数字效应对消费者行为的影响及其心理机制

经济学理性人假说判定, 个体对同一个事物的认知和需求不会随事物表征方式以及个体信息处理方式的改变而改变。同时, 消费者旨在运用最低成本获得最大收益, 实现经济效用最大化。然而消费者行为领域的学者对此提出了相反的主张。他们指出, 当个体解读刺激物数量化属性时, 不仅会对用不同数字和单位表征的同一数量判断出现偏差, 还会受到数字启动的影响, 对用不同数字表示的同一商品产生不同的需求, 甚至做出违反经济效用最大化的决策, 产生了数字效应。不同的心理机制对数字效应如何导致消费者非理性行为进行了解释。在此基础上, 对数字效应在消费者行为领域的未来研究方向进行了展望。     

Vikingism as a Metametaphysical Thesis

This paper aims to be a contribution to the recent discussion on the science‐metaphysics relationship. After drawing a distinction between two aspects of the relationship, it defends the theoretical importance of the proposed distinction and argues for the interconnectedness of the aspects in question. The paper then focuses on one of those aspects: that is, the methodological strategy of some metaphysicians to appeal to scientific findings and practice in the course of discussing various pure metaphysical problems. It discusses the question about the scope of science‐informed metaphysics and its relation to the issue concerning the existence of an autonomous metaphysical possibility. Finally, the paper explores the reasons metaphysicians have for involving science in metaphysical discussions.     

Is Science Neurotic?

Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition from which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B but represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C and, as a result, fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic." Natural science is neurotic in this sense insofar as its basic aim is represented as improving knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science itself does not suffer significantly from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences and academic inquiry more generally. freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far-reaching beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences.     

Journal reviews

Journals reviewed: Allain‐Dupré, Brigitte. ‘Né et non né: réflexions sur la fratrie empêchée’, Cahiers Jungiens de Psychanalyse Lanyado, Monica. ‘The symbolism of the story of Lot and his wife: the function of the “present relationship” and non‐interpretative aspects of the therapeutic relationship in facilitating change’ Commentaries on ‘The symbolism of the story of Lot and his wife’, Journal of Child Psychotherapy Mayer, Elizabeth Lloyd. ‘On “Telepathic Dreams?” An Unpublished Paper by Robert J. Stoller’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association Lawrence, Marilyn. ‘Loving them to death: the anorexic and her objects’, International Journal of Psychoanalysis Eshel, Ofra. ‘Whose sleep is it, anyway? Or “Night Moves”’, International Journal of Psychoanalysis Schore, Allan N. ‘Minds in the making: attachment, the self‐organizing brain, and developmentally‐oriented psychoanalytic psychotherapy’, British Journal of Psychotherapy     

传统本体论哲学的终结和马克思哲学变革的实质

本文从讨论Ontology的译名开始,主张严格区分作为一门哲学分支学科的“存在论”,和作为一种特定哲学理论形态的“本体论”两个概念;通过对传统西方哲学所代表和象征的哲学理念的把握,揭示了其基本特征和历史命运;进而从马克思哲学与传统西方哲学的否定性关系视角,阐明了马克思哲学变革的实质和意义。作者认为,马克思哲学在哲学史上最具深远意义的革命变革,就在于它通过对传统本体论哲学的批判和超越,开创了哲学发展的新方向．奠定了哲学发展新形态的基础。     

中西形而上学的异通发微

中国传统哲学属于境界形态的形而上学 ,它与西方的自亚里士多德以来的实体形态的形而上学不同。亚氏的形而上学是由对是的逻辑分析开始的 ,即由对逻辑命题的分析而寻找不变的实体存在。亚氏的思维方式对西方文化产生了深远的影响。中国传统哲学则不然 ,它是由“省身”、“尽心、知性、知天”、“思诚”、“静观”、“玄览”、觉悟而去认识世界的本体 ,这种形而上学固然是境界形态的。至于现代 ,西方哲学出现了转向 ,存在主义者海德格尔对存在 (是 )作了新的诠释 ,海氏的诠释在某种意义上与中国传统哲学有契合之处 ,这从一个侧面说明了中国传统哲学所潜含的现代意义。     

