Can Competition Ever be Fair? Challenging the Standard Prejudice

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insufficient as a justification of fairness in competition, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns out to be unfair even if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness, where U stands for the usual fairness notion, and S-fairness, where S stands for the sequential aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom: first of all, there is an eclipse of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfair even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect a deeper aspect of unfairness.     

The impact of conventional versus robust norming on cognitive characterization and clinical classification of MCI and dementia

We examined the impact of conventional versus robust normative approaches on cognitive characterization and clinical classification of MCI versus dementia. The sample included participants from the National Alzheimer's Coordinating Center Uniform Data Set. Separate demographically adjusted z-scores for cognitive tests were derived from conventional (n = 4273) and robust (n = 602) normative groups. To assess the impact of deriving scores from a conventional versus robust normative group on cognitive characterization, we examined likelihood of having a low score on each neuropsychological test. Next, we created receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for the ability of normed scores derived from each normative group to differentiate between MCI (n = 3570) and dementia (n = 1564). We examined the impact of choice of normative group on classification accuracy by comparing sensitivity and specificity values and areas under the curves (AUC). Compared with using a conventional normative group, using a robust normative group resulted in a higher likelihood of low cognitive scores for individuals classified with MCI and dementia. Comparison of the classification accuracy for distinguishing MCI from dementia did not suggest a statistically significant advantage for either normative approach (Z = −0.29, p = .77; AUC = 0.86 for conventional and AUC = 0.86 for robust). In summary, these results indicate that using a robust normative group increases the likelihood of characterizing cognitive performance as low. However, there is not a clear advantage of using a robust over a conventional normative group when differentiating between MCI and dementia.     

The Influence of American Urban Culture on the Development of Normative Beliefs About Aggression in Middle-Eastern Immigrants

The effects of a community's culture on children's and adolescents' normative beliefs about the appropriateness of aggression were examined. One hundred forty-seven high school students and 103 fourth graders participated in a survey of normative beliefs; 69 high school and 44 elementary school students were of Middle-Eastern background. Although there were no differences in the beliefs of immigrant and nonimmigrant fourth graders, adolescents born in the United States were more accepting of aggression than those who immigrated from the Middle East. Moreover, adolescents who immigrated to the U.S. at age 12 or later were less accepting of aggression than those who immigrated prior to age 12.     

Speech act conditions as tools for reconstructing argumentative discourse

According to the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation, for analysing argumentative discourse, a normative reconstruction is required which encompasses four kinds of transformations. It is explained in this paper how speech act conditions can play a part in carrying out such a reconstruction. It is argued that integrating Searlean insights concerning speech acts with Gricean insights concerning conversational maxims can provide us with the necessary tools. For this, the standard theory of speech acts has to be amended in several respects and the conversational maxims have to be translated into speech act conditions. Making use of the rules for communication thus arrived at, and starting from the distribution of speech acts in a critical discussion as specified in the pragma-dialectical model, it is then demonstrated how indirect speech acts are to be transformed when reconstructing argumentative discourse.     

Psychometric assessment of cardiac transplantation candidates

Psychometric assessment protocols were used to chart the course of 287 end-stage cardiac patients' psychological adjustment at pretransplantation and, again, in 34 who were subsequently transplanted. The regression and repeated-measures analyses suggested that psychological distress is typical of the adult transplantation candidate, although impaired cognitive functioning is more typical of the acute postoperative stage. Negative affect, cognitive, personality, and coping measures are interrelated at pretransplantation; depression and mental control show significant decreases at 2 weeks posttransplantation. Whereas the transplantation process is inherently distressing, psychological testing may identify cognitive and personality features that require more specific clinical attention.     

Can Character Traits Be Based on Brute Psychological Facts?

Some of our largely unchosen first‐order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally‐laden character traits. This observation is in tension with the plausible idea that virtues and vices are based on reasons. I propose a way to resolve the tension.     

Agency and Normative Self-Governance

We are agents: we can deliberate about what to do, and then act on the basis of that deliberation. We are also capable of normative self-governance: we can identify and respond to reasons as reasons. Many theorists believe that these two capacities are intimately connected. On the basis of this connection they conclude that practical reasoning must be carried out under the guise of a justification. This paper explores two strategies for avoiding that conclusion. The first, which just denies the connection between agency and normative self-governance, is rejected as too costly, since it leaves the normative significance of agency unexplained. The second, which suggests that we can respond to a consideration as a reason without representing it as a reason, seems more promising, but it requires a reductive account of reasons for action. The upshot is that metaethics and action theory are entwined in ways that few have recognized.