Daily life with early orphanhood from HIV/AIDS: An exploratory study

This study explored the everyday lived life by South African early adolescents orphaned by HIV/AIDS. Informants were ten early adolescents (age range 12 to 14 years; females?=?6; males?=?4) from a low socioeconomic status neighbourhood of Johannesburg. The adolescents completed autobiographical essays and in-depth individual interviews on their quality of life in the school, home, and community. Thematic analysis of the data revealed the early adolescents, orphaned due to HIV/AIDS, to experience extreme sadness, anxiety, and fear. Their sense of emotional distress was compounded by living in material and relational poverty, with frequent exposure to bullying at school, and crime in their neighbourhood. Integrated psycho-social interventions addressing both material and relational poverty might enhance the physical and psycho-social well-being of adolescents with orphanhood from HIV/AIDS.     

Safe Danger – On the Experience of Challenge,Adventure and Risk in Education

This article reconsiders the presence and value of danger in outdoor and adventurous activities and sports in safety-conscious societies, especially in relation to the education of children and youth. Based on an original analysis of the relation between the concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘danger’, we offer an account of the relation between challenge, adventure, risk and danger, and emphasise the importance of teaching risk recognition, risk assessment, risk management and risk avoidance to children and youth, without the necessity of exposing them to jeopardy in dangerous situations. Our conclusion is that ‘Safe Danger’ describes what educators should seek, namely: the educational benefits of the challenges set by risk-taking and the demands of risk-facing, including those in adventurous situations, which are obtainable in the absence of significant danger, and which contribute to risk education. The educational value of adventurous and outdoor pursuits lies elsewhere than in the opportunities that they present for danger-facing, for example in their promotion of self-reliance, confidence, ability to team-work, and especially in their promotion of risk education, as an integral aspect of everyday life planning, as preparation for the day’s adventurous challenges, and as an instrument of task completion.     

Uncertainty,Indeterminacy, and Agent-Centred Constraints

Common-sense morality includes various agent-centred constraints, including ones against killing unnecessarily and breaking a promise. However, it's not always clear whether, had an agent ?-ed, she would have violated a constraint. And sometimes the reason for this is not that we lack knowledge of the relevant facts, but that there is no fact about whether her ?-ing would have constituted a constraint-violation. What, then, is a constraint-accepting theory (that is, a theory that includes such constraints) to say about whether it would have been permissible for her to have ?-ed? In this paper, I canvass various possible approaches to answering this question and I argue that teleology offers the most plausible approach—teleology being the view that every act has its deontic status in virtue of how its outcome (or prospect) ranks, relative to those of its alternatives. So although, until recently, it had been thought that only deontological theories can accommodate constraints, it turns out that teleological theories not only can accommodate constraints, but can do so more plausibly than deontological theories can.     

Adolescent risk-taking is predicted by individual differences in cognitive control over emotional,but not non-emotional,response conflict

While much research on adolescent risk behaviour has focused on the development of prefrontal self-regulatory mechanisms, prior studies have elicited mixed evidence of a relationship between individual differences in the capacity for self-regulation and individual differences in risk taking. To explain these inconsistent findings, it has been suggested that the capacity for self-regulation may be, for most adolescents, adequately mature to produce adaptive behaviour in non-affective, “cold” circumstances, but that adolescents have a more difficult time exerting control in affective, “hot” contexts. To further explore this claim, the present study examined individual differences in self-control in the face of affective and non-affective response conflict, and examined whether differences in the functioning of cognitive control processes under these different conditions was related to risk taking. Participants completed a cognitive Stroop task, an emotional Stroop task, and a risky driving task known as the Stoplight game. Regression analyses showed that performance on the emotional Stroop task predicted laboratory risk-taking in the driving task, whereas performance on the cognitive Stroop task did not exhibit the same trend. This pattern of results is consistent with theories of adolescent risk-taking that emphasise the impacts of affective contextual influences on the ability to enact effective cognitive control.     

How Does Explicit Versus Implicit Risk Information Influence Adolescent Risk‐Taking Engagement?

Adolescents have been shown to be more likely to engage in risky behaviors in daily life. Many studies have indicated that adolescents could make advantageous choices when they receive explicit information but could fail to choose advantageously when they are not informed about risks. The current study aimed to examine the influence of explicit risk information (i.e., when risk information is directly available) versus implicit risk information (i.e., when risk information has to be learned from feedback) on risk‐taking engagement, in order to clarify whether the enhanced risk‐taking observed in decision making under ambiguity in adolescents results from either a greater exploration of ambiguous situations (i.e., a higher ambiguity tolerance) or a specific difficulty associated with learning based on previous choices' outcomes. Adolescents and young adults completed a new adaptation of the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. They were required to accumulate as many points as possible by inflating balloons associated with variable break points and avoiding explosions. This adaptation involved a manipulation of the information level with two conditions, an “informed” condition and a “noninformed” condition, in which the participants had to learn the matching of colors with balloons' resistances based on feedback. The results demonstrated that providing explicit risk information allows adolescents to be as efficient as adults at the end of the game. In contrast, adolescents failed to adjust risk‐taking to the balloon resistance in the noninformed condition. These findings critically suggest that this failure reflects a specific impairment of feedback‐based learning ability but not a global excess of risk‐taking during adolescence. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Structure of the Dospert: Is There Evidence for a General Risk Factor?

