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721.
幼儿是如何通过错误信念任务的:信念还是规则?   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1       下载免费PDF全文
旨在研究错误信念任务的有效性。采用真实信念(TB)任务和错误信念(FB)任务,以知否问题和想法问题为检测指标,通过比较儿童在FB和TB任务上的表现,本研究发现4~6岁儿童在知否问题上存在正确反应、忽略推断和“是”反应偏差三种反应模式。儿童通过FB任务的方式也有三类:基于信念、基于规则,以及其它(可能是猜测或其它未知策略)。儿童在知否问题与想法问题上的通过率并无显著差异。  相似文献   
722.
Personality-relationship transactions were investigated in a general population sample of young German adults with three assessments over 8 years. Four general findings were obtained. First, personality development was characterized by substantive individual differences in change. Second, bivariate latent growth models indicated that individual differences in personality change were substantially associated with change in peer and family relationships. Third, forming a partner relationship for the first time moderated the maturation of personality. This finding was replicated over two subsequent time intervals with independent subgroups. Fourth, higher neuroticism and higher sociability predicted which of the singles began a partner relationship during the next 8 years. The results confirm that individual differences in personality development predict and result from life transitions and relationship experiences.  相似文献   
723.
724.
What Are Degrees of Belief?   总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1  
Probabilism is committed to two theses:
1)  Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences.
2)  The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus.
Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is:
i)  to give an account of what degrees of belief are,
and then
ii)  to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality.
Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage i) has been adequately discharged, various authors move on to stage ii) with varied and ingenious arguments. But an unsatisfactory response at stage i) clearly undermines any gains that might be accrued at stage ii) as far as probabilism is concerned: if those things are not degrees of belief, then it is irrelevant to probabilism whether they should be probabilities or not. In this paper we scrutinize the state of play regarding stage i). We critically examine several of the leading accounts of degrees of belief: reducing them to corresponding betting behavior (de Finetti); measuring them by that behavior (Jeffrey); and analyzing them in terms of preferences and their role in decision-making more generally (Ramsey, Lewis, Maher). We argue that the accounts fail, and so they are unfit to subserve arguments for probabilism. We conclude more positively: ‘degree of belief’ should be taken as a primitive concept that forms the basis of our best theory of rational belief and decision: probabilism. Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by Branden Fitelson  相似文献   
725.
In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different (and seemingly independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695, 2000, Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2004) and Adler (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 267–285, 1999, Beliefs own ethics, MIT Press, 2002). Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle about epistemic justification, about what we ought to believe. Adler’s, on the other hand, makes evidentialism a principle about how we come to believe, what it is, broadly speaking, rational for us to believe. Having identified this difference, I consider two complaints levied against evidentialism, namely what I call the threshold problem and what I call the availability problem, and hope to show that: (a) only an independent, bracketed justification principle of evidentialism can deal with those problems; (b) the rationality principle of evidentialism is not in fact independent from the justification principle; (c) the rationality principle is hard to motivate; and that (d) in the final analysis the argument for the justification principle depends on the rationality principle. I thus conclude that although it may be convenient for evidentialists to treat these two principles as independent, such an independence cannot be maintained.
Anthony Robert BoothEmail:
  相似文献   
726.
Abstract: Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace challenge my account of moral arrogance, and Triplett and Wallace challenge its application to the problem of abortion. I try to show here that Driver's attempt to defend consequentialism from my charge that it promotes moral arrogance is successful only if consequentialism explicitly gives up what has been considered one of its major virtues. I acknowledge that Triplett has uncovered some unclarity in my claim that the moral acceptability of abortion is an unresolvable moral issue. I also acknowledge that Wallace has uncovered some unclarity in my account of moral arrogance. After clarifying that account, I try to meet her challenge to defend my claim that it is not morally arrogant for a state to place some restrictions on abortions.  相似文献   
727.
幼儿对基于信念的惊奇情绪的认知发展   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
刘国雄  方富熹 《心理学报》2007,39(4):662-667
采用简化的错误信念任务,考察了90名3~5岁幼儿对自己或他人信念证伪引发的惊奇情绪认知及其错误信念理解。结果显示,3~5岁幼儿对自身或是故事主人公信念证伪之后的惊奇情绪理解表现出显著的发展趋势,其归因均以情境定向为主,只有极少数幼儿提到了相应的信念状态。3、4、5幼儿对他人、以及自身错误信念的认知基本是一致的,通过率分别为一半左右、76.7%、93.3%。幼儿对惊奇情绪产生原因的逆向推理能力在3~5岁之间获得了显著的发展,这一能力显著差于其错误信念认知,且略低于其顺向预测能力。这些结果揭示出幼儿很早就发展的心理理论以及心理表征技能在惊奇情绪理解中的作用  相似文献   
728.
特定句法提示对3-4岁儿童错误信念理解的影响   总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2  
通过在错误信念任务中,为儿童提供关于错误信念表征的特定句法,考察这种句法理解对儿童的错误信念理解成绩是否有促进作用。124名3-4岁幼儿参加实验,每个年龄组幼儿随机分配到零级提示,一级提示和二级提示等三个句法提示条件组,并完成4个错误信念任务。结果发现,一级提示条件和二级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩显著高于零级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩,而一级和二级两种提示条件之间没有显著差异。句法提示对不同的错误信念任务的影响是相同的,对错误信念的预测问题和解释问题的影响模式是一致的。表明对错误信念表征的特定句法提示,有效促进了儿童的错误信念成绩,提示这种句法结构可能有助于儿童的错误信念理解  相似文献   
729.
宋海燕 《社会心理科学》2007,22(1):171-173,223
文章首先引出宗教这一概念,然后着重介绍了近年来我国在大学生宗教信仰研究方面取得的成果,主要涉及当前大学生宗教信仰的研究现状与特征以及宗教信仰的原因分析,最后从实证的角度,提出了一些针对正确引导大学生宗教信仰的措施与对策。  相似文献   
730.
主体交互解释是主观解释的发展,它比主观解释具有更为明显的客观性。本文探讨了主体交互概率的测度,主体交互概率形成的条件,主体交互解释与人造客体概率解释一道构造的从主观向完全客观延伸的谱系,以及主体交互解释的恰当性问题。通过探讨这个新近兴起的理论,为人们在确定基本概率时提供了普遍的适用性并使人们避免了主观的随意性。  相似文献   
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