Valorisation de la recherche en santé humaine et protection des données à l’ère du numérique

Medical research collects a huge number of medical data sheltered in Data Centers. An European regulation rule (GDRP) or General Data Protection Regulation aims to give an ethic frame to protect personal data and delegate responsability to citizens.     

Recherche sur données : aspects juridiques et éthiques à travers l’expérience de l’hôpital Foch

Health data is the object of covetousness by many actors, of course by the healthcare industry, in particular the drug and medical device industry, by hospitals and research institutes, but also by all types of merchant companies which would like to derive substantial benefits from it. Faced with this phenomenon, the European Commission, within the framework of the replacement of the European Directive on health data of 1995, by the General Data Protection Regulation of 2016 (GDPR) has strengthened the protection of health data which is particularly sensitive data for everyone and, consequently, carrying out studies on health data. Researches that does not involve human beings, improperly called “Data studies”, are closely regulated by the GDPR and, for France, by the Data Protection Act, which has been amended accordingly. This article describes the steps to be taken for the implementation of data studies and what are the rights of participants/patients in the context of these researchs. Ethical vigilance would require that such research be reviewed by an ad hoc committee.     

Association rule learning in neuropsychological data analysis for Alzheimer’s disease

Efficient methods of analysis readily available for clinicians continue to be limited within neuropsychological assessment at the raw data level. Here, a novel approach for generating predictive response patterns and analysing neuropsychological raw data is offered. In order to assess the usefulness of association rule learning as an analysis tool for neuropsychological raw data, Frequent Pattern Growth (FP-Growth) was used to mine patterns from the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease Neuropsychological Battery (CERAD-NB) database. Complete assessment data for 84 post-mortem confirmed Alzheimer’s disease (AD) cases and 294 age, race, and education matched controls were analysed across baseline and one-year follow-up using FP-Growth, for the purpose of assessing the clinical utility of a finer analysis at the raw data level and the feasibility of predicting response patterns for clinical/control groups. Output from FP-Growth, in terms of the number of frequent itemsets retained across both evaluation timepoints, was discernable between controls, mild, and moderate to severe Alzheimer’s disease cases (p < .001, and η² = .488). Patterns within raw data scores, both in terms of frequent itemsets and predictive association rules, appear to be differentiable across groups within neuropsychological analysis, which indicates that FP-Growth is applicable as a supplementary analysis tool for neuropsychological assessment by means of offering an additional level of data analysis, predictive item response capabilities, and aiding in clinical decision making.     

The duality of non-conceptual content in Husserl’s phenomenology of perception

Recently, a number of epistemologists have argued that there are no non-conceptual elements in representational content. On their view, the only sort of non-conceptual elements are components of sub-personal organic hardware that, because they enjoy no veridical role, must be construed epistemologically irrelevant. By reviewing a 35-year-old debate initiated by Dagfinn Følledal, I believe Husserlian phenomenology can be updated to offer an important contribution to this discussion. On my interpretation, what Husserl calls “hyletic data” may be read as that subjective quality of experience inarticulable as a propositional attitude – and, thus, hyletic data are non-conceptual. In anticipation of the recent conceptualist position, Føllesdal and his adherents argued that what Husserl had called “noema” or representational content is, however, entirely conceptual. A closer inspection of the relevant texts, however, reveals that Husserl admits non-conceptual elements into his characterization of the noema. If that is correct, then Husserl must have been a dualist about non-conceptual content. In turn, I believe what explains this dualism is a non-foundationalist reconstruction of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction.An earlier version of this paper was delivered at Fordham University on the occasion of the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Husserl Circle. I am grateful to Prof. Steven Crowell who, in his capacity as respondent, offered incisive and helpful commentary. I also thank Prof. John J. Drummond for organizing the meeting, and all those present during my talk; as well as two anonymous reviewers for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, who offered helpful questions and comments.