Freedom in responsibility: a response.

This paper is a critical response to Elisabeth Gr?b-Schmidt's article "Freedom in responsibility: On the relevance of 'sin' as hermeneutic guiding principle in bioethical decision making." Gr?b-Schmidt's chief contention is that ethics begins with anthropology, and that moral responsibility is thereby grounded within a set of given limits. Freedom is distorted into sin when these limits are transgressed. My principal complaint is that her account of the relationship between freedom and sin is grounded in a tragic ontology. Alternatively, I contend that anthropology is grounded in Christology in which freedom is a gift of the Spirit. Consequently, sin is not so much tragic as it marks a refusal of humans to accept their divine election. The issues of human cloning and embryonic stem-cell research are used to exemplify what difference these respective differences might make in a process of moral deliberation.     

Mel Gibson’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Passion of the Christ</Emphasis> Seen Through Jewish Eyes

Mel Gibsons The Passion of the Christ has stirred up long simmering tensions between Christian, and Jews. This article, by someone of the Jewish faith who has for many years worked at a Presbyterian seminary, discusses Gibsons morbid—almost pornographic—fascination with violence, Gibsons theology of sin and atonement, and the dangers of Gibsons disparaging and inflammatory portrayal of Jews through the use of despicable stereotypes. Gibsons violence drenched Christianity is contrasted with a more tolerant Christianity rooted in love and justice.     

When confessing sin feels good

This paper draws on a qualitative study of how young people engaged in two youth ministries in the Church of Norway reflect on sin and shame in relation to their existential dilemmas . The authors analyze this practice through the lens of Hartmut Rosa's concept of resonance, arguing that there is consonance between how young people in the study express shame and the Lutheran understanding of sin as being curved in on oneself. Both sin and shame prevent the subject from being open to the world, thus constituting resistance to resonance. Yet, the practice of confessing sin may be a remedy to this closing in on oneself, as confession affords a resonant space, countering feelings of existential inadequacy caused by both sin and shame. Bringing the concept of vulnerability into the discussion, the paper further argues that confessing sin may prove healing and liberating also for experiences of shame as long as it does not violate the subject's ability to speak with her own voice or involve harmful god-images or harmful power dynamics.     

Reformation Humanism: Reading the Classics in the New Theology

Scholarly discussions on what constitutes Christian humanism in the Renaissance and Reformation periods have typically concentrated on its manifestations before 1536, when Erasmus died. In this period, the old arguments for the reading of the Classics once set out by Basil and Augustine still predominated. Calvin’s teaching on the Fall and the noetic effects of sin, however, provided another basis for the incorporation of pagan thought into Christian learning. Christians who followed Calvin benefited from his precise and comprehensive theological position on the place of worldly knowledge in God’s original creation as a means for justifying their study of the Classics.     

RETHINKING THE IMAGE OF GOD

Abstract The present ecological crisis imposes a rethinking of the relation between the human being and the rest of nature. Traditional theological articulations of this relation have proven problematic where they foster separatism and anthropocentrism, which give a false report on the relation and have a negative impact on thinking and acting in relation to nature. One place to begin rethinking is through an exploration of the affirmation that the human being is “made in the image of God,”imago dei. Some ways of construing the theological meaning of this designation are more helpful than others. Science has recognized the extent to which the human being is not only dependent upon but even emergent from nature. We are made of the same “stuff” that makes up the rest of the universe. We are nature. The place of the human being is much more modest, recent, and precarious than usually acknowledged in theological reflection. New ways of interpreting our role within nature must evolve out of this new understanding. Philip Hefner has proposed that we think of the human being as created co‐creator. His is a distinctive and promising contribution. This essay responds with both affirmations and friendly questions.     

幽明之故与天人之际--从船山易学的视域看

易学具有一个言幽明而不言有无的视域,明清之际的思想家王夫之的研究表明,从这个视域可以更为深入地理解中国哲学的基本问题:天人之际.天人之际的根本回答不在于流俗所理解的"天人合一",而在于天人相继.通过天人相继,确立的是人的自由以及人道的基本依据.而且,在幽明之故的视野中,还可以生发出中国古典思想对原善问题的基本理解,善不是别的,正是在人道的畛域内发生的对天人之间的存在连续性的努力.     

"象思维"视野下的"易道"

"易道"的根本在于,观物取象,并进而在象的流动与转化中洞察出卦象,由卦象以尽意."象思维"的本质在于"非实体性",而这种非实体性使<周易>的象思维具有"原发创生"性,并且表现出与西方实体性的概念思维本质不同.从原发创生的视角观之,历史上和今天关于卦爻之象数与卦爻辞哪个根本的问题,可以归结为原发创生的"筑象"过程."原发创生",就是无极而太极之生,是"无中生有"和"有中见无"之生.     

Responsibility, Passion, and Sin: A Reassessment of Abelard's Ethics

This article reassesses Peter Abelard's account of moral intention,or, better, consent, in light of recent work on his own thought and on the twelfth-century background of that thought. The author argues (1) that Abelard's focus on consent as the determining factor for morality does not rule out, but, on the contrary, presupposes objective criteria for moral judgment and (2) that Abelard's real innovation does not lie in hisdoctrine of consent as the sole source of merit or guilt, but, rather, in his exploration of the ways in which this doctrine affects our understanding of the objective criteria for moral judgment. In particular, Abelard is led by his doctrine of consent to a thoroughgoing reassessment of the moral significance of the passions, which, in turn, leads him to reject the view that actions should be evaluated in terms of the praiseworthy or vicious character of the passions they express.     

Splendid Vices and Secular Virtues: Variations on Milbank's Augustine

John Milbank's case against secular reason draws much of its authority and force from Augustine's critique of pagan virtue. Theology and Social Theory could be characterized, without too much insult to either Augustine or Milbank, as a postmodern City of God. Modern preoccupations with secular virtues, marketplace values, and sociological bottom‐lines are likened there to classically pagan preoccupations with the virtues of self‐conquest and conquest over others. Against both modern and antique “ontological violence” (where ‘to be’ is ‘to be antagonistic’), Milbank advances an Augustinian hope for the peace that is both beyond and prior to the peace of (temporarily) repressed antagonism. One aim of this essay is to consider whether virtues conceived out of such a hope are really all that different from the virtues they are taken to replace. I take a critical look at Augustine's critique of pagan virtue, Milbank's appropriation of that critique, the applicability of that critique to Plato, and the polemical value of Augustine's notion of original sin. I end up being skeptical of the notion of a peculiarly Christian way to turn antagonistically conceived virtues into love, but I am not unsympathetic to Milbank's concerns about a loveless and self‐complacent secularity.     

LYING TO THE NAZI AT THE DOOR

Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that lying is never permissible under any circumstances, but none has offered a satisfactory answer to the question of what one ought to do when facing such a dilemma. I argue that there can be no morally satisfying answer to this question, because every possible action will involve some degree of sin, even if lying is the least sinful action. This should not lead us to redefine what it means to tell a lie, nor to say that lying to the intruder is a good or right action; rather, it should lead us to acknowledge the tragic dimension of life in a fallen world.