not really a detective’, and show that fictionalism about some normative standards helps us explain the possibility of normative authority. 相似文献