An account of consciousness in physical and functional terms: A target for research in the neurosciences

The neurophysiology of mental events cannot be fully understood unless that of consciousness is understood. As the first step in a top-down approach to that problem, one needs to find an account of consciousness as a property of the biological organism that can be clearly defined as such. However, if it is to deliver what must be expected of it, it should address what is commonly meant by the wordconsciousness. Unless the last condition is satisfied, the theory will fail to deliver what must ultimately be expected of it. Although current interest lies mainly in the higher functions of consciousness, such as its role in language and social relationships, the common usage of the word relates to modes of awareness that are not denied to creatures lacking language or social relationships. The basic features to be covered include awareness of the surrounding world, of the self, and of one’s thoughts and feelings; the subjective qualities of phenomenal experience (qualia); the conditions a brain event must satisfy to enter consciousness; and the main divisions of mental events, such as sensations, feelings, perceptions, desires, volitions, and mental images.     

“Outsiders”: How some counselling psychologists construct themselves

The identity of counselling psychology in Britain is still developing. This study aims to contribute to our understanding of what counselling psychology is through an analysis of discourses that practitioners draw on when talking about their work. Drawing on data from interviews with eight practicing counselling psychologists, we identity a “maverick” repertoire and examine how it is used by the participants. This repertoire is used to characterize counselling psychology as occupying a position outside established schools of psychological therapy. We also identify how the maverick/outsider repertoire provides solutions to problems of internal consistency within counselling psychology. We discuss implications for the future and the importance of self-awareness for the profession.     

证有有形无形、客观主观之分

证的概念包括证据与诊断两方面的含义,诊断是证据在头脑中的意识反应,两者不能割舍.用有形无形、客观主观来统一证的理论内涵,认为无形之证是有形之证的意识概括,两者总是在不同层次、不同角度达到统一.     

从客观决定性到意志自由——论行动哲学研究的方法论变革

如果说心灵哲学是当代西方学术界的“第一哲学”,那么,以“客观决定性VS．意志自由”为核心问题的行动哲学研究,则是这种哲学研究在当今最重要的组成部分和基本发展趋势,因而只有在研究客观决定性和意志自由的相互关系方面取得了根本性突破,行动哲学和心灵哲学研究才有可能取得实质性进展。不过,由于绝大多数研究者都没有通过对惟理智主义研究方法论的深刻批判反思而达到方法论的自觉,所以,只有真正实现了对由基本倾向、思维方式和研究模式构成的研究方法论的彻底变革,这样的突破才是可能的;本文认为,以社会个体生成论彻底扬弃和取代基于抽象个体的预成论,是实现这种变革的富有建设性意义的学术理路。     

自我觉知的适应、不适应性及其在心理疗法中的作用

自我觉知是当注意力指向个体自身时对自己所产生的内部主观状态,根据其指向及程度可以有多种分类方法。自我觉知在心理过程中既有适应性,如促进自我了解、对他人的理解、提高自尊等;但过度的自我觉知会对心理产生不良影响,诸多研究对其与抑郁和焦虑的关系进行了论证。很多心理疗法中都涉及到自我觉知对心理状况的影响,包括格式塔疗法、来访者中心疗法、森田疗法等等。如何保持适度的自我觉知以促进心理健康是需要进一步研究的。     

Searching for the Self: Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness from Lotze to Scheler

Abstract

Phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness are often said to combine two elements by means of a necessary connection: the primitive and irreducible subjective character of experiences and the idealist transcendental constitution of consciousness. In what follows I argue that this connection is not necessary in order for an account of self-consciousness to be phenomenological, as shown by early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness – particularly in Munich phenomenology. First of all, I show that the account of self-consciousness defended by these phenomenologists was not influenced as much by Husserl as by two important figures in the prehistory of phenomenology: their teacher Theodor Lipps, and – indirectly, through Lipps’ influence – Hermann Lotze. Second, I show that their account of self-consciousness takes the metaphysical realism underlying Lotze’s and Lipps’ views on the distinction between feeling and sensations seriously. I argue that this distinction played a central role in the development of many early phenomenological accounts of self-consciousness.     

Metamemory Experiments in Neurological Populations: A Review

Metamemory refers to knowledge about one's memory capabilities and strategies that can aid memory, as well as the processes involved in memory self-monitoring. Although metamemory has been studied in cognitive psychology for several decades, there have been fewer studies investigating the neuropsychology of metamemory. In recent years, a growing number of studies of neurological patient groups have been conducted in order to investigate the neural correlates of metamemory. In this review, we examine the neuropsychological evidence that the frontal lobes are critically involved in monitoring and control processes, which are the central components of metamemory. The following conclusions are drawn from this literature: (1) There is a strong correlation between indices of frontal lobe function or structural integrity and metamemory accuracy (2) The combination of frontal lobe dysfunction and poor memory severely impairs metamemorial processes (3) Metamemory tasks vary in subject performance levels, and quite likely, in the underlying processes these different tasks measure, and (4) Metamemory, as measured by experimental tasks, may dissociate from basic memory retrieval processes and from global judgments of memory.     

Linked arguments and the validity requirement

In this paper I demonstrate that most textbook accounts of the linked/convergent distinction fail to conform to the widespread intuition that all valid arguments ought to be classified as linked arguments. I also show that standard textbook accounts of linkage and convergence cannot provide a satisfactory treatment of fallacies of irrelevance and, due to their general insensitivity to the epistemic context in which arguments are offered, must be supplemented by subjective accounts of linkage and convergence which appeal exclusively to authorial beliefs and intentions.Drafts of this paper were read at the Ontario Philosophical Society meeting held at Trent University in October 1990 and the Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association held in Chicago in April 1991. I thank Trudy Govier, Hans Hansen and an anonymous referee for helpful and encouraging comments on various drafts.