On the origin of happiness by means of natural felicitation

The present study tested theoretical models of the forgivingness – well-being association with depression symptoms and social justice commitment as outcome measures and with differentiation of self (DoS) and dispositional humility as mediators. In doing so, we addressed the need to explicitly frame the study of virtues in a relational view of the self and extended the research on forgivingness and humility that moves beyond a focus on personal benefit and attends to the ways in which virtues also benefit other persons. The sample consisted of 213 graduate students from a religiously-affiliated university who completed a questionnaire of self-report measures. Results supported the proposed models as significant specific indirect effects were observed through DoS and humility. The findings support a self-regulating mechanism, as measured by DoS and dispositional humility, for the protective influence of forgivingness on depression symptoms and the promotive influence of forgivingness on prosocial relating.     

The Intrinsic Value of Sport: A Reply to Culbertson

Leon Culbertson's recent contribution, ‘Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value?’ objects to the account of the value of sport as intrinsic value I had developed in my Sport, Rules and Values; in particular, as this occurs in my argument that the value of some sports resided in the possibility of their functioning as a moral laboratory. He identifies two accounts of intrinsic value; and shows that neither would fit my purposes seamlessly. He urges that my account of the place of normative reasons cannot generate intrinsic value: rather, the person whose reasons they are somehow imports that value. Yet he has misunderstood my particularist conception of values; and the place occupied by my contextualism – these, rather than a residual commitment to essentialism, are what generates an apparent inconsistency he identifies. But they also explain it away. As a result, much of his concern to find some exact account of the term ‘intrinsic’ is misplaced: we need to look contextually. Further, the project of my discussion was limited to showing, first, how the moral laboratory idea might explain the value of some sport (on the assumption that sport had intrinsic value); and, second, how failures of realisation of that intrinsic value might be traced to the distinction between motivating reasons and normative ones.     

Spiritual Development Across the Adult Life Course: Findings from a Longitudinal Study

Longitudinal data spanning early (30s) and older (late 60s/mid-70s) adulthood were used to study spiritual development across the adult life course in a sample of men and women belonging to a younger (born 1928/29) and an older (born 1920/21) age cohort. All participants, irrespective of gender and cohort, increased significantly in spirituality between late middle (mid-50s/early 60s) and older adulthood. Members of the younger cohort increased in spirituality throughout the adult life cycle. In the second half of adulthood, women increased more rapidly in spirituality than men. Spiritual involvement in older age was predicted by religious involvement and personality characteristics in early adulthood and subsequent experiences of negative life events.     

Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings

Can collectives feel guilt with respect to what they have done? It hasbeen claimed that they cannot. Yet in everyday discourse collectives areoften held to feel guilt, criticized because they do not, and so on.Among other things, this paper considers what such so-called collectiveguilt feelings amount to. If collective guilt feelings are sometimesappropriate, it must be the case that collectives can indeed beguilty. The paper begins with an account of what it is for a collectiveto intend to do something and to act in light of that intention.According to this account, and in senses that are explained, there is acollective that intends to do something if and only if the members of agiven population are jointly committed to intend as a body to do thatthing. A related account of collective belief is also presented. It isthen argued that, depending on the circumstances, a group's action canbe free as opposed to coerced, and that the idea that a collective assuch can be guilty of performing a wrongful act makes sense. The ideathat a group might feel guilt may be rejected because it is assumed thatto feel guilt is to experience a ``pang'' or ``twinge'' of guilt –nothing more and nothing less. Presumably, though, there must becognitions and perhaps behavior involved. In addition, the primacy, eventhe necessity, of ``feeling-sensations'' to feeling guilt in theindividual case has been questioned. Without the presumption that it isalready clear what feeling guilt amounts to, three proposals as to thenature of collective guilt feelings are considered. A ``feeling ofpersonal guilt'' is defined as a feeling of guilt over one's own action.It is argued that it is implausible to construe collective guiltfeelings in terms of members' feelings of personal guilt. ``Membershipguilt feelings'' involve a group member's feeling of guilt over what hisor her group has done. It is argued that such feelings are intelligibleif the member is party to the joint commitment that lies at the base ofthe relevant collective intention and action. However, an account ofcollective guilt in terms of membership guilt feelings is found wanting.Finally, a ``plural subject'' account of collective guilt feelings isarticulated, such that they involve a joint commitment to feel guilt asa body. The parties to a joint commitment of the kind in question may asa result find themselves experiencing ``pangs'' of the kind associatedwith personal and membership guilt feelings. Since these pangs, byhypothesis, arise as a result of the joint commitment to feel guilt as abody, they might be thought of as providing a kind of phenomenology forcollective guilt. Be that as it may, it is argued the plural subjectaccount has much to be said for it.     

