Reductionism in Fallacy Theory

(1) The aim of the paper is to develop a reduction of fallacy theory, i.e. to 'deduce' fallacy theory from a positive theory of argumentation which provides exact criteria for valid and adequate argumentation. Such reductionism has several advantages compared to an unsystematic action, which is quite usual in current fallacy but which at least in part is due to the poor state of positive argumentation theory itself. (2) After defining 'fallacy' (3) some principle ideas and (4) the exact criteria for (argumentatively) valid and adequate arguments of the 'practical theory of argumentation' of the author are expounded. These criteria will be used as the positive basis for the following reduction. (5) In the main part of the paper a systematization, definition and explanation of the main types and many subforms of fallacies of argumentative validity and (6) adequacy is developed, following the list of positive conditions of validity and adequacy. In addition to many new types of fallacies, this systematization contains the most important of the traditionally known and named fallacies; these are explained and the criteria for some of them are corrected or put more precisely.     

Slippery Slopes and Collapsing Taboos

A slippery slope argument is an argument to this twofold effect. First, that if a policy or practice P is permitted, then we lack the dialectical resources to demonstrate that a similar policy or practice P* is not permissible. Since P* is indeed not permissible, we should not endorse policy or practice P. At the heart of such arguments is the idea of dialectical impotence, the inability to stop the acceptance of apparently small deviations from a heretofore secure policy or practice from leading to apparently large and unacceptable deviations. Using examples of analogical arguments and sorites arguments I examine this phenomenon in the context of collapsing taboos.     

Identification of Matrices in Science and Engineering

Engineering science is a scientific discipline that from the point of view of epistemology and the philosophy of science has been somewhat neglected. When engineering science was under philosophical scrutiny it often just involved the question of whether engineering is a spin-off of pure and applied science and their methods. We, however, hold that engineering is a science governed by its own epistemology, methodology and ontology. This point is systematically argued by comparing the different sciences with respect to a particular set of characterization criteria. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

概念改变的本体类别研究

概念改变是科学学习和教学的重要问题。研究表明有些错误概念难于转变,本文从本体类别的观点出发,阐释了错误概念难于改变的原因,进而细致地分析了力的概念,以支持本体类别的观点,最后提出跨本体类别间概念改变的教学对策。     

Metadialogues for Resolving Burden of Proof Disputes

In this paper, a solution to the problem of analyzing burden of proof in argumentation is developed by building on the pioneering work of Erik C. W. Krabbe on metadialogues. Three classic cases of burden of proof disputes are analyzed, showing how metadialogue theory can solve the problems they pose. The solution is based on five dialectical requirements: (1) global burden of proof needs to be set at the confrontation stage of a dialogue, (2) there need to be special mechanisms for resolving disputes about burden of proof at all four stages of the dialogue, (3) they are especially significant during the argumentation stage, where burden of proof often shifts back and forth at each move, (4) such local shifts need to be partly regulated by the global burden of proof already set, and (5) the connection between burden of proof and the speech act of making a presumption in a dialogue needs to be clarified.     

Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? (Dedicated to the Memory of R.M. Chisholm, 1916–1999)

Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.     

明清之际在华耶稣会士之《易》说

近代之前易学的某些内容就已传入西方世界,例如数学化的洛书图式即是其例。西方人真正对《易经》展开研究是在近代时期,开创者是明清之际来华的耶稣会士。随着《易经》的译介,易学作为西方汉学最初的课题确立起来,迄今已逾四百年历史。本文是对以利玛窦、白晋为代表的耶稣会士之《易》说而作的初步梳理。这种梳理带有哲学分析的性质,显示耶稣会士围绕太极之辨而突出的宗教性的哲学立场。耶稣会士一般推崇早期儒学及中国哲学原典,对理学和宋易则颇有批评,这就使他们卷入当时中西学界的复杂的学术纷争。对这场持续近二百年的学术论辩仍有待展开更为系统而深入的研究。     

Johnson on the Metaphysics of Argument

This paper responds to two aspects of Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). The first is his critique of deductivism. The second is his failure to make room for some species of argument (e.g., visual and kisceral arguments) proposed by recent commentators. In the first case, Johnson holds that argumentation theorists have adopted a notion of argument which is too narrow. In the second, that they have adopted one which is too broad. I discuss the case Johnson makes for both claims, and possible objections to his analysis.     

Objectivist conditions for defeat and evolutionary debunking arguments

I make a case for distinguishing clearly between subjective and objective accounts of undercutting defeat and for rejecting a hybrid view that takes both subjective and objective elements to be relevant for whether or not a belief is defeated. Moderate subjectivists claim that taking a belief to be defeated is sufficient for the belief to be defeated; subjectivist idealists add that if an idealised agent takes a belief to be defeated then the belief is defeated. Subjectivist idealism evades some of the objections levelled against moderate subjectivism but can be shown to yield inconsistent results in some cases. Both subjectivisms should be rejected. We should be objectivists regarding undercutting defeat. This requirement, however, is likely to be problematic for a popular interpretation of evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics as it can be shown that existing objectivist accounts of defeat do not support such arguments. I end by discussing the constraints of developing such an account.     

When Conflict Traumas Fragment: Investigating the Sociopsychological Roots of Turkey’s Intractable Conflict

This article investigates the historical processes contributing towards the specific development of Turkey after the 1920s that in turn established the main contours of Turkey's conflict with the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK). It first argues that the traumatic conflict memories of the Turkish leadership (1918–35) influenced its individual‐level patterns of actions. These memories were used by the leadership to consolidate its imagined national agency in Turkey. The leadership perceived the traditional‐conservative groups as ontological insecurity sources, jeopardizing this agency. It second claims that Turkey's military apparatus is designed to silence these ontological insecurity sources. Finally, it claims these developments informed the ways in which the PKK's narratives of rebellion were constructed. Empirically, it problematizes the impact of the Ottoman Empire's collapse on the Turkish elites. Then, through a discourse analysis of elites' speeches and legal documents, it traces their anxieties to the Ottoman Empire's traumatic end. This article contributes to the trauma literature on ontological security and the emotions literature in International Relations in two ways. It first explores the particular national context in which traumatic memories are shaped and in turn articulated through emotional performances. Secondly, it shows the interplay between sociopsychological processes of security and agency making.