Adjusting for the correspondence bias: Effects of causal uncertainty, cognitive busyness, and causal strength of situational information

This research examined the conditions under which people who have more chronic doubt about their ability to make sense of social behavior (i.e., are causally uncertain; [Weary and Edwards, 1994] and [Weary and Edwards, 1996]) are more likely to adjust their dispositional inferences for a target’s behaviors. Using a cognitive busyness manipulation within the attitude attribution paradigm, we found in Study 1 that higher causal uncertainty predicted increased correction of dispositional inferences, but only when participants had sufficient attentional resources to devote to the task. In Study 2, we found that higher-causal uncertainty predicted greater inferential correction, but only when the additional information provided a more compelling alternative explanation for the observed behavior. Results of this research are discussed in terms of their relevance to the Causal Uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and dispositional inference models.     

Experimental studies of sequential selection and assignment with relative ranks

We study a class of sequential selection and assignment problems in which a decision maker (DM) must sequentially assign applicants to positions with the objective of minimizing expected cost. In modeling this class of problems, we assume that on each period the DM is only informed of the rank of the present applicant relative to the applicants that she previously observed and assigned. We first present the optimal decision policy that we subsequently use as a normative benchmark, and then report results from three experiments designed to study sequential assignment behavior. In comparing the aggregate results from all three experiments to the optimal decision policy, we identify a systematic bias, called the middleness bias, to over‐assign applicants to intermediate positions. The results also reveal a strong bias for early applicants to be over‐assigned to important positions. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于职业的内隐年龄偏见

本研究针对119名大学生,采用内隐联想测验(Implicit Associa-tion Test,IAT)和相应的外显报告法,考察大学生针对不同职业的内隐与外显年龄偏见。结果表明,在大学生中普遍存在基于职业的内隐年龄偏见;职业年龄偏见是双向的,即有的职业偏好年轻人,有些职业偏好年长者;而且有些被试的内隐和外显态度存在不一致性。     

社交焦虑个体对于不同威胁信息的注意偏向

目的:研究社交焦虑个体对不同类型词语的注意偏向。方法:被试41名,采用情绪Stroop范式,研究词与非词不同比例条件下高低社交焦虑个体对不同类型词(被关注词、被评价词、躯体威胁性词、中性词和非词)的注意偏向。结果:在词和非词比例高的条件下,高社交焦虑组在负性评价词和受他人关注词上的Stroop效应显著大于低社交焦虑组。结论:高社交焦虑个体对负性评价和他人关注的词语存在注意偏向。     

乐观主义研究简介

乐观主义是一种积极的人格特征,是对未来发生事件的正性预期的倾向,也是一种对人对事的态度。本文在回顾了乐观主义的测量、乐观主义的影响因素、乐观主义的作用机制、乐观主义与现实性的关系的基础上,并对今后的研究方向进行了探讨。     

Using narratives to explore other-directed occupational choice and academic success

The construct of “other-directed versus self-directed career choice” has existed for quite some time. The current focus of vocational psychologists and counselors has made them question the relevance of this construct for contemporary American society. Many counselors today challenge the assumption that a career choice based on others’ expectations is problematic. This longitudinal study utilized a logistic regression analysis to determine whether self-directed or other-directed status, as measured by the Thematic Apperception Test related to success with which individuals enacted career choices. The sample consisted of 433 BS/MD students enrolled in a Bachelor of Science-Doctor of Medicine (BS/MD) degree program at a Midwestern medical college. The findings showed that self-directed or other-directed career choice did not predict academic success.     

