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71.
Selusi Ambrogio 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2018,13(1):55
In this paper I investigate differences and similarities in the definitions of human being and human essence as proposed by two of the most influential thinkers of 20th-century world philosophy, namely Mou Zongsan and Martin Heidegger. I first examine a number of interpretations put forth by scholars that assess the philosophical compatibility of the thought of the two philosophers. Each of these assessments tend to agree that they are incompatible with each other based on what they perceive as an absolute distance between Mou’s and Heidegger’s ways of thinking. Although these studies are pioneering and show an in-depth understanding of Mou’s thought, none demonstrate a correct understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy. Therefore, I will attempt to demonstrate that, despite their differences, the ontological and ethical theses of Mou and Heidegger have several striking points of contact. I will also put forth the claim that Heidegger’s post-turn philosophy is more compatible with Mou’s philosophy than Kant’s system. 相似文献
72.
叶秀山 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2008,3(3):438-454
Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology,” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,”
and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other”
but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he
does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and “ethics
(axiology),” placing the former under the “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy
focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though. More often than not, the
issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions”; nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline,
philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be
understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests
itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather
than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy.
Translated by Zhang Lin from Wen Shi Zhe 文史哲 (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), 2007, (1): 61–70 相似文献
73.
Holger Andreas 《Axiomathes》2008,18(3):379-394
The concept of measurement is fundamental to a whole range of different disciplines, including not only the natural and engineering
sciences, but also laboratory medicine and certain branches of the social sciences. This being the case, the concept of measurement
has a particular relevance to the development of top-level ontologies in the area of knowledge engineering. For this reason,
the present paper is concerned with ontological aspects of measurement. We are searching for a list of concepts that are apt
to characterize measurement methods in a general manner. To establish such means of characterization, we will primarily deal
with the semantics of measurement values.
相似文献
Holger AndreasEmail: |
74.
Tom Stoneham 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2016,11(1):54-72
Quine's justly famous paper "On What There Is" introduced a criterion of ontological commitment which has been almost universally accepted by analytic philosophers ever since.In this paper I try to unpack some of the substantive and controversial philosophical commitments that are presupposed by this criterion.The aim is not to show that the criterion is incorrect,but merely that it is not as obvious as it is taken to be by many,and that we might have reasons to explore alternative ways of thinking about ontological commitments. 相似文献
75.
James O. YOUNG 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(2):284-297
A bewildering array of accounts of the ontology of musical works is available. Philosophers have held that works of music
are sets of performances, abstract, eternal sound-event types, initiated types, compositional action types, compositional
action tokens, ideas in a composer’s mind and continuants that perdure. This paper maintains that questions in the ontology
of music are, in Rudolf Carnap’s sense of the term, pseudo-problems. That is, there is no alethic basis for choosing between
rival musical ontologies. While we have no alethic basis for choosing any ontology of music, pragmatic reasons can be given
for favoring certain ontologies of musical works over others. 相似文献
76.
Helen STEWARD 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2011,6(3):390-401
The paper argues against the very commonly held view that whenever a substance may be said to be the cause of something, a
fuller and metaphysically more accurate understanding of the situation can always be obtained by looking to the properties
in virtue of which that substance was able to bring about the effect in question. Paul Humphreys’ argument that when a substance
is said to have produced an effect, it always turns out to be an aspect or property of that substance which brought about
the effect in question is examined and criticized; it is argued that it is based on an illegitimate application of Mill’s
Methods of Difference and Agreement to the case. Mill’s methods, it is suggested, are methods of empirical, not of ontological
enquiry. The paper then turns to examine an argument by Mele which appears to depend on a structurally rather similar assumption
that if there is nothing about a subject which could explain why she does one thing rather than another, it cannot really
be up to that subject which thing occurs. It is suggested that, too, the inference is faulty, and that once it is rejected,
one common objection to libertarianism—the argument from luck—might be more readily met. 相似文献
77.
Ilkka Pyysiäinen 《Zygon》2002,37(3):729-740
Miracles are real or imagined events that contradict our intuitive expectations of how entities normally behave. Miracles in the weak sense are unexplained counterintuitive events. Miracles in the strong sense are counterintuitive events we explain by referring to the counterintuitive agents and forces of various religious traditions. Such explanations result from the fact that our minds treat half–understood information by carrying out searches in the memory, trying to connect new information with something already known. This is cognitively the most economical way of dealing with new information: we obtain the maximum of relevance at minimal processing cost. 相似文献
78.
Luc Schneider 《Studia Logica》2009,91(1):25-51
The Ontological Square is a categorial scheme that combines two metaphysical distinctions: that between types (or universals) and tokens (or particulars) on the one hand, and that between characters (or features) and their substrates (or bearers) on the other hand. The resulting four-fold classification of things comprises particular substrates, called substances, universal substrates, called kinds, particular characters, called modes or moments, and universal characters, called attributes. Things are joined together in facts by primitive ontological ties or nexus. This article describes a logic that is meant to capture the basic intuitions behind the Ontological Square. Given a minimal
correspondence between atomic logical form and ontological structure, the commitment to nexus as a distinct ontological category
entails a rehabilitation of copulae as ties of predication. Thus, the Logic of the Ontological Square is a copula calculus
rather than a predicate calculus; its soundness and completeness can be established with respect to a model akin to a so-called
first-order semantics for standard second-order logic.
Presented by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
79.
80.
by Inna Semetsky 《Zygon》2009,44(2):323-345
This essay interprets the meaning of one of the cards in aTarot deck, "The Magician," in the context of process philosophy in the tradition of Alfred North Whitehead. It brings into the conversation the philosophical legacy of American semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce as well as French poststructuralist Gilles Deleuze. Some of their conceptualizations are explored herein for the purpose of explaining the symbolic function of the Magician in the world. From the perspective of the logic of explanation, the sign of the Magician is an index of nonmechanistic, mutualist or circular, causality that enables self-organization embedded in coordination dynamics. Its action is such as to establish an unorthodox connection crossing over the dualistic gap between mind and matter, science and magic, process and structure, the world without and the world within, subject and object, and human experience and the natural world, thereby overcoming what Whitehead called the paradox of the connectedness of things. The Magician represents a certain quality that acts as a catalytic agent capable of eliciting transmutations, that is, the emergence of novelty. I present a model for process∼structure that uses mathematics on the complex plane and the rules of projective geometry. The corollary is such that the presence of the Magician in the world enables a particular organization of thought that makes pre-cognition possible. 相似文献