Belief bias is stronger when reasoning is more difficult

Three studies examine the influence of varying the difficulty of reasoning on the extent of belief bias, while minimising the possibility that the manipulation would influence the way participants approach the task. Specifically, reasoning difficulty was manipulated by making variations in problem content, while maintaining all other aspects of the problems constant. In Study 1, 191 participants were presented with consistent and conflict problems varying in two levels of difficulty. The results showed a significant influence of problem difficulty on the extent of the belief bias, such that the effect of belief was more pronounced for difficult problems. This effect was stronger in Study 2 (73 participants) where the difference in the difficulty of the problems was purposely accentuated. The results of both studies stress the importance of controlling for problem difficulty when studying belief bias. Study 3 examined one consequence of this, i.e., the classic belief vs. logic interaction could be eliminated by manipulating problem difficulty. Theoretical implications for dual-process accounts of belief bias are also discussed.     

Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence?

Abstract

The desire to maintain current beliefs can lead individuals to evaluate contrary evidence more critically than consistent evidence. We test whether priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduces this often-observed myside bias, when people evaluate scientific evidence about which they have prior positions. We conducted three experiments in which participants read a news-style article about a study that either supported or opposed their attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. We manipulated whether participants completed a test posing scientific reasoning problems before or after reading the article and evaluating the evidence that it reported. Consistent with previous research, we found that participants were biased in favor of evidence consistent with their prior attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. Priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduced myside bias only when accompanied by direct instructions to apply those skills to the task at hand. We discuss the processes contributing to biased evaluation of scientific evidence.     

Judgements vs affective evaluations of counterfactual outcomes

Counterfactual thoughts are imagined alternatives to past events and outcomes. Such thoughts may address possible consequences and effects of a counterfactual turn of events, and also an affective evaluation of that simulated outcome. Previous research has shown that estimates of counterfactual consequences are exaggerated (Teigen, Kanten, & Terum, 2011). The present research compared both consequence estimates and affective evaluations of factual and counterfactual outcomes. Consistent with previous findings, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: Factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than comparable counterfactual outcomes, for both negative (Experiment 1) and positive outcomes (Experiment 2). We discuss these apparently contradictory findings within the framework of construal level theory and suggest that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high-level account of counterfactual thinking.     

Attributions of Responsibility for Problem Cause and Problem Solution: Their Relationship to Self-Esteem

The relationship of self-esteem to attribution of responsibility for problem cause and problem solution was studied in a sample of 205 college undergraduates. The results revealed a tendency for self-esteem to be negatively associated with the endorsement of an attribution style that features high responsibility for problem cause but low responsibility for problem solving. This result may be due to the lack of instrumentality and the feelings of failure associated with such an attribution style. The results are also discussed with reference to previous research on self-esteem and attribution of responsibility.     

Individual differences in positivity offset and negativity bias: Gender-specific associations with two serotonin receptor genes

Individual differences in the evaluation of affective stimuli, such as the positivity offset and negativity bias may have a biological basis. We tested whether two SNPs (HTR2A; 102T>C and HTR1A; 1019C>G) related to serotonin receptor function, a biological pathway associated with affective regulation, were differentially related to positivity offset and negativity bias for males and females. Participants were 109 cigarette smokers who rated a series of affective stimuli to assess reactions to positive and negative pictures. Gender × genotype interactions were found for both SNPs. Males with the 102T allele showed a greater positivity offset than males with the 102C allele. For females, in contrast, the 1019C allele was associated with a greater positivity offset than the 1019G allele, whereas the 102T allele was associated with a greater negativity bias than the 102C allele. Identifying how gender differences may moderate the effect of serotonin receptor genes on affective information processing may provide insight into their role in guiding behavior and regulating affect.     

Attentional Bias Modification in People with Chronic Pain: A Proof of Concept Study

The purpose of this proof of concept study was to explore the role of attentional bias modification (ABM) in improving clinically relevant outcomes in chronic pain. Eight participants with chronic pain completed eight ABM sessions, which featured a modified version of the visual-probe task implicitly training attention away from pain-related stimuli towards neutral stimuli. Training sessions included a variety of linguistic and pictorial pain-related stimuli, which were presented at two presentation times (500 and 1250 ms). Participants also completed a standard version of the visual-probe task pre- and post-ABM to assess changes in bias. The primary outcome measure was pain intensity, and secondary outcome measures were anxiety, depression severity and pain interference. Statistically and clinically significant change was shown pre- to post-ABM in pain intensity, anxiety, depression and pain interference. Attentional bias scores did not statistically differ across time. These results support the continued exploration of ABM in chronic pain and the modifications we made to the intervention (i.e. the inclusion of pictorial stimuli and a longer presentation time). Future research is needed to explore the optimal form of ABM and whether improvements are maintained over time.     

行为决策中的比率偏差

比率偏差是指小概率事件以不同比率形式呈现时,人们倾向于认为以较小数字呈现的事件更不可能发生.这种现象在医疗卫生领域和职业生涯决策中有重要的应用价值.目前关于比率偏差产生的解释主要包括标准理论与认知经验自我理论.比率偏差的影响因素主要包括元认知技能、计算能力、认知视角和任务性质等.未来的研究需要从比率偏差现象的产生、心理机制及应用方面进行深入研究.     

回避性依恋和注意偏向：刺激普遍性与刺激特定性

采用工作记忆算式-词对广度任务,通过87名大学生探索依恋回避倾向性与注意的关系。研究发现：依恋回避与三类词的工作记忆成绩呈负相关;工作记忆广度类型、词类型主效应显著;工作记忆广度类型与词类型交互作用显著。结果表明：回避性依恋者具有回避性注意偏向;回避性注意偏向既有刺激普遍性,又有刺激特定性,依恋性刺激比中性刺激更容易在信息加工早期被防御性地排除;回避性注意偏向具有调节情绪的功能性价值。为去激活策略情绪调节观提供了跨文化研究证据。     

共同方法偏差检验：问题与建议

检验共同方法偏差(CMB)已经成为心理学实证研究中的一个环节。本文从数学模型角度分析方法变异(CMV)的影响,并讨论了CMB常用的检验法——Harman单因子法、控制未测量的潜在方法因子(ULMC)法、验证性因子分析(CFA)标签变量法的检验力。Harman单因子法检验力很低,ULMC法检验力中等,CFA标签变量法检验力虽然较高但问题也不少。提出一个好的检验法应当满足的三个特点：符合CMV的数学模型、评价标准不受非CMV来源的影响、对CMV、CMB的变化敏感。最后给出CMB检验的建议。     

害羞者对模糊情境信息的解释偏向

以模糊情境句子和形容词为刺激材料,分别采用文本材料范式和改编的词汇情境联接范式,对害羞者的延时解释和即时解释偏向特点进行探讨。结果发现：害羞者对模糊情境信息不仅缺乏积极的即时解释偏向特点,而且也缺乏积极的延时解释偏向特点;害羞者未表现出消极的即时和延时解释偏向特点。研究表明害羞者可能是社交焦虑的前期阶段,对害羞者的干预可以通过引导其积极的解释偏向的方式来实现。