Power and Legitimizing Ideologies in Hierarchy‐Enhancing vs. Hierarchy‐Attenuating Environments

According to social dominance theory, intergroup dynamics are strongly influenced by the social positions which individuals hold in society. Several studies suggest that holding a position of power can, sometimes automatically, generate negative attitudes and hostile behaviors toward subordinate social groups. However, at present, the studies carried out on these effects of power have not taken into account the influence of the normative context. Based on the distinction made by Sidanius and Pratto between “hierarchy‐enhancing” (HE) vs. “hierarchy‐attenuating” (HA) environments, this study examines if the effects of power on legitimizing cognitions vary as a function of the normative environment. A laboratory study and a study conducted in a natural environment confirm our hypothesis that individuals holding a powerful or dominant social role in a HE setting differ significantly from individuals holding an equally powerful role in a HA setting. The effects of power observed in past research probably resulted from studying power in hierarchy‐enhancing environments, but not in hierarchy‐attenuating ones.     

第三方惩罚中的规范错觉：基于公正世界信念的解释

惩罚规范在一定程度上会影响个体的惩罚行为, 但个体对惩罚规范的感知与实际规范之间可能存在差异, 这被称为规范错觉。为了更好地从这一角度理解第三方惩罚, 我们需要回答的是：第三方惩罚中是否存在规范错觉?如果存在, 其方向如何?会对个体自身的惩罚行为产生何种影响?实验1 (N = 449)和实验2 (N = 134)的结果表明, 在违规情境中, 人们往往低估了他人的惩罚水平, 这导致自身较低的惩罚行为。实验3 (N = 164)和实验4 (N = 284)进一步发现, 较弱的公正世界信念导致人们对他人惩罚水平的低估, 从而影响了自身的惩罚行为, 而社会距离调节了公正世界信念对规范错觉的影响。上述结果表明, 规范错觉会受到内部(公正世界信念)和外部(社会距离)两个参照点的影响, 同时也在一定程度上说明第三方惩罚是一种注重维护规范的积极行为、而非注重个人收益的策略行为。     

On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness

According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does not yet mean that he confronts it with a sound objection.     

A New Set of Moral Dilemmas: Norms for Moral Acceptability,Decision Times,and Emotional Salience

At the present time, the growing interest in the topic of moral judgment highlights the widespread need for a standardized set of experimental stimuli. We provide normative data for a sample of 120 undergraduate students using a new set of 60 moral dilemmas that might be employed in future studies according to specific research needs. Thirty dilemmas were structured to be similar to the Footbridge dilemma (“instrumental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a means to save more people), and thirty dilemmas were designed to be similar to the Trolley dilemma (“incidental” dilemmas, in which the death of one person is a foreseen but unintended consequence of the action aimed at saving more people). Besides type of dilemma, risk‐involvement was also manipulated: the main character's life was at risk in half of the instrumental dilemmas and in half of the incidental dilemmas. We provide normative values for the following variables: (i) rates of participants' responses (yes/no) to the proposed resolution; (ii) decision times; (iii) ratings of moral acceptability; and (iv) ratings of emotional valence (pleasantness/unpleasantness) and arousal (activation/calm) experienced during decision making. For most of the dependent variables investigated, we observed significant main effects of type of dilemma and risk‐involvement in both subject and item analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

信息性从众行为和规范性从众行为比较研究

目的:从众可分成两种,即信息性从众行为和规范性从众,探讨它们两者之间的区别。方法:通过瑞文智力测验为材料创造了这两种从众情境,观察大学生被试在两种实验条件下的行为差异。结果:信息性从众和社会规范性从众两者之间存在显著差异(Z=-3.183,P=0.001)。结论:大学生被试的信息性从众行为多于社会规范性从众行为,两者存在统计学上的显著性差异。     

同一性风格:青少年自我同一性研究的新视角

近年来,自我同一性问题的研究由关注同一性状态转向关注同一性风格。同一性风格是指个体在建立与维持同一性时表现出的社会认知策略方面的偏好,包括信息风格、规范风格和扩散/逃避风格。研究者围绕同一性风格与社会认知加工策略、人格、家庭环境、心理健康、学业表现等方面关系展开了丰富的研究。未来的研究方法和被试样本应该更加多样化,跨文化比较研究及干预性研究也有待进一步开展。     

Justice and desert-based emotions

A number of contemporary philosophers have pointed out that justice is not primarily an intellectual virtue, grounded in abstract, detached beliefs, but rather an emotional virtue, grounded in certain beliefs and desires that are compelling and deeply embedded in human nature. As a complex emotional virtue, justice seems to encompass, amongst other things, certain desert-based emotions that are developmentally and morally important for an understanding of justice. This article explores the philosophical reasons for the rising interest in desert-based emotions and offers a conceptual overview of some common emotions of this sort having to do with the fortunes of others and of oneself, respectively. The article does not give a definitive answer to the question of whether those emotions really are virtuous, but aims at enriching our understanding of what kind of virtue they might possibly represent.     

The duplication of love's reasons

If X loves Y does it follow that X has reasons to love a physiologically exact replacement for Y? Can love's reasons be duplicated? One response to the problem is to suggest that X lacks reasons for loving such a duplicate because the reason-conferring properties of Y cannot be fully duplicated. But a concern, played upon by Derek Parfit, is that this response may result from a failure to take account of the psychological pressures of an actual duplication scenario. In the face of the actual loss of a loved one and the subsequent appearance of a duplicate, how could we resist the inclination to love? Drawing upon duplication scenarios from Parfit and from Stanislaw Lem's Solaris, this paper will argue that there could be reasons for X to come to love a duplicate of Y but that these would not be identical with the reasons that X had (and may still have) to love Y. Nor (in the case of an agent with a normal causal history) could they be reasons for a love that violates the requirement that love is a response to a relationship and therefore takes time to emerge.