Do people automatically track others’ beliefs? Evidence from a continuous measure

Recent findings suggest that tracking others’ beliefs is not always effortful and slow, but may rely on a fast and implicit system. An untested prediction of the automatic belief tracking account is that own and others’ beliefs should be activated in parallel. We tested this prediction measuring continuous movement trajectories in a task that required deciding between two possible object locations. We independently manipulated whether participants’ belief about the object location was true or false and whether an onlooker’s belief about the object location was true or false. Manipulating whether or not the agent’s belief was ever task relevant allowed us to compare performance in an explicit and implicit version of the same task. Movement parameters revealed an influence of the onlooker’s irrelevant belief in the implicit version of the task. This provides evidence for parallel activation of own and others’ beliefs.     

Post hoc versus predictive accounts of children’s theory of mind: A reply to Ruffman

Ruffman (2014) argues for a minimalist account of infants’ performance on theory of mind tasks. This commentary argues that because Ruffman’s minimalist account is post hoc, it neither generates testable predictions about how infants will respond in new situations, nor does it offer a coherent explanation for existing false-belief findings. An alternative, mentalist account is presented. This account integrates infancy findings with prior theory of mind literature and generates novel predictions about children’s false belief performance.     

女大学生性别角色、性别观念与大学适应的关系

对北京市某校1082名女大学生的调查,探讨性别角色与大学适应的关系,进一步验证一致性模型、双性化模型和男性化模型哪一种理想性别模型更适合女大学生这一群体,并探讨当今中国多元性别文化背景下,对女大学生性别角色模型的影响。研究结果表明：（1）女大学生的理想性别角色模型是双性化模型;（2）平等性别观念对女大学生大学适应有促进作用,而传统性别观念和反传统性别观念对女大学生大学适应有阻碍作用;（3）性别观念对女大学生大学适应的影响,是通过男性化、女性化特质的中介作用产生影响,中介效应显著,中介效应检验进一步证明了双     

Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?

A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider, and reply to, seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way of softening the blow, I show how the counterexample itself suggests a plausible diagnosis of why this claim has seemed so plausible to so many.     

The Normative Significance of Forgiveness

P.F. Strawson claimed that forgiveness is such an essential part of our moral practices that we could not extricate it from our form of life even if we so desired. But what is it about forgiveness that would make it such a central feature of our moral experience? In this paper, I suggest that the answer has to do with what I will call the normative significance of forgiveness. Forgiveness is normatively significant in the sense that, in its paradigmatic instances, forgiving alters the operative norms bearing on the interaction between the victim and the wrongdoer in certain characteristic ways. My project here is, first, to clarify the ways that paradigmatic cases of forgiveness alter the norms of interaction between victim and wrongdoer and to argue that it is in this respect that forgiveness is a normatively significant feature of our moral responsibility practices. Second, I show that most extant theories of forgiveness fail to explain the characteristic ways in which forgiving alters norms. Third, I offer a theory of forgiveness that accounts for this significant normative feature. I conclude by addressing two objections to my proposal.     

Is Belief in God Related to Differences in Adolescents’ Psychological Functioning?

Many studies have documented links between positive psychological functioning and religiousness during the adolescent years, but very few have contrasted religious and nonreligious youth. The purpose of the present study was to examine differences in psychological functioning among adolescent atheists, agnostics, and believers using a profile analysis approach. The authors conducted a survey of Grade 8 students (N = 1,925) enrolled in Catholic schools in two Australian states. The survey included 10 measures of psychological functioning, broadly divided into three categories (positive adjustment, social well‐being, and negative outcomes). Results indicated that belief in God was related to distinct profiles of psychological adjustment. The implications of these findings for understanding how differing value systems are related to particular developmental stages are discussed.     

