论马克思的实践——社会生产关系本体论

For a long time, under the influence of traditional Western philosophy, Orthodox interpreters have distorted Marx’s philosophy as the ontology of matter, thereby concealing the essence of Marx’s philosophy, and eliminating the fundamental difference between Marx’s philosophy and traditional philosophy. This paper proposes that Marx’s philosophy is not the ontology of matter, but on the contrary, by examining the ontology of matter, Marx put forward his own ontological theory, i.e., the ontology of the praxis-relations of social production, by which Marx linked the realms of phenomenon and essence, revealing the content and essence of his philosophy. __________ Translated by Kong Hui from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2008, (3): 3–11     

Approaching Religious Guidelines for Chimera Policymaking

Recent developments in the use of cow egg cells to clone human somatic cells, and the grafting by researchers at several universities of human neurons into mice, bring the notion of the chimera, a mixture of several living organisms, from myth into reality. In his article “Cross‐Species Chimeras: Exploring a Possible Christian Perspective,” Neville Cobbe considers the religious arguments overlying the creation of human‐nonhuman chimeras. In my commentary I focus on the distinction between germline‐ and tissue transplant‐related chimeric techniques implicit in Cobbe's essay and argue that the former poses more serious moral difficulties than the latter if the chimeric product is brought to term. The substantive view of the imago Dei, or image of God, serves as a scaffold by which to judge the permissibility of chimera creation using stem cell and other tissue implants. While useful for judging the rights of such artificially generated beings, I argue that specific criteria such as proportion of tissue uptake, mental capacity, and adherence with the organism's telos are more appropriately considered within a composite image of the living being reflecting its unique integrality. Human co‐creativity with the Divine will inevitably prompt attempts to generate medically useful chimeras. Religious dialogue, combined with the categories of religious moral argument appearing in Cobbe's essay, will help to establish the outline of feasible policy guidelines addressing the complexities inherent in the creation of chimeras.     

Naturalisms and Religion

Such terms as materialism , naturalism , and near synonyms evoke strong negative reactions among many believers. However, the notion of naturalism has various meanings; implications for religion differ for the several varieties of naturalism. In this paper I analyze epistemological and ontological variants of naturalism and explore the perspectives for religion within a nonreductive ontological naturalism.     

EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF SPIRIT AS A MODEL FOR THE GOD-WORLD RELATIONSHIP IN THE AGE OF GENETICS

Abstract. The cultural impact of genetics focuses the intellectual and moral challenge of science to theology. Many traditional images of God and the God-world relation are inadequate to represent religious ideas in a world whose self-understanding has been transformed by genetics. Such images also lack the power to help in approaching the ethical challenges of this new era. The way conceptions of the God-world relation can be modified in the light of genetic knowledge is explored by examining how far a new conception of Spirit can function alongside contemporary genetic views of human life in nature. The relationship between genetic theories of human behavior and evolution is related to the revised conception of Spirit.     

Hegel and Sellars on the Unity of Things

ABSTRACT

I have claimed previously that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic visionaries, though with radically different visions of the grand unity of things. In this paper I explain and defend that claim. Section one differentiates several kinds of monism; section two discusses Hegel’s vision of the underlying unity of thing, while section three does the same for Sellars. The compare-and-contrast assignment is brought to completion in section four.     

Negative Existentials in Metaphysical Debate

There are statements of the form “There are no Fs” that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true (at least, operating within the semantic framework of structured propositions). The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to metaphysical discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms.     

Scheid on Punishment

I critically evaluate the notion of structure Ted Sider presents in Writing the Book of the World. A prerequisite to understanding Sider's notion of structure is understanding Sider's take on ideology and ontology. In Section II, I discuss this. In Section III, I consider arguments in favor of structure. In Section IV, I examine one debate that is considered by Sider to be nonsubstantive: the debate over modality. I conclude, in Section V, by examining the reception Writing the Book of the World has received in the philosophical community.     

The cost of truthmaker maximalism

According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. However, it will be argued here that these theories cannot be sustained, and hence maximalism comes with a serious ontological cost. Neither Armstrong's invocation of totality facts nor the Martin-Kukso line on absences can meet this cost satisfactorily. I'll claim that negative facts are the best (and perhaps only) way out of the problem for the truthmaker maximalist.     

Mereology and mathematics: Christian Wolff's foundational programme

ABSTRACT

How did the traditional doctrine of parts and wholes evolve into contemporary formal mereology? This paper argues that a crucial missing link may lie in the early modern and especially Wolffian transformation of mereology into a systematic sub-discipline of ontology devoted to quantity. After some remarks on the traditional scholastic approach to parts and wholes (Sect. 1), Wolff's mature mereology is reconstructed as an attempt to provide an ontological foundation for mathematics (Sects. 2–3). On the basis of Wolff's earlier mereologies (Sect. 4), the origin of this foundational project is traced back to one of Wolff's private conversations with Leibniz (Sect. 5) and especially to the former's appropriation of the latter's notion of similarity as a means to define quantity (Sect. 6). Despite some hesitancy concerning the ultimate characterization of quantity (Sect. 7), Wolff's contribution was historically significant and influential. By developing a quantitative, extensional account of mereological relations, Wolff departed from the received doctrine and paved the way for the later revival of mereology at the intersection of ontology and mathematics.     

Plotinus: towards an ontology of likeness (On the One and Nous)

Plotinus’ thesis of the relationship between the One and Nous (Intellect) is central to his thought. In dealing with this relationship, he concentrates far more on what makes the One and Nous alike than on what makes them different. This is because by preference he envisages the One as the ‘causal principle () of everything’, in what might be termed a ‘top‐down’ model of metaphysics in which first cause (the One) leads downwards to second cause (Nous). Plotinus is obliged to present the distinction between the One and Nous as relative, not as absolute, precisely because he wants to show that Nous is firmly grounded in the One. The One differs from Nous to no more than the degree, and in no more than the manner, that are necessary for there to be created a Nous which is as like as possible to the One Itself.