Passage,Becoming and the Nature of Temporal Reality

I first distinguish several notions that have traditionally been conflated (or otherwise neglected) in discussions of the metaphysics of time. Thus, for example, I distinguish between the passage of time and temporal becoming. The former is, I maintain, a confused notion that does not represent a feature of the world; whereas a proper understanding of the latter provides the key for a plausible and comprehensive account of the nature of temporal reality. There are two general classes of views of the nature of temporal reality; proponents of particular views in both classes attempt to account for the phenomenon of temporal becoming in terms of qualitative change. I argue that any such account – in terms of change – is irredeemably problematic. And so I propound a different account of temporal becoming, based on the notion that temporal reality is transient, which provides the means to characterize intuitively and vividly the significant effects of time on the metaphysical nature of the world.

Year-one children thinking about and writing ‘large’ quantities / Niños de primer grado pensando en y anotando cantidades ‘grandes’

Abstract

We studied how year-one children in primary school think about and with numbers when they use verbal expressions and numerical notations to suggest ‘very large’ quantities in different contexts of meaning (tokens, an elderly person’s age, stars). We individually interviewed 63 children from schools in Río Negro, Argentina. The analysis identified the different ways children approached the tension that exists between stability and innovation. Context seems to influence the answers given by many of the children who were interviewed. The results showed five cognitive trajectories: in the first two, children did not demonstrate any innovation in their notations. Children in the remaining trajectories (84% of respondents) conducted a kind of numerical ‘take off’ in at least one of the tasks. Knowledge of the number series does not guarantee an easy approach to writing ‘large’ quantities but it does seem to favour a strategy of greater cognitive flexibility.     

We Do Not Count by Identity

It is widely assumed in psychology, philosophy, and linguistics that we count by identity. For example, to count the dogs by identity, we correlate each dog that isn't identical to the rest with a natural number, starting with one and assigning each successive dog the successive natural number. When we run out of distinct dogs, we've yielded a correct count. I argue that this model of counting is incorrect. We do not count by identity.     

对死亡恐惧的形而上追问

死亡恐惧与自我意识相伴而生,成为人类无法根除的永恒性焦虑。它既根源于他人之死呈现出的经验性恐惧,也来自于拒斥死亡的社会文化所导致的认知性恐惧以及面临“自我”之死时产生的形而上恐惧。死亡恐惧不能彻底消解只能消减,保持适当的死亡恐惧是必要的,也是有益的,它是人类一切精神性追求的内在动力。人们通常力求通过外向性的追求去摆脱或超越死亡恐惧,然而只有通过反躬自省,不假外求的方式,才能最终完成对生命的觉解与超越。     

THE CONCEPT OF CONTINUOUS CREATION PART I: HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY USE

The concept of continuous creation is now widely used in the context of reflections on the dialogue between science and religion. The first part of this research work seeks to understand its meaning through a twofold elaboration: (1) the historical setting of the three philosophical trends in which this concept was developed: scholastic (conservation), Cartesian (conservation through repetition of the creative act at each instant), and dynamic (interpreting the emergence of radical and contingent novelty in nature as a sign of the continuity of creation); (2) a philosophical and theological critique of the concept of continuous creation regarding the question of the relationship between change and creation, in the light of its highly polymorphous contemporary use, and, in opposition, its absence within the Catholic Magisterium. This work opens the field a further step toward reflection on a renewed concept of continuous creation.     

Metaphysics Within Science: Against Radical Naturalism

In Every Thing Must Go James Ladyman and Don Ross argue for a radical version of naturalistic metaphysics and propose that contemporary analytic metaphysics is detached from science and should be discontinued. The present article addresses the issues of whether (i) science and metaphysics are separable, (ii) intuitions and understanding should be excluded from scientific theory, and (iii) Ontic Structural Realism satisfies the criteria of the radical version of naturalism advanced by Ladyman and Ross. The point underlying those topics is that successful scientific research presupposes metaphysics, and that basic epistemic virtues common to metaphysics and science may allow us—as opposed to what Ladyman and Ross suggest—to increase our understanding of the world and to put constraints on allowable metaphysical theories.     

