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711.
在殷商、西周、春秋三个时期,卜筮对于中国早期至上神信仰的作用历经了从催生到消泯的变化:殷商时期,卜筮与至上神"帝"信仰有着表里与共的内在关系,卜筮催生宗教;西周以后,周人不再把"帝"而是把祖考作为信仰对象,卜筮沦为了政治的工具,与"帝"信仰发生了断裂;春秋时期,卜筮又成了人本精神所利用的舞台,周人借助对卜筮形式的肯定和卜筮结果的否定来彰显人的主体性,消泯"帝"信仰。卜筮在历史中两种截然相反的作用,对早期中国宗教的发生与夭折形成深刻的影响。 相似文献
712.
Beth Innocenti Manolescu 《Argumentation》2007,21(4):379-395
Shame appeals may be both relevant to and make possible argumentation with reluctant addressees. I propose a normative pragmatic
model of practical reasoning involved in shame appeals and show that its explanatory power exceeds that of a more traditional
account of an underlying practical inference structure. I also illustrate that analyzing the formal propriety of shame appeals
offers a more complete explanation of their normative pragmatic force than an application of rules for dialogue types. 相似文献
713.
714.
特定句法提示对3-4岁儿童错误信念理解的影响 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2
通过在错误信念任务中,为儿童提供关于错误信念表征的特定句法,考察这种句法理解对儿童的错误信念理解成绩是否有促进作用。124名3-4岁幼儿参加实验,每个年龄组幼儿随机分配到零级提示,一级提示和二级提示等三个句法提示条件组,并完成4个错误信念任务。结果发现,一级提示条件和二级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩显著高于零级提示条件下的错误信念理解成绩,而一级和二级两种提示条件之间没有显著差异。句法提示对不同的错误信念任务的影响是相同的,对错误信念的预测问题和解释问题的影响模式是一致的。表明对错误信念表征的特定句法提示,有效促进了儿童的错误信念成绩,提示这种句法结构可能有助于儿童的错误信念理解 相似文献
715.
幼儿对基于信念的惊奇情绪的认知发展 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
采用简化的错误信念任务,考察了90名3~5岁幼儿对自己或他人信念证伪引发的惊奇情绪认知及其错误信念理解。结果显示,3~5岁幼儿对自身或是故事主人公信念证伪之后的惊奇情绪理解表现出显著的发展趋势,其归因均以情境定向为主,只有极少数幼儿提到了相应的信念状态。3、4、5幼儿对他人、以及自身错误信念的认知基本是一致的,通过率分别为一半左右、76.7%、93.3%。幼儿对惊奇情绪产生原因的逆向推理能力在3~5岁之间获得了显著的发展,这一能力显著差于其错误信念认知,且略低于其顺向预测能力。这些结果揭示出幼儿很早就发展的心理理论以及心理表征技能在惊奇情绪理解中的作用 相似文献
716.
Personality-relationship transactions were investigated in a general population sample of young German adults with three assessments over 8 years. Four general findings were obtained. First, personality development was characterized by substantive individual differences in change. Second, bivariate latent growth models indicated that individual differences in personality change were substantially associated with change in peer and family relationships. Third, forming a partner relationship for the first time moderated the maturation of personality. This finding was replicated over two subsequent time intervals with independent subgroups. Fourth, higher neuroticism and higher sociability predicted which of the singles began a partner relationship during the next 8 years. The results confirm that individual differences in personality development predict and result from life transitions and relationship experiences. 相似文献
717.
What Are Degrees of Belief? 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Probabilism is committed to two theses:
Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is:
and then
Most of the action in the literature concerns stage ii). Assuming that stage i) has been adequately discharged, various authors
move on to stage ii) with varied and ingenious arguments. But an unsatisfactory response at stage i) clearly undermines any
gains that might be accrued at stage ii) as far as probabilism is concerned: if those things are not degrees of belief, then it is irrelevant to probabilism whether they should be probabilities or not.
In this paper we scrutinize the state of play regarding stage i). We critically examine several of the leading accounts of
degrees of belief: reducing them to corresponding betting behavior (de Finetti); measuring them by that behavior (Jeffrey);
and analyzing them in terms of preferences and their role in decision-making more generally (Ramsey, Lewis, Maher). We argue
that the accounts fail, and so they are unfit to subserve arguments for probabilism. We conclude more positively: ‘degree
of belief’ should be taken as a primitive concept that forms the basis of our best theory of rational belief and decision:
probabilism.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology I. Edited by
Branden Fitelson 相似文献
1) | Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. |
2) | The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. |
i) | to give an account of what degrees of belief are, |
ii) | to show that those things should be probabilities, on pain of irrationality. |
718.
719.
Anthony Robert Booth 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):401-417
In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different (and seemingly independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism
and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695, 2000, Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2004) and Adler (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 267–285, 1999, Beliefs own ethics, MIT Press, 2002). Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle about epistemic justification, about what we ought to believe. Adler’s, on the other hand, makes evidentialism a principle about how we come to believe, what it is, broadly speaking, rational for us to believe. Having identified this difference, I consider two complaints levied against evidentialism, namely what
I call the threshold problem and what I call the availability problem, and hope to show that: (a) only an independent, bracketed
justification principle of evidentialism can deal with those problems; (b) the rationality principle of evidentialism is not
in fact independent from the justification principle; (c) the rationality principle is hard to motivate; and that (d) in the
final analysis the argument for the justification principle depends on the rationality principle. I thus conclude that although
it may be convenient for evidentialists to treat these two principles as independent, such an independence cannot be maintained.
相似文献
Anthony Robert BoothEmail: |
720.
BERNARD GERT 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(4):404-419
Abstract: Julia Driver, Timm Triplett, and Kathleen Wallace challenge my account of moral arrogance, and Triplett and Wallace challenge its application to the problem of abortion. I try to show here that Driver's attempt to defend consequentialism from my charge that it promotes moral arrogance is successful only if consequentialism explicitly gives up what has been considered one of its major virtues. I acknowledge that Triplett has uncovered some unclarity in my claim that the moral acceptability of abortion is an unresolvable moral issue. I also acknowledge that Wallace has uncovered some unclarity in my account of moral arrogance. After clarifying that account, I try to meet her challenge to defend my claim that it is not morally arrogant for a state to place some restrictions on abortions. 相似文献