Reply to William R. Ferrell's paper "Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: A single model for both"

William R. Ferrell's paper is a reply to our article "Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: Two different accounts", 1993, 34, 135–148 in this journal. Ferrell's critique centres around three issues: (1) The model of sensory discrimination proposed by Björkman et al. (1993) and discussed in Winman and Juslin (1993) is not new, (2) this model does not predict underconfidence, (3) there is no need for separate models of calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments. Below we respond to each of the three issues raised by Ferrell.     

Identifying the Effects of Unjustified Confidence versus Overconfidence: Lessons Learned from Two Analytic Methods

One of the most common findings in behavioral decision research is that people have unrealistic beliefs about how much they know. However, demonstrating that misplaced confidence exists does not necessarily mean that there are costs to it. This paper contrasts two approaches toward answering whether misplaced confidence is good or bad, which we have labeled the overconfidence and unjustified confidence approach. We first consider conceptual and analytic issues distinguishing these approaches. Then, we provide findings from a set of simulations designed to determine when the approaches produce different conclusions across a range of possible confidence–knowledge–outcome relationships. Finally, we illustrate the main findings from the simulations with three empirical examples drawn from our own data. We conclude that the unjustified confidence approach is typically the preferred approach, both because it is appropriate for testing a larger set of psychological mechanisms as well as for methodological reasons. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The recalcitrance of overconfidence and its contribution to decision aid neglect

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that people's overconfidence in the quality of their intuitive judgment strategies contributes to their reluctance to use helpful actuarial judgment aids. Participants engaged in a judgment task that required them to use five cues to decide whether a prospective juror favored physician‐assisted suicide. Participants had the opportunity to examine the judgments of a statistical equation that correctly classified 77% of the prospective jurors. In all experiments, participants infrequently examined the equation, performed worse than the equation, and were highly overconfident. In Experiments 1 and 2, outcome feedback and calibration feedback failed to reduce overconfidence. In Experiment 3, enhanced calibration feedback reduced overconfidence and increased reliance on the equation, thus leading to improved judgment performance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

学习困难与一般初中生过度自信特点的比较

采用比较研究的实验范式,从偏离校准、优于常人、控制错觉和过分乐观三个效应上比较学习困难初中生和一般初中生的过度自信特点。结果显示:(1)在"偏离校准"效应上,学习困难初中生在困难任务中和学习一般初中生同样存在过度自信的认知偏差,但在简单任务中则存在不自信。(2)在"优于常人"效应上,学习困难初中生和学习一般初中生都存在过度自信的认知偏差。简单任务中,他们认为自己"优于常人",而困难任务中,他们认为自己"差于常人"。(3)在"控制错觉和过分乐观"效应上,学习困难初中生和学习一般初中生都存在过度自信的认知偏差。男生比女生的过度自信程度更大。     

Partisanship,Political Knowledge,and the Dunning‐Kruger Effect

A widely cited finding in social psychology holds that individuals with low levels of competence will judge themselves to be higher achieving than they really are. In the present study, I examine how the so‐called “Dunning‐Kruger effect” conditions citizens' perceptions of political knowledgeability. While low performers on a political knowledge task are expected to engage in overconfident self‐placement and self‐assessment when reflecting on their performance, I also expect the increased salience of partisan identities to exacerbate this phenomenon due to the effects of directional motivated reasoning. Survey experimental results confirm the Dunning‐Kruger effect in the realm of political knowledge. They also show that individuals with moderately low political expertise rate themselves as increasingly politically knowledgeable when partisan identities are made salient. This below‐average group is also likely to rely on partisan source cues to evaluate the political knowledge of peers. In a concluding section, I comment on the meaning of these findings for contemporary debates about rational ignorance, motivated reasoning, and political polarization.     

The Effect of Information Strength and Weight on Behavior in Financial Markets

Griffin and Tversky (1992) explain evidence of individual over- and underconfidence as resulting from attending too much to the strength (i.e., extremity) of information and not enough to the weight (i.e., statistical reliability) of information. We report two experiments that demonstrate how information strength and weight affect confidence, trading, prices, and wealth in laboratory markets. Our results indicate that information strength and weight affect individual over- and underconfidence and that market participants lack sufficient self-insight to avoid trading when they are biased. As a consequence, market prices are biased, and market participants with high-strength, low-weight information systematically transfer wealth to participants with low-strength, high-weight information.     

Depressive Cognition: A Test of Depressive Realism Versus Negativity Using General Knowledge Questions

This research is an examination of whether cognition in depressed individuals incorporates a realistic view of the world or a general tendency toward negativity. Participants provided two types of probability judgments of the likelihood that they correctly answered general knowledge questions: the probability that they correctly answered each of the individual questions and an aggregate judgment, after completing the questionnaire, of the percentage of all the questions they thought they had correctly answered. These tasks generally elicit overconfidence and accuracy in nondepressives. In accord with theories of both depressive realism and general negativity, in their item-by-item assessments of their answers to the individual questions, depressed participants demonstrated less overconfidence than nondepressed participants. In accord with the theory of general negativity but not with the theory of depressive realism, however, depressed participants demonstrated underconfidence in their aggregate judgments. The implications of these findings on theories of depressive cognition are discussed.     

Narcissism,confidence, and risk attitude

The present research addresses whether narcissists are more overconfident than others and whether this overconfidence leads to deficits in decision making. In Study 1, narcissism predicted overconfidence. This was attributable to narcissists' greater confidence despite no greater accuracy. In Study 2, participants were offered fair bets on their answers. Narcissists lost significantly more points in this betting task than non‐narcissists, due both to their greater overconfidence and greater willingness to bet. Finally, in Study 3, narcissists' predictions of future performance were based on performance expectations rather than actual performance. This research extends the literature on betting on knowledge to the important personality dimension of narcissism. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why people fail to recognize their own incompetence

Successful negotiation of everyday life would seem to require people to possess insight about deficiencies in their intellectual and social skills. However, people tend to be blissfully unaware of their incompetence. This lack of awareness arises because poor performers are doubly cursed: Their lack of skill deprives them not only of the ability to produce correct responses, but also of the expertise necessary to surmise that they are not producing them. People base their perceptions of performance, in part, on their preconceived notions about their skills. Because these notions often do not correlate with objective performance, they can lead people to make judgments about their performance that have little to do with actual accomplishment.     

“过分自信”的研究及其跨文化差异

“过分自信”是一种偏离校准,是指人们关于一般知识问题的概率判断通常以某种方式偏离校准,这种偏离都偏高。跨文化系列研究表明：面对常识和概率判断问题,集体主义文化成员（如中国人）比个体主义文化成员（如美国人）更过分自信。文章在简要回顾“过分自信”研究的基础上,对“过分自信”的跨文化差异及原因进行了比较详细地介绍,并对“过分自信”跨文化差异研究的进一步发展和实际应用进行讨论。冀对以往的研究做初步的归纳和总结,促进决策领域中跨文化比较方面的研究得到进一步发展