When Subjectivism Matters

Abstract: In this article I consider when the question of whether entities exist subjectively (only in the minds of subjects) or objectively (in themselves, independently of the minds of subjects) is important, both theoretically and practically. I argue that when it comes to the metaphysics underlying three types of moral questions, broadly conceived, the subjectivity question does not matter practically, although it is widely thought to matter. Subjectivism does not matter in these moral questions in the same way(s) it matters in some nonmoral metaphysical issues. The moral questions I consider are the meaning of life, normative ethics, and the free‐will problem. The nonmoral issues I address are the existence of God, the traditional mind/body problem, and personal identity. I explain the difference by noting that certain metaphysical issues on the fact side of the fact/value distinction impinge on persons' lives more prominently than do the metaphysics behind the three moral questions.     

Group decision process and incrementalism in organizational decision making

In two studies examining resource allocation, support is found for the notion that group decisions are affected in systematic ways depending on whether or not there was individual consideration of the problem before meeting as a group. Specifically, compared to no prior consideration groups, prior consideration groups (1) escalate their commitment more in progress (i.e., ongoing) decisions, and (2) are less willing to concentrate resources on a single project in adoption (i.e., resource utilization) decisions. The findings challenge the blanket assertion that promoting divergent views in a group decision context is always related to better decisions.     

Expanding the traditional user versus non‐user dichotomy amongst ecstasy users

Differences in the drug use characteristics and psychosocial variables in the use and non‐use of ecstasy within 845 16–25 year‐olds in the UK was examined. Based on levels of ecstasy use and intentions, two groups of non‐users (resistant and vulnerable), three groups of users (light, moderate and heavy) and an ex‐user group were identified. It was found that there is predictive utility in this way of expanding the widely employed ‘user versus non‐user’ dichotomy. Resistant non‐users were more likely to be younger, female, and were characterized by lower levels of use of four other drugs (amphetamine, cannabis, cocaine and LSD). Those ‘at risk’ of using ecstasy reported more frequent use of amphetamine, LSD, and cannabis than resistant non‐users. Heavy user groups reported using amphetamine, cocaine and LSD more frequently than all the other groups. Having ecstasy using friends increased the odds of being an ‘at risk’ non‐user or an ecstasy user. Normative influence also differentiated between the three user groups (light, moderate, and heavy). Beliefs about ecstasy use being immoral, ecstasy offers being difficult to resist, ecstasy use making one feel guilty and ecstasy being readily available differentiated between user and non‐user groups. These factors could usefully inform the content of health education materials designed to change ecstasy use. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

NON‐RELATIVE REASONS AND HUMEAN THOUGHT: IF WHAT IS A REASON FOR YOU IS A REASON FOR ME,WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE HUMEAN?

Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis.     

Riding the waves: A functional‐cognitive perspective on the relations among behaviour therapy,cognitive behaviour therapy and acceptance and commitment therapy

Different types of therapy explain psychopathology and the effects of psychotherapy differently. Different explanations are, however, not necessarily mutually exclusive. Based on the idea that functional and cognitive explanations are situated at different levels, we argue that functional therapies such as traditional Behaviour Therapy (BT) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) are not necessarily incompatible with Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT). Whether a functional and a cognitive therapy actually align depends on whether they highlight the same type of environmental causes. This functional‐cognitive perspective reveals various differences and communalities among BT, CBT and ACT.