Is it always fallacious to derive values from facts?

Since the time of David Hume, many philosophers have held that there is a logical Is/Ought gap. According to the doctrine of the Is/Ought gap, there are no valid (i.e., non-fallacious) arguments from purely factual premises about whatis the case to moral or normative conclusions about whatought to be. Occasionally, this doctrine has been challenged, but frequently it has been accepted without argumentation. Charles Pigden has recently argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden's argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, and does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic. Moreover, my argument does not rely, as other alleged counter-examples do, on controversial assumptions from Aristotelian biology about natures or ends, or about institutions such as promise-making.     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

Just Plain "Ought'

Is there any sense to the idea of an ``ought''that is not relative to any particularnormative framework? This ``ought'' would not bea moral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, orreligious ``ought,'' but rather an unqualified or just plain ``ought.'' Thispaper (i) argues for the existence andusefulness of just plain ``ought''; (ii) locatesthe concept of just plain ``ought'' within amajor strand in the history of ethics (namely,the perennial attempt to demonstrate thatmorality and prudence are in harmony); and(iii) challenges David Copp's recent attempt toshow that in fact there is no such thing asjust plain ``ought.'' A theory of just plain``ought'' emerges along the way.     

关于"亚道德"问题的思考

关于“亚道德”是否存在及其在特定条件下应否提倡,伦理学界存在着不同的观点和看法。事实上,正如违法行为可分为一般违法行为和严重违法行为一样,我们对非道德行为的审视和判定,也不应简单地遵循非此即彼的逻辑。非道德行为的“亚道德”和不道德的标准划分,有助于深化对人类行为复杂性的认识,有助于社会利益的更好维护,因此,笔者认为,无论从应然角度还是实然角度,“亚道德”的提倡都有其合理的根据。     

传统伦理学的价值伦理学转向

传统伦理学的价值伦理学转向,一是基于研究重心由“应当”问题转换为“德行之所以然”的问题,二是基于研究范式上由目的论、德性论、义务论等转换为价值论。作为传统伦理学的集大成者,康德伦理学一方面因其浓烈的价值论色彩而成为舍勒和N．哈特曼价值伦理学的前奏,另一方面因其“实质”内容缺失而致的形式主义又为后者的拓展提供了空间。舍勒,尤其是N．哈特曼的实质价值伦理学正是在康德伦理学的理论平台上得以建立的。     

TRANSCENDING IRONY

A more complete understanding of the biocultural evolutionary origins of the concept of ought as developed by David Hume and G. E. Moore may lower the philosophical barrier between is and ought and provide new insights about the separations between the domains of religion and science. If this conjecture is correct, the resulting wisdom will help transcend a major source of irony that Philip Hefner has so aptly identified in his essay.