Self-esteem modulates attentional responses to rejection: Evidence from event-related brain potentials

Individuals with low self-esteem have been shown to exhibit an attentional bias for social rejection cues. The present study investigated whether individuals with low self-esteem would demonstrate greater reactivity to rejection-related stimuli during an attention shifting task than was exhibited by those with high self-esteem. Individuals with low self-esteem showed higher amplitude event-related potentials (ERPs) in response to rejection cues than was observed for those with high self-esteem. These results suggest that individuals with low self-esteem allocate more attentional resources to rejection cues than those with high self-esteem. Discussion will focus on the implications of these findings for understanding the connection between low self-esteem and social rejection.     

What We Know Now About Bias and Intergroup Conflict, the Problem of the Century

After nearly a century's study, what do psychologists now know about intergroup bias and conflict? Most people reveal unconscious, subtle biases, which are relatively automatic, cool, indirect, ambiguous, and ambivalent. Subtle biases underlie ordinary discrimination: comfort with one's own in–group, plus exclusion and avoidance of out–groups. Such biases result from internal conflict between cultural ideals and cultural biases. A small minority of people, extremists, do harbor blatant biases that are more conscious, hot, direct, and unambiguous. Blatant biases underlie aggression, including hate crimes. Such biases result from perceived intergroup conflict over economics and values, in a world perceived to be hierarchical and dangerous. Reduction of both subtle and blatant bias results from education, economic opportunity, and constructive intergroup contact.     

A Review of “The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Religion”

Online and distance learning are delivery modes in theological education that prompt questions about a library's ability to serve non-resident or occasionally resident students. This bibliometric study of 23 Doctor of Ministry theses completed at Garrett-Evangelical Theological Seminary between 2006 and 2010 includes data about the kind of resources that are being used by distance students. The data is analyzed longitudinally and also by overall sample. Percentages of items cited that are in the library holdings either in hard or e-versions are also provided. Preliminary recommendations are made about how the library might adapt to serve the research needs of distance students.     

Biased interpretation in perfectionism and its modification

Perfectionism is a transdiagnostic construct associated with a range of diagnoses, including depression, eating disorders and obsessive compulsive disorder. Treatments that directly target perfectionist cognitions have been shown to successfully reduce associated pathologies. However, the way in which they do this is not clear. We set out to assess the role of one candidate mechanism of action, namely the cognitive process of interpretation of ambiguity. In one experiment we looked for associations between biased interpretation and perfectionism. In a second, we manipulated interpretations, thereby providing a strong test of their aetiological significance. Results from the first experiment confirmed the presence of biased interpretation in perfectionism and demonstrated that these are highly specific to perfection relevant information, rather than reflecting general negativity. The second experiment succeeded in manipulating these perfection relevant interpretations and demonstrated that one consequence of doing so is a change in perfectionist behaviour. Together, these data experimentally demonstrate that biased interpretation of perfection relevant ambiguity contributes to the maintenance of perfectionism, but that it is also possible to reverse this. Clinical implications include the identification of one likely mechanism of therapeutic change within existing treatments, as well as identification of an appropriate evidence-based focus for future treatment development. Targeting underlying functional mechanisms, such as biased interpretation, has the potential to offer transdiagnostic benefits.     

中学生攻击性行为的注意偏向与冲动控制特征

通过注意偏向实验、BPAQ攻击问卷与Barratt冲动量表的施测,探讨中学生攻击性行为的注意偏向与冲动控制特征。研究结果发现,中学生攻击性行为及冲动控制性别差异不显著;低攻击性与高攻击性中学生表现出对攻击性刺激的注意偏向特征,在冲动控制上差异也极其显著;中学生攻击性行为与注意偏向、冲动控制总体上呈显著正相关;攻击词注意偏向与冲动控制对中学生攻击性行为具有显著预测作用。     

Can unpredicted outcomes be intended? The role of outcome-beliefs in children's judgments of intention

An adult-like concept of intention includes a deliberate action to achieve a goal and a belief that one's action (if successful) will cause the desired outcome. For example, good outcomes caused by accident or by chance are not believed to be caused intentionally. In two experiments, we asked whether children understand this connection between intentions and outcomes. Children played two games in which actions could produce unintended outcomes (i.e., causes were unplanned). Children sometimes received a desirable reward independent of intention. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds mistakenly claimed they had intended the desirable outcome even when it was unexpected. Four-year-olds judged that they had not intended a deliberate action if it did not yield a rewarding outcome. Experiment 2 demonstrates that 6-year-olds seldom make these errors. The results suggest that 4- and 5-year-old children have not yet attained an adult-like concept of intention. Their inaccurate judgments regarding their intentions, given a rewarding yet unexpected outcome, can be explained by a positivity bias.     

Predicting Political Biases Against the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party Movements

Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right‐wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment.     

A Below‐Average Effect with Respect to American Political Stereotypes on Warmth and Competence

The “above‐average effect” is the phenomenon that people tend to judge themselves above average on desirable traits. Based on social identity theory, we propose that a “below‐average effect” may arise when individuals rate themselves and the average ingroup member on traits stereotypically associated with the ingroup. In two studies, Republican and Democrat participants rated themselves and the average political ingroup member on possession of desirable traits related to warmth and competence. Current political stereotypes in America associate the former dimension with Democrats and the latter with Republicans. Consistent with our hypothesis, the above‐average effect was moderated by political group and dimension in interaction. In particular, Democrats rated themselves below the average Democrat on warmth and Republicans rated themselves below the average Republican on competence.     

The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.