主观社会阶层正向预测利他性惩罚

利他性惩罚是指个体自行承担成本来惩罚违规者的行为, 它受到社会阶层的影响。研究1利用2013年中国综合社会调查数据发现阶层显著正向预测利他性惩罚。研究2 (N = 450)基于真实生活事件的调查表明, 惩罚成本调节了阶层对惩罚的影响：在成本较高的直接惩罚中, 阶层正向预测惩罚; 而在成本较低的间接惩罚中, 这种作用不再显著。研究3 (N = 232)通过操纵阶层与成本进一步证实惩罚成本的调节作用：高阶层者比低阶层者更有可能做出利他性惩罚, 但两者的差距在高成本条件下更突出。研究4 (N = 125)综合考察了阶层影响惩罚的心理机制, 多层线性分析显示：惩罚成本较低时, 阶层通过公正世界信念来间接影响惩罚, 而成本较高时, 阶层直接正向影响了惩罚。上述结果意味着利他性惩罚受到个体社会阶层的影响, 同时也在一定程度上说明在利他性惩罚中基于成本-收益的策略性考虑并非完全缺席。     

有限理性的本质辨析与价值之争

有限理性不是受约束条件下的最优化, 更不能等同于非理性。从本质上说, 它是对迄今为止人类理性进化和发展水平的客观描述, 意味着无论在对待现实的态度上, 还是在认识和改造现实的能力上, 人都是理性的, 但人的理性是有限度的。有限理性观质疑当代社会科学中流行的强势理性观及其推演出来的方法论和知识体系的可靠性, 但并不质疑人的理性本身, 摆脱了历史上形形色色的理性论或非理性论非此即彼的二元论思维模式, 为我们提供了从资源观、量化观及动态发展观角度理解和把握人类理性本质的新视角。在价值理性意义上, 有限理性是有缺陷的, 但在工具理性意义上, 有限理性具有合理性, 需要在二者之间寻找适当的均衡点。心理学的有限理性研究及其产生的广泛影响酿成了继文艺复兴的概率革命之后又一次人类理性观的革命, 是这门学科为人类知识和思想宝库做出的最重要的贡献之一, 不仅具有深远的历史意义, 而且具有跨学科的方法论意义。     

眼睛效应不稳定与感知规范：一个新视角

眼睛效应指人们面对眼睛或类似眼睛的图案时会发生行为改变的现象。但是, 眼睛效应的稳健性备受争议, 主要有4种观点：促使人们更亲社会、更遵守社会规范、降低反社会行为、无效果。结合规范错觉和创新扩散理论, 基于感知规范的视角, 当感知亲社会规范流行程度较高时, 眼睛效应既会“促进亲社会行为”或“促进人们遵守社会规范”, 也会“降低反社会行为”; 但当感知亲社会规范流行程度较低时, 眼睛效应对一些反社会行为“无效果”; 当规范错觉较大且无规范干预时, 眼睛效应同样对一些反社会行为无效果。因此, 将以上4种争议观点整合为“不同感知规范条件下的眼睛效应”, 揭示了眼睛效应不稳定的原因, 为未来实证研究和实践应用提供理论基础。     

Maintaining faith in agency under immutable constraints: cognitive consequences of believing in negotiable fate

Negotiable fate refers to the idea that one can negotiate with fate for control, and that people can exercise personal agency within the limits that fate has determined. Research on negotiable fate has found greater prevalence of related beliefs in Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe and English-speaking countries. The present research extends previous findings by exploring the cognitive consequences of the belief in negotiable fate. It was hypothesized that this belief enables individuals to maintain faith in the potency of their personal actions and to remain optimistic in their goal pursuits despite the immutable constraints. The belief in negotiable fate was predicted to (a) facilitate sense-making of surprising outcomes; (b) increase persistence in goal pursuits despite early unfavorable outcomes; and (c) increase risky choices when individuals have confidence in their luck. Using multiple methods (e.g., crosscultural comparisons, culture priming, experimental induction of fate beliefs), we found supporting evidence for our hypotheses in three studies. Furthermore, as expected, the cognitive effects of negotiable fate are observed only in cultural contexts where the fate belief is relatively prevalent. Implications of these findings are discussed in relation to the intersubjective approach to understanding the influence of culture on cognitive processes (e.g., Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010), the sociocultural foundations that foster the development of a belief in negotiable fate, and an alternative perspective for understanding the nature of agency in contexts where constraints are severe. Future research avenues are also discussed.