NON‐RELATIVE REASONS AND HUMEAN THOUGHT: IF WHAT IS A REASON FOR YOU IS A REASON FOR ME,WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE HUMEAN?

Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis.     

Health‐adjusted neuropsychological test norms based on 463 older Swedish car drivers

There is a need for improved normative information in particular for older persons. The present study provides neuropsychological test norms on seven cognitive tests used in a sample representing the general older driving population, when uncontrolled and controlled for physical health. A group of 463 healthy Swedish car drivers, aged 65 to 84 years, participated in a medical and neuropsychological examination. The latter included tests of visual scanning, mental shifting, visual spatial function, memory, reaction time, selective attention, and simultaneous capacity. Hierarchical regression analyses demonstrated that, when uncontrolled for health, old age was associated with significant impairment on all seven tests. Education was associated with a significant advantage for all tests except most reaction time subtests. Women outperformed men on selective attention. Controlling for health did not consistently change the associations with education, but generally weakened those with age, indicating rises in normative scores of up to 0.36 SD (residual). In terms of variance explained, impaired health predicted on average 2.5%, age 2.9%, education 2.1% and gender 0.1%. It was concluded (1) that individual regression‐based predictions of expected values have the advantage of allowing control for the impact of health on normative scores in addition to the adjustment for various demographic and performance‐related variables and (2) that health‐adjusted norms have the potential to classify functional status more accurately, to the extent that these norms diverge from norms uncontrolled for physical health.     

Why we can still believe the error theory

The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.     

Reasoning and normative beliefs: not too sophisticated

Does reasoning to a certain conclusion necessarily involve a normative belief in support of that conclusion? In many recent discussions of the nature of reasoning, such a normative belief condition is rejected. One main objection is that it requires too much conceptual sophistication and thereby excludes certain reasoners, such as small children. I argue that this objection is mistaken. Its advocates overestimate what is necessary for grasping the normative concepts required by the condition, while seriously underestimating the importance of such concepts for our most fundamental agential capacities. Underlying the objection is the observation that normative thoughts do not necessarily cross our minds during reasoning. I show that proponents of the normative belief condition can accommodate this observation by taking the required normative belief to guide the reasoning process and offer a novel account of what such guidance consists in.     

The continuing relevance of “queer” theology for the rest of the field

ABSTRACT

What does it mean to queer theology? How is this task of queering theology relevant to and engaged with mainstream academic theological discourse? What is already queer about theology? What direction should queering theology take in the future? This special issue examines these key questions, among others, which are at the heart of the overall project that has been referred to as “queer theology”. In this introduction to the volume, we outline common strands of thought, and key issues and questions that undergird and interlace the essays in this volume. We also provide a brief history of queer theology, highlighting four themes that we consider essential to the study of queer theology as a whole: (1) the role of witness, (2) the project of disentangling the “real” issues from the incidentals in reactions to a queer presence in the Church, (3) the creative rereading of tradition with an eye toward emancipation and (4) the ways in which queer theology orients the field of theological studies as a whole to what really matters (or ought to matter) for Christians and others seeking to follow the witness of Jesus.     

Why Care about Being an Agent?

The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments to the exercise of our other capacities for which being a full-blown agent is a necessary condition. Thus, the only kind of reason available is hypothetical rather than categorical. The status of this reason may seem to undermine the importance of this answer. I show, however, that it both achieves much of what we want when we cite categorical reasons and highlights why agency is valuable.     

Political Action in Conflict and Nonconflict Regions in Indonesia: The Role of Religious and National Identifications

This study examined the relationship between group identification and political action in Indonesia. We made four contributions to the literature. First, we studied political action on behalf of religious groups and examined the role of religious identification alone and in combination with national identification. Second, we analyzed political action in a non‐Western country where social cleavages occur primarily along religious lines and where a conflict and nonconflict region can be studied. Third, we compared Muslims and Christians, whose majority and minority status varies across the two regions, and fourth, we investigated both normative and nonnormative forms of political action (protest and violence). In line with the dual‐identification model of politicization, we found that religious identification increased support for protest (but not violence) in the conflict region only and particularly among high national identifiers. In the nonconflict region, religious identification was not related to violence, and it was related to lower support for protest among high national identifiers. The patterns were largely similar for Muslims and Christians, but some differences were found depending on the majority‐minority status. We conclude that particularities of the intergroup context should be taken into consideration when studying politicization.     

时间压力下你想听什么? 参照组影响对冲动购买的调节

本文研究时间压力下消费者冲动性购买怎样受参照组的影响。通过二手数据和实验的方法发现时间压力和参照组影响类型对冲动性购买具有交互作用:时间压力低,信息性影响更能激发冲动性购买;时间压力高,规范性影响更能起作用;即时喜悦和规范性评估起中介作用。而且不同的信息性影响类型也会产生差异:时间压力高,数量性信息更容易使消费者冲动性购买;时间压力低,内容性信息更能起作用。本文的研究丰富了冲动性购买的相关理论和管理经验。     

Genocidalism

This is an attempt to develop a more complete understanding of ``genocidalism of commission,' or the genocidal use of ``genocide,' defined stipulatively as ``the energetic attributions of ``genocide' in less than clear cases without considering available and convincing opposing evidence and argumentation.' Genocidalism is a widespread phenomenon regarding the discourse on international affairs in the advanced, liberal societies of the West, embedding a ``normative divide' between the ways of attending to domestic (national) concerns and ways of attending to international issues. I argue that genocidalism is morally wrong, explore its likely causes, and suggest possible ways of getting rid of this hateful practice. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.