QUANTUM PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD: INSIGHTS FROM WOLFGANG PAULI

Abstract. Nobel Laureate in physics Wolfgang Pauli studied philosophy and the history of ideas intensively, especially in his later years, to form an accurate ontology vis-à-vis quantum theory. Pauli's close contacts with the Swiss psychiatrist C.G. Jung gave him special qualifications for also understanding the basic problems of empirical knowledge. After Pauli's sudden death in 1958, this work was maintained mainly in his posthumously published correspondence, which so far extends only to 1939. Because Pauli's view differs essentially from the direction physics research took after the deaths of the founding fathers of quantum theory, this article attempts to describe the main features in Pauli's revolutionary thought, which is based on nature's "epistemological lesson" as revealed by Pauli's atomic research. Pauli's conclusions have important implications for various issues in Western culture, not least with the limits of science and the relation of science to religion.     

PERSONS IN NATURE: TOWARD AN APPLICABLE AND UNIFIED ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

Abstract. Two major contenders for the role of robust environmental ethics claim our allegiance. One is Baird Callicott's, based on the land ethic formulated by Aldo Leopold; the other is that of Holmes Rolston, 111, sharply distinguishing environmental from social (human) ethics. Despite their many strengths, neither gives us the vision we need. Callicott's ethic leaves too much out of his picture; Rolston's leaves too much disconnected between nature and humankind. A really usable environmental ethic needs to be both comprehensive and integrated. For that, we need a worldview that includes the human in nature but also affirms the unique values of personhood.     

An algorithm for generating artificial test clusters

An algorithm for generating artificial data sets which contain distinct nonoverlapping clusters is presented. The algorithm is useful for generating test data sets for Monte Carlo validation research conducted on clustering methods or statistics. The algorithm generates data sets which contain either 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 clusters. By default, the data are embedded in either a 4, 6, or 8 dimensional space. Three different patterns for assigning the points to the clusters are provided. One pattern assigns the points equally to the clusters while the remaining two schemes produce clusters of unequal sizes. Finally, a number of methods for introducing error in the data have been incorporated in the algorithm.     

The SNARC effect in the processing of second-language number words: Further evidence for strong lexico-semantic connections

We present new evidence that word translation involves semantic mediation. It has been shown that participants react faster to small numbers with their left hand and to large numbers with their right hand. This SNARC (spatial-numerical association of response codes) effect is due to the fact that in Western cultures the semantic number line is oriented from left (small) to right (large). We obtained a SNARC effect when participants had to indicate the parity of second-language (L2) number words, but not when they had to indicate whether L2 number words contained a particular sound. Crucially, the SNARC effect was also obtained in a translation verification task, indicating that this task involved the activation of number magnitude.     

Task instructions determine the visuospatial and verbal–spatial nature of number–space associations

Evidence for number–space associations comes from the spatial–numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect, consisting in faster reaction times to small/large digits with the left/right hand, respectively. Two different proposals are commonly discussed concerning the cognitive origin of the SNARC effect: the visuospatial account and the verbal–spatial account. Recent studies have provided evidence for the relative dominance of verbal–spatial over visuospatial coding mechanisms, when both mechanisms were directly contrasted in a magnitude comparison task. However, in these studies, participants were potentially biased towards verbal–spatial number processing by task instructions based on verbal–spatial labels. To overcome this confound and to investigate whether verbal–spatial coding mechanisms are predominantly activated irrespective of task instructions, we completed the previously used paradigm by adding a spatial instruction condition. In line with earlier findings, we could confirm the predominance of verbal–spatial number coding under verbal task instructions. However, in the spatial instruction condition, both verbal–spatial and visuospatial mechanisms were activated to an equal extent. Hence, these findings clearly indicate that the cognitive origin of number–space associations does not always predominantly rely on verbal–spatial processing mechanisms, but that the spatial code associated with numbers is context dependent.     

Knowledge of Need

Some of the duties of individuals and organisations involve responsiveness to need. This requires knowledge of need, so the epistemology of need is relevant to practice. The prevailing contention among philosophers who have broached the topic is that one can know one’s own needs (as one can know some kinds of desires) by feeling them. The article argues against this view. The main positive claims made in the article are as follows. Knowledge of need, in both first‐person and second‐person cases, is a type of knowledge‐that with no basic epistemological source. Needs, like medical conditions, have signs and symptoms. Knowledge of these, with inference, results in knowledge of need. Finally, it is argued that need is akin to, but not a special case of, metaphysical necessity de re. Some implications of this for the epistemology of need are explained.     

Did Rorty’s Pragmatism Have Foundations?

Abstract

There is an overt tension between Rorty’s pragmatist critique of philosophy and his apparent epistemological and metaphysical commitments, which it is instructive to examine in order to assess not only Rorty’s overall position, but also renewed contemporary interest in pragmatism and its metaphilosophical implications. After showing why Rorty’s attempts to limit the scope of his critique failed to resolve this tension, I try reading him as a constructive metaphysician who was attempting to balance a causal account of the language / world relation with panrelationism. However, Rorty intended these commitments to be interpreted in light of his pragmatism about vocabularies, and relied upon a ‘social standpoint strategy’ to render his overall position consistent. I conclude that to the extent that this strategy succeeds, it removes almost all of the argumentative force from Rorty’s pragmatism.     

Synesthesia Affects Verification of Simple Arithmetic Equations

To investigate the effects of color–digit synesthesia on numerical representation, we presented a synesthete, called SE, in the present study, and controls with mathematical equations for verification. In Experiment 1, SE verified addition equations made up of digits that either matched or mismatched her color–digit photisms or were in black. In Experiment 2A, the addends were presented in the different color conditions and the solution was presented in black, whereas in Experiment 2B the addends were presented in black and the solutions were presented in the different color conditions. In Experiment 3, multiplication and division equations were presented in the same color conditions as in Experiment 1. SE responded significantly faster to equations that matched her photisms than to those that did not; controls did not show this effect. These results suggest that photisms influence the processing of digits in arithmetic verification, replicating and extending previous findings.     

Against Fallibilism

In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ‘infallibilism’, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has greater explanatory power than fallibilism. In particular, I argue that an infallibilist can easily explain why assertions of ‘p, but possibly not-p’ (where the ‘possibly’ is read as referring to epistemic possibility) is infelicitous in terms of the knowledge rule of assertion. But a fallibilist cannot. Furthermore, an infallibilist can explain the infelicity of utterances of ‘p, but I don't know that p’ and ‘p might be true, but I'm not willing to say that for all I know, p is true’, and why when a speaker thinks p is epistemically possible for her, she will agree (if asked) that for all she knows, p is true. The simplest explanation of these facts entails infallibilism. Fallibilists have tried and failed to explain the infelicity of ‘p, but I don't know that p’, but have not even attempted to explain the last two facts. I close by considering two facts that seem to pose a problem for infallibilism, and argue that they don't.