An Integrated View of Empathy: Psychology,Philosophy, and Neuroscience

In this paper, we will examine and untangle a conflict mainly between a developmental psychologist, Martin Hoffman and a social psychologist, Daniel Batson. According to Hoffman, empathic distress, a vicarious feeling through empathy, is transformed into an altruistic motivation. Batson and others on the other hand, criticize Hoffman, claiming that empathic altruism has no relation with empathic distress. We will point out some problems with Batson’s position by referring to the results of fMRI experiments that suggest empathic distress and empathic altruism share a common basis, and defend Hoffman’s argument. This will also offer new insights into the evolution of empathy.

Mysteries of morality

Evolutionary theories of morality, beginning with Darwin, have focused on explanations for altruism. More generally, these accounts have concentrated on conscience (self-regulatory mechanisms) to the neglect of condemnation (mechanisms for punishing others). As a result, few theoretical tools are available for understanding the rapidly accumulating data surrounding third-party judgment and punishment. Here we consider the strategic interactions among actors, victims, and third-parties to help illuminate condemnation. We argue that basic differences between the adaptive problems faced by actors and third-parties indicate that actor conscience and third-party condemnation are likely performed by different cognitive mechanisms. Further, we argue that current theories of conscience do not easily explain its experimentally demonstrated insensitivity to consequences. However, these results might be explicable if conscience functions, in part, as a defense system for avoiding third-party punishment. If conscience serves defensive functions, then its computational structure should be closely tailored to the details of condemnation mechanisms. This possibility underscores the need for a better understanding of condemnation, which is important not only in itself but also for explaining the nature of conscience. We outline three evolutionary mysteries of condemnation that require further attention: third-party judgment, moralistic punishment, and moral impartiality.     

道德与人伦——论伦理中的强制性因素与非强制性因素

从对社会成员的约束力来看,伦理可以分为两个部分,一个部分是强制性的,一个部分是非强制性的。前一个部分就是人们通常所说的道德,后一个部分可以称为人伦。道德与人伦既相互对立,又相辅相成,此消彼长。从某种意义上说,这种对立统一实际上是个体自由与集体意志在伦理领域中的表现。就世界范围看,伦理的人伦化是当代社会的一个重要趋势。从伦理内部来讲,这种趋势的产生与传统的伦理模式的失落有关。区分道德与人伦有着重要的意义。它有利于更好地发挥伦理的作用与功能,促进和谐社会的构建。     

Socio-cognitive conflict, emotions and complexity of thought in real-life morality

A new taxonomy of real-life dilemmas was tested in two studies. In Study 1, 35 respondents assessed six types of real-life dilemmas in terms of socio-cognitive conflict. Support was found for a classification of dilemmas into three levels of socio-cognitive conflict. In Study 2, 191 young women responded to measures of social perspective-taking and emotional empathy and reported a real-life moral dilemma as well as their feelings while making decisions about it. The dilemmas were classified into personal and impersonal and into three levels of socio-cognitive conflict. Dependent variables were the integrative complexity of the arguments and the reported feelings (sympathy, upset, and remorse). Dispositional empathy and perspective taking predicted level of socio-cognitive conflict and feelings of sympathy but not integrative complexity. Personal dilemmas aroused more feelings of upset than did impersonal ones. Low socio-cognitive conflict dilemmas evoked less complex thinking and less intensive feelings of upset and sympathy than did moderate and high socio-cognitive conflict dilemmas.     

论焦循“假卜筮而行教”的易学观

论文分”四圣同吉说”、“忠恕一贯论”、“迁善改过说”三部分,详细论证了清代著名易学家焦循“假卜筮而行教”的易学观。论文指出一、焦循认为元、亨、利、贞为易学之本。是“(?)、文、周、孔”四位圣人思想的核心,同时也是焦循本人追求的四个道德理想。二、焦循研究易学,旨在恢复儒家仁义道德的正统地位．以儒家的理论排斥宋儒的义理之学,将自己的道德学说融入易学之中。三、焦循将易学的变通思想概括为一个“迁普改过”的过程,那么就必须透过《周易》的占卜形式来发挥教化人的作用。因此,焦循的迁善改过说客观上仍是以儒家的伦理观念作为其思想基础的。     

Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough?

The liberal view that valid consent is sufficient for a sex act to be morally legitimate is challenged by three major philosophies of sex: the Catholic view of sex as ordained for procreation and properly confined to marriage, the romantic view of sex as bound up with love, and the radical feminist analysis of sex in our society as part and parcel of the domination of women by men. I take a critical look at all three, focusing on Mary Geach's recent statement of the procreation view, Roger Scruton's theory of sexual desire as naturally evolving into intimacy and love, and several radical feminist discussions of sex in sexist society which argue that the notion of consent is unhelpful and, indeed, irrelevant. I argue that none of these lines of argument is convincing, and that consent remains the touchstone of morally permissible sex – although, dmittedly, it may not be very helpful in discussing ideals of human sexuality.     

Two Puzzles for Deontologists: Life-Prolonging Killings and the Moral Symmetry Between Killing and Causing a Person to be Unconscious

Some form of agent-relative constraint against the killing of innocent personsis a central principle in deontological moraltheories. In this article I make two claimsabout this constraint. First, I argue that somekillings of innocents performed incircumstances usually not taken to exculpatethe killer are not even pro tanto wrong.Second, I contend that either there is noagent-relative constraint against the killingof innocents or this constraint has a verydifferent shape from that which deontologistsnormally take it to have. My defence of theseclaims rests on two propositions. First, inkilling someone one may actually prolong thatperson's life. Roughly, life-prolongingkillings are possible, because to kill someoneis to perform an act that causes someone'sdeath and it might well be true that, had onenot performed this act, one's ``victim' wouldhave died earlier. Second, all other thingsbeing equal, killing and causing a person to beunconscious are morally equivalent. Both ofthese propositions are defended in thearticle.     

Citizens' Sense of Justice and the Legal System

When an actor commits a wrong action, citizens have perceptions of the kind of responsibility the actor incurs, the degree to which the act was mitigated or justified, and the appropriate punishment for the actor. The legislatively mandated law of criminal courts, statutes, and criminal codes deals with the same issues. Experimental evidence shows that there are important discrepancies between the principles that people and legal codes use to assign responsibility. That is, the moral retributive-justice principles that people use are sometimes in conflict with the directions in which modern code drafters are taking criminal law. These discrepancies may cause citizens to feel alienated from authority, and to reduce their voluntary compliance with legal codes.     

论民族道德与政治道德

民族道德与社会政治道德具有不可分割的关系。一般说来,民族道德易受制于政治道德,而民族道德又会反作用于政治道德,同时,民族道德与政治道德作为一种有联系的精神实体,又会在相互影响、相互作用的过程中协调发展。