Reviews

Stephen J. Pope The Evolution of Altruism and the Ordering of Love
Edited by Murray Rae, Hilary Regan, and John Stenhouse Science and Theology: Questions at the Interface
Edited by Peter A. French, T. E. Uehling Jr., and H. K. Wettstein Philosophical Naturalism
Edited by Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal
Mark William Worthing God, Creation, and Contemporary Physics     

Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons

What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons.     

SOCIAL VALIDATION: THE EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY FOR TARGET BEHAVIORS

The use of social validation procedures has become widespread in recent years. Although most researchers have used social validation procedures to select target behaviors and to evaluate whether the changes produced by a treatment program should be considered socially useful, little attention has been focused upon using the social validation process to determine the optimal levels for target behaviors. This paper suggests several ways in which social validation procedures can be employed in order to select when and how much to change target behaviors.     

TEACHING RETARDED WOMEN A CLOTHING SELECTION SKILL USING COMMUNITY NORMS

Five institutionalized retarded women were taught a clothing selection skill to coincide with popular fashion. Normative data concerning popular styles of color-coordinated clothing were collected through observations of women's apparel in a local community. Using a puzzle simulation of a woman with alternative pieces of colored clothing, color coordination training was conducted using modelling, instructions, practice, praise, and feedback to teach popular selections of color combinations. A generalization training component with actual clothing was also included. Training was accompanied by large increases in percentage of popular color selections with the puzzle and actual clothing. The increases maintained over a seven- to 14-week followup period. Time efficiency measures supported the use of the simulation procedure as opposed to total reliance on actual clothing. The results underscore the utility of local norms in community preparation programs and the efficacy of instructional procedures for severely and profoundly retarded persons as part of their participation in the deinstitutionalization movement.     

Global and appearance-contingent self-esteem: Associations with health and attractiveness exercise reasons

Whilst some individuals exercise for health-related reasons, others appear to exercise to bolster physical attractiveness. For the latter, this is often attributed to dissatisfaction with appearance. Few studies, however, have explored if differences in self-esteem may relate to diverse exercise reasons. The present study investigated whether global self-esteem, appearance-contingent self-worth, and appearance satisfaction may be differentially associated with health and attractiveness exercise reasons. It was further sought to explore whether these relations coincided with different motivational regulations. Adults from the east midlands of the United Kingdom (N = 209; 75% female, 25% male; mean age = 29.77 years) completed measures relating to their global and appearance-contingent self-esteem, appearance satisfaction, exercise intentions, and motivations. Structural equation modelling revealed that global self-esteem was positively associated with appearance satisfaction and health reasons for exercise, whereas appearance-contingent self-esteem related to lower appearance satisfaction and attractiveness reasons. Appearance satisfaction had no association with either exercise reason but was associated with intrinsic motivation and lower controlled exercise motivations. Health exercise reasons were positively associated with intrinsic, identified, and introjected motivation, whereas attractiveness reasons were exclusively related to external motivation. The findings highlight the conceptual importance of differentiating the level and contingency of exercisers’ self-esteem. The findings may also have substantive value for exercise practitioners in understanding different reasons for exercise.     

The Mission of Philosophy Today

The paper gives a brief characterization of philosophical problems; points up something of their significance for the culture, the social order, and our lives; indicates the methodology appropriate for the problems; and presents a view of the cultural mission of philosophy today. Philosophy attempts to bring under critical review and to correct errors in the cultural mind of our civilization, the prevailing assumptions and beliefs about our knowledge-yielding powers, the various sectors of the culture, and the basic structure of the world. It holds the cultural mind accountable to the unavoidable presuppositions of experience, thought, and action. Errors in the cultural mind can lead to distortions in the development of the culture and to social and personal pathologies. I contend that our modern Western cultural mind undermines the humanistic dimension of the culture, and ultimately the whole culture, by a restricted view of our knowledge-yielding powers and the resulting impoverished view of reality. The mission of philosophy today is to point out the errors in our cultural mind and to work for a humanistic cultural reformation.     

Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason

This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.     

Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations

This article has three main parts, Section 2 considers the nature and extent to which individuals who are well-off have a moral obligation to aid the worlds needy. Drawing on a pluralistic approach to morality, which includes consequentialist, virtue-based, and deontological elements, it is contended that most who are well-off should do much more than they do to aid the needy, and that they are open to serious moral criticism if they simply ignore the needy. Part one also focuses on the United States, and illustrates both how incredibly wealthy the U.S. is and some of the spending habits of its citizens; however, its considerations apply to the well-off generally. Section 3 considers whether justice provides reasons for helping the needy. Noting that justice in an extremely complex notion, it discusses numerous considerations relevant to justices scope and implications, including an extended Rawlsian conception of justice, an absolute conception, a comparative conception, the distinction between natural and social justice, and various elements of common-sense morality. Section 2 also distinguishes between agent-relative justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we act justly, and agent-neutral justice-based reasons, which are relevant to whether we have reasons of justicefor acting. Correspondingly, it argues that even if one can ignore the needy without acting unjustly, as philosophers like Robert Nozick and Jan Narveson contend, there may be powerful reasons of justicefor addressing their plight. Section 4 briefly address the responsibilities of international organizations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO). Drawing on Section 2, it is suggested that in addition to standard reasons to act justlytowards needy members of the worlds community, there will be reasons of justicefor such organizations to aid the needy in both present, and future, generations. The article concludes by contending that the well-off in countries like the U.S. have reason to view international organizations like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO as their agents, and to seek to insure that they alleviate misfortunes amongst the worlds needy.