A RESPONSE TO HANS LUCHT'S “VIOLENCE AND MORALITY: THE CONCESSION OF LOSS IN A GHANAIAN FISHING VILLAGE”

The violent encounter between Africans and the forces of globalization raises the question of whether Africans should capitulate to these forces or seek to morally transform them, notwithstanding the uncertainty of achieving success. This essay argues that an exclusively existentialist interpretation of the African predicaments is inadequate because it erects a false dichotomy between African religious and moral sensibilities. It proposes instead an ethic of responsibility that affirms the interdependence of not only these two realms of life, but also of communal well‐being and individual's subjectivity.     

A Towel Less: Social Norms Enhance Pro-Environmental Behavior in Hotels

Previous research has shown that normative appeals to engage in environmentally friendly behavior were most effective when they were accompanied by a provincial norm (e.g., when norms matched individuals’ immediate situational circumstances). Analyzing hotel guests’ towel-use during their stay, the current study tests whether messages employing provincial norms were more effective in reducing towel-use than standard environmental messages. In line with previous findings, guests of two hotels used significantly fewer towels when provincial normative appeals—rather than standard environmental messages—were communicated. These findings corroborate to the body of research demonstrating the power of social norms on environmental behavior.     

Finite Reasons Without Foundations

This article develops a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein's infinitism. The view it develops, Framework Reasons, upholds Klein's principles of avoiding arbitrariness (PAA) and avoiding circularity (PAC) without requiring an infinite regress of reasons. A view of reasons that holds that the “reason for” relation is constrained by PAA and that PAC can avoid an infinite regress if the “reason for” relation is contextual. Moreover, such a view of reasons can maintain that skepticism is false by the maintaining that there is more to epistemic justification than can be expressed in any reasoning session. One crucial argument for Framework Reasons is that justification depends on a background of plausibility considerations. The final section of the article applies this view of reasons to Michael Bergmann's argument that any nonskeptical epistemology must embrace epistemic circularity.     

The You Turn

This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical Explorations on The Second Person (2014, 17:3). It does so by putting centre stage the notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made (and denied) in these papers (a) about the existence and/or nature of second person thought, second person reasons for action and second person reasons for belief and (b) about possible connections among thought-theoretical, ethical and epistemological issues and debates in this area.     

白乌鸦效应的稳定性研究

本研究以319名初中生为被试,考察群际背景中,个体对圈内和圈外的规范者和偏常者的评价模式,探索白乌鸦效应的稳定性。研究结果表明：（1）在同一群体内,个体评价偏常者总是高于规范者,这与国外研究不一致;个体评价圈内规范者高于圈外规范者,评价圈外偏常者高于圈内偏常者,这与以往研究的白乌鸦效应一致;（2）随着偏常成员偏离忠诚的程度加剧,个体对规范者的评价更积极,对偏常者的评价更消极;（3）随着群际偏见提高,个体对圈内规范者的评价提高,对圈内偏常者的评价下降,对圈外成员的评价不受群际偏见影响。     

A Logical Transmission Principle for Conclusive Reasons

Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic (David Lewis's system VC), conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a conclusive reason for believing p in Dretske's sense, and if p logically implies q, and if p and q satisfy one additional condition, it follows that r is a conclusive reason for believing q. After introducing this additional condition, I explain its intuitive import and use the condition to shed new light on Dretske's response to scepticism, as well as on his distinction between the so-called ‘lightweight’ and ‘heavyweight’ implications of a piece of perceptual knowledge.     

Experience and Life as Ever‐Present Constraints on Knowledge

This essay argues that acknowledging the existence of mind‐independent facts is a matter of vital importance, in that acquiescence before the layout of the world is something demanded of knowing agents from the most elementary empirical deliverance to the most abstract construct. Building on the idea that normativity requires the presence of more than one option to choose from, the essay shows how the cessation of one's life is the disjunctive alternative of any experiential episode. This much has been missed, it argues, because of a generalized failure to appreciate how even the simplest atomic contents embroil their subjects in acts of assent. Its account thus casts a new light on relativism and skepticism, revealing them to be provisional luxuries supported only by the cognitive labor of others.     

Bystanders’ responses to offline bullying and cyberbullying: The role of empathy and normative beliefs about aggression

Cyberbullying often takes place with the virtual presence or knowledge of bystanders. While we have some evidence about the determinants of bystanders’ responses to offline bullying, we lack empirical studies concerning the variables that influence bystanders’ responses to cyberbullying. The current study examines bystanders’ responses to offline bullying and cyberbullying incidents. Two types of responses were captured: support toward the victims and the reinforcement of bullies’ actions. Using data from 321 German adolescents (ages 12–18; M = 14.99; 44% girls), the association between bystanders’ responses and normative beliefs about verbal aggression and cyberaggression, and affective and cognitive empathy, were tested in a path model. Both types of normative beliefs positively predicted the reinforcement of bullies, and normative belief about verbal aggression also predicted support for the victims of offline bullying. Both types of empathy predicted support in offline bullying, but only affective empathy predicted support in cyberbullying. There was no link between affective or cognitive empathy to the reinforcement of bullies. Moreover, bystanders’ tendencies to respond supportively to the victim or to reinforce the bully were rather consistent in both cyber‐ and offline bullying, but there was no link between support and reinforcement. The findings are discussed with regard to implications for prevention and intervention efforts.     

Coping,Reasons for Living,and Suicide in Black College Students

The authors examined the roles of reasons for living and coping in protecting against suicidal behaviors among 361 Black college students. Results of a path analysis revealed that reasons for living mediated against suicidal ideation through an inverse effect on depression. Results also indicated that greater use of emotion‐oriented coping may lead to suicidal ideation through increased depression and decreased reasons for living, whereas avoidance‐oriented coping protected against suicide. Implications for these results are further discussed.