HIERARCHIES: THE CORE ARGUMENT FOR A NATURALISTIC CHRISTIAN FAITH

This article takes on a perhaps impossible task: not only to reconstruct the core argument of Arthur Peacocke's program in science and religion but also to evaluate it in two major areas where it would seem to be vulnerable, namely, more recent developments in systems biology and the philosophy of mind. If his theory of hierarchies is to be successful, it must stand up to developments in these two areas and then be able to apply the results in a productive way to Christian theological reflection. Peacocke recognized that one's model of the mind‐body relation is crucial for one's position on the God‐world relation and divine action. Of the three models that he constructed, it turns out that only the third can serve as a viable model for theology if it is to be more than purely deistic or metaphorical.     

Propositions, Sets, and Worlds

If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal. I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006.     

误诊误治病例所致医疗纠纷分析——附3例报告

当前医疗科技发展的相对性、疾病规律本身的复杂多变性、医生医疗知识的局限性等,导致了临床误诊误治的不可避免性,而医院发生的医疗纠纷事件中,大多是由于误诊误治所致。通过对3例误诊病例及所致医疗纠纷的分析,指出临床误诊误治的客观性、主观性及不可避免性。同时提示临床医师在疾病诊治过程中,随时更新医疗知识,注意疾病的鉴别诊断,及时完善相关的辅助检查,积极治疗,减少对疾病的延误诊治,减轻病人痛苦,改善医患关系,从而减少医疗纠纷。     

On Fork Arrow Logic and its Expressive Power

We compare fork arrow logic, an extension of arrow logic, and its natural first-order counterpart (the correspondence language) and show that both have the same expressive power. Arrow logic is a modal logic for reasoning about arrow structures, its expressive power is limited to a bounded fragment of first-order logic. Fork arrow logic is obtained by adding to arrow logic the fork modality (related to parallelism and synchronization). As a result, fork arrow logic attains the expressive power of its first-order correspondence language, so both can express the same input–output behavior of processes.     

Autoshaping and automaintenance: a neural-network approach

This article presents an interpretation of autoshaping, and positive and negative automaintenance, based on a neural-network model. The model makes no distinction between operant and respondent learning mechanisms, and takes into account knowledge of hippocampal and dopaminergic systems. Four simulations were run, each one using an A-B-A design and four instances of feedfoward architectures. In A, networks received a positive contingency between inputs that simulated a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an input that simulated an unconditioned stimulus (US). Responding was simulated as an output activation that was neither elicited by nor required for the US. B was an omission-training procedure. Response directedness was defined as sensory feedback from responding, simulated as a dependence of other inputs on responding. In Simulation 1, the phenomena were simulated with a fully connected architecture and maximally intense response feedback. The other simulations used a partially connected architecture without competition between CS and response feedback. In Simulation 2, a maximally intense feedback resulted in substantial autoshaping and automaintenance. In Simulation 3, eliminating response feedback interfered substantially with autoshaping and automaintenance. In Simulation 4, intermediate autoshaping and automaintenance resulted from an intermediate response feedback. Implications for the operant-respondent distinction and the behavior-neuroscience relation are discussed.     

What is Classical Mereology?

Classical mereology is a formal theory of the part-whole relation, essentially involving a notion of mereological fusion, or sum. There are various different definitions of fusion in the literature, and various axiomatizations for classical mereology. Though the equivalence of the definitions of fusion is provable from axiom sets, the definitions are not logically equivalent, and, hence, are not inter-changeable when laying down the axioms. We examine the relations between the main definitions of fusion and correct some technical errors in prominent discussions of the axiomatization of mereology. We show the equivalence of four different ways to axiomatize classical mereology, using three different notions of fusion. We also clarify the connection between classical mereology and complete Boolean algebra by giving two “neutral” axiom sets which can be supplemented by one or the other of two simple axioms to yield the full theories; one of these uses a notion of “strong complement” that helps explicate the connections between the theories.     

Sociopsychological profiles of students that leave the ingroup or engage in social competition

We present a study of the sociopsychological profiles of students who are disposed to engage in social competition on behalf of ingroup interests. Five predictors were selected: the advantageous or unfavourable context for ingroup interests, group identification, meritocracy, just-world beliefs, and social dominance orientation. It was found that those students who were prepared to invest personal resources on behalf of ingroup interests were characterized by a strong group identification and middle or low scores in the meritocracy and social dominance orientation. In contrast, students with the lowest disposition to social competition were defined by their low identification and/or middle-high scores in the meritocracy and social dominance orientation. Against our expectation, the manipulation of the favourable versus unfavourable situation of the ingroup did not have a significant influence. In order of their importance, the variables that showed stronger effects were group identification, followed by meritocracy, social dominance orientation, and world-just beliefs.     

The neighbor and the infinite: Marion and Levinas on the encounter between self,human other,and God

In this article I examine Jean-Luc Marion's two-fold criticism of Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of other and self, namely that Levinas remains unable to overcome ontological difference in Totality and Infinity and does so successfully only with the notion of the appeal in Otherwise than Being and that his account of alterity is ambiguous in failing to distinguish clearly between human and divine other. I outline Levinas’ response to this criticism and then critically examine Marion's own account of subjectivity that attempts to go beyond Levinas in its emphasis on a pure or anonymous appeal. I criticize this move as rather problematic and turn instead back to Levinas for a more convincing account of the relations between self, human other, and God. In this context, I also show that Levinas in fact draws quite careful distinctions between human and divine others.     

On the Value of Coming into Existence

In this paper I argue that coming into existence can benefit (or harm) aperson. My argument incorporates the comparative claim that existence canbe better (or worse) for a person than never existing. Since these claimsare highly controversial, I consider and reject a number of objectionswhich threaten them. These objections raise various semantic, logical,metaphysical and value-theoretical issues. I then suggest that there is animportant sense in which it can harm (or benefit) a person not to comeinto existence. Again, I consider and reject some objections. Finally, Ibriefly consider what the conclusions reached in this paper imply for ourmoral obligations to possible future people.     

Thinking about the past,present, and future: Time perspective and self-esteem in adolescents,young adults,middle-aged adults,and older adults

We examined time perspective and self-esteem in adolescents, young adults, middle-aged adults, and older adults. Time perspective was measured with scales that assess relative orientations and relationships among the past, present, and future. Age effects were examined with standard analytic strategies to determine categorical differences between age groups and with new statistical techniques designed to show continuous age patterns. Findings indicated that (1) thinking about the future was greatest for adolescents and young adults and lowest for middle-aged and older adults, and thinking about the present increased across ages; (2) fewer adolescents and middle-aged participants perceived that the time periods were interrelated compared to younger and older adults; and (3) across ages, a greater emphasis towards the past compared to other time periods was associated with lower self-esteem, whereas emphasizing the present and the future jointly was associated with higher self-esteem.