眼睛效应不稳定与感知规范：一个新视角

眼睛效应指人们面对眼睛或类似眼睛的图案时会发生行为改变的现象。但是, 眼睛效应的稳健性备受争议, 主要有4种观点：促使人们更亲社会、更遵守社会规范、降低反社会行为、无效果。结合规范错觉和创新扩散理论, 基于感知规范的视角, 当感知亲社会规范流行程度较高时, 眼睛效应既会“促进亲社会行为”或“促进人们遵守社会规范”, 也会“降低反社会行为”; 但当感知亲社会规范流行程度较低时, 眼睛效应对一些反社会行为“无效果”; 当规范错觉较大且无规范干预时, 眼睛效应同样对一些反社会行为无效果。因此, 将以上4种争议观点整合为“不同感知规范条件下的眼睛效应”, 揭示了眼睛效应不稳定的原因, 为未来实证研究和实践应用提供理论基础。     

Expansion and Contraction of Finite States

We present a theory that copes with the dynamics of inconsistent information. A method is set forth to represent possibly inconsistent information by a finite state. Next, finite operations for expansion and contraction of finite states are given. No extra-logical element — a choice function or an ordering over (sets of) sentences — is presupposed in the definition of contraction. Moreover, expansion and contraction are each other's duals. AGM-style characterizations of these operations follow.     

Weighting information from outside sources: a biased process

How do people utilize information from outside sources in their decisions? Participants observed a signal‐plus‐noise or noise‐alone event and then made a yes–no decision about whether a signal had occurred. Participants were provided with two information sources to aid decision making. Each source consisted of four components that provided estimates of signal likelihood. In Experiment 1, the two sources had equal overall accuracy but differed in the expertise and internal correlation of their components. A regression analysis indicated that participants overweighed the high‐expertise‐high‐correlation source. This bias occurred on trials when the aggregate opinions of the sources disagreed. In Experiment 2, both the overall accuracy of the source and its components were manipulated. Participants overweighed information from the higher accuracy source. These biases reflect people's sensitivity to across‐trial and within‐trial differences in the accuracy and internal consistency of information sources. Experiment 3 provided additional evidence supporting these conclusions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

The guise of the good and the problem of partiality

According to the guise of the good thesis, we desire things under the ‘guise of the good.’ Here I sympathetically articulate a generic formulation of the guise of the good thesis, and address a problem for the view, which I call the problem of partiality. The problem is, roughly, that our partial pro-attitudes –for example, our special concern for ourselves –do not correspond to what is absolutely good. I criticize three solutions to the problem, and propose an alternative strategy, on which partial pro-attitudes constitute a species of illusion.     

Liar,liar: Consistent lying decreases belief in the truth

This study investigated the effects of lying on belief ratings for autobiographical childhood events. Participants lied by trying to convince the experimenter that likely events had not happened and that unlikely events had happened. Participants consistently lied, consistently told the truth, and alternated lying and truth telling across two sessions. Results showed that consistent false assents increased belief in those false events and that consistent false denials decreased belief in those true events. False denials had a larger influence on belief than did false assents. False assents that were told first were more likely to increase in belief than were false assents told in the second session. False denials decreased belief in the true event regardless of when they were told. These results suggest that lying influences confidence ratings both by increasing belief in a lied‐about event and by decreasing belief in a true event.     

Belief Revision,Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

道德信仰的两重规定及其限度

道德必须以信仰为基础 ,道德信仰既是对道德的信仰 ,又是对善的终极追求。两者合为一体 ,统一于道德信仰这一主体的道德意识之中的 ,它们从不同的角度与层面反映了人对道德的态度与意愿。这是研究道德信仰应有的理论视点。     

道德信仰危机的成因及其克服

道德信仰是对道德的终极关怀,是理性的非理性存在方式,是人的精神支柱。道德理想主义,制度安排不尽合理,市场经济负面效应以及社会主义低谷是道德信仰危机的重要根源。发展经济,加强制度伦理建设,强化规则意识等克服道德信仰危机的主要措施。     

童年中晚期攻击的发展轨迹和性别差异：基于母亲报告的分析

采用母亲报告的方法, 对1618名儿童的攻击进行了4年(9岁~12岁)的追踪研究, 分析了童年中晚期攻击的一般发展轨迹、亚组发展轨迹以及性别差异。结果发现：(1)总体上, 童年中晚期儿童的攻击水平随年龄而下降。(2)基于亚组的准参数模型分析表明, 童年中晚期母亲报告的儿童攻击呈现三条不同的发展轨迹, 即无攻击轨迹、低攻击—下降轨迹以及持续高攻击轨迹, 各轨迹组人数比例分别约为68.7%、26.8%、4.5%。持续高攻击轨迹组以及低攻击—下降轨迹组的儿童在童年晚期均面临一定程度的人际适应困难。(3)多项Logit模型以及卡方检验表明, 男生更倾向于归属于攻击轨迹组(高或者低攻击轨迹组), 而女生更倾向于归属于无攻击轨迹组; 但这并不说明高攻击轨迹组中没有女生, 约2%的女生属于高攻击轨迹组。