They should have known: Hindsight and outcome biases in child abduction cases

Two cognitive biases might partially account for public support of the ineffective AMBER Alert system. Hindsight bias is a cognitive error in which people with outcome knowledge overestimate the likelihood that this particular outcome would occur; outcome bias is an error made in evaluating the quality of a decision once the outcome is known. Two experiments assessed whether hindsight and outcome bias occur in child abduction scenarios. Study 1 was a pre/posttest experiment that examined whether hindsight bias occurs in situations in which the identity of the abductor (stranger or parent) is manipulated between groups, and all participants are told the child was killed. Study 2, a between-subjects experiment, examined whether hindsight and outcome biases occur in situations in which no AMBER Alert was issued (because the situation did not meet the legal requirements to issue an Alert), and manipulated the identity of the abductor and the outcome (child safely returned, killed, or not outcome provided). Hindsight and outcome biases occurred in both studies, given the correct set of circumstances. Abductor identity also impacted outcome estimates. Results from the two studies indicate that hindsight and outcome bias occur, but this is dependent on the outcome (child killed, child returned safely, no outcome provided) and the identity of the abductor (stranger, dangerous parent, non-dangerous parent). Limitations and future directions are discussed.     

Evaluating complex interventions: Perspectives and issues for health behaviour change interventions

Objective: Health behaviour change interventions (HBCIs), used in health education, health promotion, patient education and psychotherapy areas, are considered complex interventions. The objective of this article is to discuss the value and limitations of using randomised clinical trials (RCTs) to asses HBCIs.

Methods: A scoping review of the literature was conducted to identify the main challenges of using RCTs for evaluating HBCIs. The issues were illustrated by case studies selected from research conducted by our multidisciplinary team.

Results: In complex interventions, effects are produced not only by the intervention, but are strongly linked to context. Issues relating to transferability of results are therefore critical, and require adjustments to the RCT model. Sampling bias, biases related to the experimental conditions and biases due to the absence of double-blindness were examined and illustrated by case studies.

Conclusion: The results underline the importance of a multidisciplinary approach. They call for adapted or alternative evaluation models that overcome the limitations of RCTs.     

Implicit bias,confabulation, and epistemic innocence

In this paper I explore the nature of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias. I claim that such explanations can have significant epistemic benefits in spite of their obvious epistemic costs, and that such benefits are not otherwise obtainable by the subject at the time at which the explanation is offered. I start by outlining the kinds of cases I have in mind, before characterising the phenomenon of confabulation by focusing on a few common features. Then I introduce the notion of epistemic innocence to capture the epistemic status of those cognitions which have both obvious epistemic faults and some significant epistemic benefit. A cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some epistemic benefit to the subject which would not be attainable otherwise because alternative (less epistemically faulty) cognitions that could deliver the same benefit are unavailable to the subject at that time. I ask whether confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias have epistemic benefits and whether there are genuine alternatives to forming a confabulatory explanation in the circumstances in which subjects confabulate. On the basis of my analysis of confabulatory explanations of actions guided by implicit bias, I argue that such explanations have the potential for epistemic innocence. I conclude that epistemic evaluation of confabulatory explanations of action guided by implicit bias ought to tell a richer story, one which takes into account the context in which the explanation occurs.     

Testing the bi‐dimensional effects of attitudes on behavioural intentions and subsequent behaviour

Attitudes are typically treated as unidimensional predictors of both behavioural intentions and subsequent behaviour. On the basis of previous research showing that attitudes comprise two independent, positive and negative dimensions, we hypothesized that attitudes would be bi‐dimensional predictors of both behavioural intentions and subsequent behaviour. We focused on health‐risk behaviours. We therefore also hypothesized that the positive dimension of attitude (evaluations of positive behavioural outcomes) would better predict both behavioural intentions and subsequent behaviour than would the negative dimension, consistent with the positivity bias/offset principle. In Study 1 (cross sectional design), N = 109 university students completed questionnaire measures of their intentions to binge‐drink and the positive and negative dimensions of attitude. Consistent with the hypotheses, both attitude dimensions independently predicted behavioural intentions and the positive dimension was a significantly better predictor than was the negative dimension. The same pattern of findings emerged in Study 2 (cross sectional design; N = 186 university students) when we predicted intentions to binge‐drink, smoke and consume a high‐fat diet. Similarly, in Study 3 (prospective design; N = 1,232 speed limit offenders), both the positive and negative dimensions of attitude predicted subsequent (6‐month post‐baseline) speeding behaviour on two different road types and the positive dimension was the better predictor. The implications for understanding the motivation of behaviour and the development of behaviour‐change interventions are discussed.