Two Types of Quidditism

According to structuralism, all natural properties are individuated by their roles in causal/nomological structures. According to quidditism, at least some natural properties are individuated in some other way. Because these theses deal with the identities of natural properties, this distinction cuts to the core of a serious metaphysical dispute: Are the intrinsic natures of all natural properties essentially causal/nomological in character? I'll argue that the answer is ‘no’, or at least that this answer is more plausible than many critics of quidditism have recognized. In section 1, I distinguish between two versions of quidditism. Bare quidditism holds that worlds with distinct properties and isomorphic structures must be qualitatively identical in the following sense: inhabiting one world would be indistinguishable from inhabiting the other. In contrast, qualitative quidditism allows such worlds to have qualitative differences. In section 2, I discuss an epistemological position that allows us to better understand the sense in which isomorphic structures can be qualitatively distinct. In sections 3 and 4, I argue that qualitative quidditism fares much better than bare quidditism with respect to a number of well-known arguments in the field—both for quidditism and against it.     

Bad–good constraints on a polarity correspondence account for the spatial–numerical association of response codes (SNARC) and markedness association of response codes (MARC) effects

Performance in numerical classification tasks involving either parity or magnitude judgements is quicker when small numbers are mapped onto a left-sided response and large numbers onto a right-sided response than for the opposite mapping (i.e., the spatial–numerical association of response codes or SNARC effect). Recent research by Gevers et al. [Gevers, W., Santens, S., Dhooge, E., Chen, Q., Van den Bossche, L., Fias, W., & Verguts, T. (2010). Verbal-spatial and visuospatial coding of number–space interactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139, 180–190] suggests that this effect also arises for vocal “left” and “right” responding, indicating that verbal–spatial coding has a role to play in determining it. Another presumably verbal-based, spatial–numerical mapping phenomenon is the linguistic markedness association of response codes (MARC) effect whereby responding in parity tasks is quicker when odd numbers are mapped onto left-sided responses and even numbers onto right-sided responses. A recent account of both the SNARC and MARC effects is based on the polarity correspondence principle [Proctor, R. W., & Cho, Y. S. (2006). Polarity correspondence: A general principle for performance of speeded binary classification tasks. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 416–442]. This account assumes that stimulus and response alternatives are coded along any number of dimensions in terms of – and + polarities with quicker responding when the polarity codes for the stimulus and the response correspond. In the present study, even–odd parity judgements were made using either “left” and “right” or “bad” and “good” vocal responses. Results indicated that a SNARC effect was indeed present for the former type of vocal responding, providing further evidence for the sufficiency of the verbal–spatial coding account for this effect. However, the decided lack of an analogous SNARC-like effect in the results for the latter type of vocal responding provides an important constraint on the presumed generality of the polarity correspondence account. On the other hand, the presence of robust MARC effects for “bad” and “good” but not “left” and “right” vocal responses is consistent with the view that such effects are due to conceptual associations between semantic codes for odd–even and bad–good (but not necessarily left–right).     

The left digit effect in a complex judgment task: Evaluating hypothetical college applicants

A left digit effect has been broadly observed across judgment and decision-making contexts ranging from product evaluation to medical treatment decisions to number line estimation. For example, $3.00 is judged to be a much greater cost than $2.99, and “801” is estimated strikingly too far to the right of “798” on a number line. Although the consequences of the effects for judgment and decision behavior have been documented, the sources of the effects are not well established. The goal of the current work is to extend investigations of the left digit effect to a new complex judgment activity and to assess whether the magnitude of the effect at the individual level can be predicted from performance on a simpler number skills task on which the left digit effect has also recently been observed. In three experiments (N = 434), adults completed a judgment task in which they rated the strength of hypothetical applicants for college admission and a self-paced number line estimation task. In all experiments, a small or medium left digit effect was found in the college admissions task, and a large effect was found in number line estimation. Individual-level variation was observed, but there was no relationship between the magnitudes of the effects in the two tasks. These findings provide evidence of a left digit effect in a novel multiattribute judgment task but offer no evidence that such performance can be predicted from a simple number skills task such as number line estimation.