The Domain‐specific Risk‐taking scale was designed to assess risk taking in specific domains. This approach is unconventional in personality assessment but reflects conventional wisdom in the decision community that cross‐situational consistency in risk taking is more myth than reality. We applied bifactor analysis to a large sample (n = 921) of responses to the Domain‐specific Risk Taking. Results showed that, in addition to domain‐specific facets, there does appear to be evidence for a general risk‐taking disposition. And this general appetite for risk appears to be useful for predicting real‐world outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Narcissism and Performance on Behavioral Decision‐making Tasks

Three studies examined narcissism and behavioral decision making. Decision‐making tasks included the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Studies 1–3), Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Studies 1–3), Columbia Card Task (CCT; Studies 2 and 3), and Game of Dice Task (Study 3). To tease apart the contributions of grandiose narcissism (i.e., narcissism found in the general population), pathological narcissism, and narcissistic traits (i.e., grandiosity, entitlement, and exploitativeness) in decision making, we assessed grandiose narcissism in Studies 1 (n = 380) and 2 (n = 244), pathological narcissism in Study 2, and the narcissistic traits in Study 3 (n = 312). Grandiose and pathological narcissism failed to predict decision making regardless of whether or not decision making included immediate feedback. In Study 3, the narcissistic trait of grandiosity (i.e., having an inflated sense of self‐importance) was associated with greater risk taking on the CCT‐hot (i.e., provided immediate feedback), and entitlement was associated with greater risk taking on the IGT. Measurement and applied implications are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behaving Optimistically: How the (Un)Desirability of an Outcome Can Bias People's Preparations for It

Past research on the desirability bias and on bracing for bad news has focused on the potential influence of outcome desirability on people's stated expectations. The present studies examined its influence on behavior—that is, what is done in anticipation of, or preparation for, an uncertain outcome. In five studies, the desirability of possible outcomes for an event, which was uncertain and uncontrollable by the participant, was manipulated, and preparation behavior was measured. Study 1 used a hypothetical‐events paradigm. Studies 2 and 3 involved a computer activity in which behavior was tracked on a trial‐by‐trial basis. In Studies 4 and 5, the uncertain event was the ending of a videotaped basketball game. Rather than exhibiting bracing or a reluctance to tempt fate, participants tended to behave in a manner consistent with an optimistic desirability bias. In a subset of studies, predictions and likelihood judgments were also solicited; the differential effects of outcome desirability on these measures are discussed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Well Do We Know Our Inner Daredevil? Probing the Relationship Between Self‐Report and Behavioral Measures of Risk Taking

To measure a person's risk‐taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self‐report scales (e.g., “Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior”) and more direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., “Do you accept or reject the risky option?”). It is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined the relationship between self‐report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred participants (aged 19–85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal‐detection approach showed that people's likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings and choice. Further, older adults' likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly than younger adults'. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the study of risk‐taking propensity, which have often relied on self‐reported risk tendency for ambiguous activities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Numeracy Predicts More Effortful and Elaborative Search Strategies in a Complex Risky Choice Context: A Process‐Tracing Approach

The goal of the current study was to explore information search and processing differences between individuals who are less and more numerate in an attempt to better understand the mechanisms that might differentiate the choices they make. We did so using a computerized process‐tracing system known as MouseTrace, which presented monetary gambles in an alternative × attribute matrix with outcome (dollar amount) and probability information as attributes. This information was initially occluded but could be revealed by clicking on the cell that contained the desired information. Beginning with nine gambles offering the chance of gaining or losing a specified amount, participants (N = 110) narrowed down the options (to three and then one) using an inclusion or exclusion strategy. Consistent with previous research, inclusion was a more effortful strategy, and individuals who were higher in numeracy were more likely to select prospects with the highest expected value. Process measures revealed these individuals expended more effort (i.e., attended to and sought out more information and processed it in greater depth) and exhibited more compensatory processing than those who were lower in numeracy, but this sometimes depended on whether one was asked to include or exclude. These results serve as further evidence that individuals with higher levels of numeracy often engage in more elaborative processing of the decision task, which tends to lead to more optimal choices. However, they also suggest that individuals are adaptive and that the specific situation can matter. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.