Non-mereological pluralistic supersubstantivalism: an alternative perspective on the matter/spacetime relationship

In both the historical and contemporary literature on the metaphysics of space (and, more recently, spacetime), a core dispute is that between relationism and substantivalism. One version of the latter is supersubstantivalism, according to which space (or, again, spacetime) is the only kind of substance, such that what we think of as individual material objects (electrons, quarks, etc.) are actually just parts of spacetime which instantiate certain properties. If those parts are ontologically dependent on spacetime as a whole, then we arrive at an ontology with only a single genuinely independent substance, namely the entire spacetime manifold. This is monist supersubstantivalism. A view on which the parts of spacetime are ontologically prior to the whole has been called pluralistic supersubstantivalism. As currently formulated, supersubstantivalism (in either its monist or pluralistic forms) carries significant advantages and encounters major difficulties. I argue that some of the latter motivate an alternative formulation, non-mereological pluralistic supersubstantivalism, according to which spacetime is a real substance, but what we think of as material objects are also real substances, irreducible to and numerically distinct from that larger spacetime manifold and any of its parts. Yet, the underlying nature of those material objects is ultimately the same type as that of spacetime: at bottom, a particle is just a smaller quantity of spacetime embedded in or contained by or co-located with the larger whole that we would normally think of as ‘spacetime,’ capable both of genuine movement within/across the larger spacetime manifold and (at least in principle) independent existence from it.     

Rapid communication The mental number line dominates alternative,explicit coding of number magnitude

Numerical judgments are facilitated for left-space responses to a smaller number and right-space responses to a larger number (the spatial–numerical association of response codes, SNARC, effect). Despite support for a mental number line (i.e., spatial) explanation of the SNARC effect, this account has been challenged by an intermediate-coding theory that makes use of a polarity-correspondence principle. The latter is a general explanatory framework whereby stimulus and response dimensions are represented in a categorical, binary manner, with complementary categories coded as having either positive or negative polarity. When stimulus and response polarity match, responding is facilitated. In the present experiment we pitted explicitly presented close–far coding against an implicit mental number line (i.e., left–right coding). Subjects categorized numbers (1, 4, 6, and 9) as greater or less than a standard (5) using keys defined only as close to and far from a starting key. We found that, despite instructing subjects to use a close–far coding scheme, they exhibited a typical SNARC effect, with small-number responses facilitated on the left and large-number responses on the right. These results are discussed in the context of results supporting the polarity explanation and with respect to representational pluralism.     

Unity,Plurality, and Hylomorphic Composition in Aristotle's Metaphysics

How should we understand the relationship, for Aristotle, between matter, form, and hylomorphic composite? Are matter and form distinct from each other, so that each hylomorphic unity harbours a plurality within it, or would such a plurality undermine the unity of the composite? A recent strand of argument in both Aristotelian and contemporary literature on hylomorphism has concluded that no genuine unity can be composed of a plurality. I will argue that the objection motivating this conclusion falls away as improperly formulated in light of Aristotle's metaontology—in particular, his thesis that unity (and therefore also plurality) is indeterminate. The genuine objection threatening hylomorphic unity is one that Aristotle himself formulates as a central concern in his Metaphysics: no substance can be composed of substances. He answers this genuine objection in his appeal to the actuality/potentiality distinction, and in Metaphysics VIII.6 he reminds us why no more basic problem of hylomorphic unity arises. Against the backdrop of Aristotle's metaontology, hylomorphic unity cannot be undermined by the plurality, just as such, of matter and form.     

Quality and Quantifiers

I examine three ‘anti-object’ metaphysical views: nihilism (there are no objects at all), generalism (reality is ultimately qualitative), and anti-quantificationalism (quantification over objects does not perspicuously represent the world). After setting aside nihilism, I argue that generalists should be anti-quantificationalists. Along the way, I attempt to articulate what a ‘metaphysically perspicuous’ language might even be.