Health‐adjusted neuropsychological test norms based on 463 older Swedish car drivers

There is a need for improved normative information in particular for older persons. The present study provides neuropsychological test norms on seven cognitive tests used in a sample representing the general older driving population, when uncontrolled and controlled for physical health. A group of 463 healthy Swedish car drivers, aged 65 to 84 years, participated in a medical and neuropsychological examination. The latter included tests of visual scanning, mental shifting, visual spatial function, memory, reaction time, selective attention, and simultaneous capacity. Hierarchical regression analyses demonstrated that, when uncontrolled for health, old age was associated with significant impairment on all seven tests. Education was associated with a significant advantage for all tests except most reaction time subtests. Women outperformed men on selective attention. Controlling for health did not consistently change the associations with education, but generally weakened those with age, indicating rises in normative scores of up to 0.36 SD (residual). In terms of variance explained, impaired health predicted on average 2.5%, age 2.9%, education 2.1% and gender 0.1%. It was concluded (1) that individual regression‐based predictions of expected values have the advantage of allowing control for the impact of health on normative scores in addition to the adjustment for various demographic and performance‐related variables and (2) that health‐adjusted norms have the potential to classify functional status more accurately, to the extent that these norms diverge from norms uncontrolled for physical health.     

Why we can still believe the error theory

The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.     

'I'm Just Saying . . .': Discourse Markers of Standpoint Continuity

Examining discourse markers (Schiffrin, 1987) in two transcribed discussions of controversial issues in an undergraduate 'critical thinking' class, we note frequent uses of 'I'm just saying' and related metadiscursive expressions (I'm/we're saying, I'm/we're not saying, etc.). Our central claim is that these 'saying' expressions are pragmatic devices by which speakers claim 'all along' to have held a consistent argumentative standpoint, one that continues through the discussion unless changed for good reasons. Through close analysis of a series of discourse examples, we show how these discourse markers are used to display continuity, deflect counterarguments, and acknowledge the force of counterarguments while preserving continuity. In a concluding section we reflect critically on the use of these continuity markers with regard to four pragmatic functions that they potentially serve: to specify and clarify argumentative standpoints, to acknowledge a presumption of standpoint continuity, to acknowledge a normative expectation that discussion participants should have standpoints, and to avoid overt disagreement while saving face.     

Reviews

Rottschaefer, William A. The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency
Mccutcheon, Russell T. Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia
Drengson, Alan The Practice of Technology: Exploring Technology,Ecophilosophy, and Spiritual Disciplines for Vital Links
Burrell, David B. and Mcginn, Bernard (eds.) God and Creation: An Ecumenical Symposium     

语篇语境对句子理解的影响：来自N400的证据

N400作为语义违反的特异性ERP组分,其波幅反映了语义整合加工过程的难度,因此可将其作为研究语篇语境意义建构过程的一项重要指标。语篇语境可分为语言语境和非语言语境。前人一系列基于语篇水平的N400研究表明,从语义的角度上看,语言语境对句子理解具有制约和协调作用,其机制涉及词汇语义启动、场景适宜性、文字内容信息以及因果推理等方面;非语言语境对句子理解具有制约和补充作用,但其机制尚不明确。两种不同来源的语义信息在实时理解中是同时得到加工的     

句子理解过程中词类加工的功能性质

句法优先理论假设词类加工功能上优先于语义、动词论元结构和话语信息加工。来自德语和法语的证据显示, 词类违反阻断语义整合和动词论元结构加工, 因而词类优先于语义和动词论元结构。关于词类加工在功能上是否优先于话语信息加工, 尚无来自任何语言的证据。汉语证据尽管显示词类并不优先于语义, 但未充分讨论任务因素的影响。将来研究有必要使用ERP技术和违反范式, 从语义整合、动词论元结构加工和话语水平加工等多个层面, 同时操纵词类的正确性和非句法因素, 考察句法特性上与德语和法语不同的语言, 如汉语和韩语。这方面研究将有助于洞察一个语言的语言学特性如何制约或调整词类加工的功能性质。     

Rousing the Partisan Combatant: Elite Incivility,Anger, and Antideliberative Attitudes

The claim that elite political incivility can rouse partisan, antideliberative attitudes has many adherents, but the empirical record demonstrating a relationship is surprisingly limited. Yet the extant research suggests that incivility can stimulate aversive feelings, of the sort that discrete and dimensional theories of emotion predict should induce a partisan, antideliberative mode of citizenship among those exposed. Leveraging two online experiments, I address the questions of whether elite incivility provokes anger, rather than enthusiasm and anxiety, and whether the affective reactions induced by incivility yield the changes in deliberative attitudes that theories of emotion predict. I find that elite incivility, when counterattitudinal, rouses anger, which in turn can provoke an active and combative form of partisan citizenship. Despite claims to the contrary, the link between proattitudinal incivility, anger, and antideliberative attitudes is less clear. The results provide insight into the dynamics of discourse in the digital age, when affective polarization is the norm and elites commonly employ uncivil rhetoric.     

How does discourse among like-minded individuals affect their thinking about a complex issue?

Is there reason to be concerned about what has been seen as an increasing trend for discourse on complex issues to be confined to an “echo chamber” of like-minded individuals? To investigate how thinking regarding an issue changes in form following concentrated discourse with like-minded peers, we undertook a qualitative examination of changes in the reasoning that 34 older adults used to justify their positions prior to and following such discourse. They showed a divergence of patterns. A minority abandoned mention of previously expressed ideas at odds with their own positions or otherwise narrowed the reasoning used to justify their positions. Consistent with findings from previous studies, only a minority showed increased certainty and/or extremity (polarisation) on quantitative scales. Countering this minority were a larger proportion whose thinking appeared to benefit from such engagement in several respects that we describe. A follow-up study compares results for a sample of young adults.     

“I'm a police officer not a social worker or mental health nurse”: Online discourses of exclusion and resistance regarding mental health‐related police work

Despite estimates suggesting that around 15% of UK police incidents involve people with a mental health concern, officers receive very little mental health training. The police have faced high‐profile criticisms over their handling of mental health‐related incidents, whereas the underfunding and fragmentation of UK mental health services has led to concerns that police officers are being forced to undertake a primary role in mental health care. At a time of austerity and widespread cuts to public services, it is important to explore how particular groups work to justify the parameters of their professional duties. This article therefore explores the discourses surrounding mental health problems on an online police discussion forum, highlighting two distinct ways in which mental health‐related work is represented as being incompatible with policing. First, mental health problems are delegitimised and conflated with “scrounging,” positioning individuals as undeserving of police time; second, mental health problems are reified and associated with violence and extreme behaviour, justifying the use of force by police officers and deflecting responsibility onto mental health services. Findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that mental health work is not perceived to be a valid part of the police role.