Experimental studies of sequential selection and assignment with relative ranks

We study a class of sequential selection and assignment problems in which a decision maker (DM) must sequentially assign applicants to positions with the objective of minimizing expected cost. In modeling this class of problems, we assume that on each period the DM is only informed of the rank of the present applicant relative to the applicants that she previously observed and assigned. We first present the optimal decision policy that we subsequently use as a normative benchmark, and then report results from three experiments designed to study sequential assignment behavior. In comparing the aggregate results from all three experiments to the optimal decision policy, we identify a systematic bias, called the middleness bias, to over‐assign applicants to intermediate positions. The results also reveal a strong bias for early applicants to be over‐assigned to important positions. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Le paradigme de Jellison et Green : de la clairvoyance à la réactivité normative

This article questions congruence between the contents of the definition of the concept of normative perspicacity and Jellison and Green's paradigm to obtain its measurement. It centres the discussion on the capacity of the subjects to answer the changes of instructions and restores it in the study of complex mechanisms governing the relations of the individuals with the social standards.     

Revival and significance of political philosophy at present time

Taking a panoramic view on the history of modern philosophy, we can learn that political philosophy, a new arena for modern philosophy, has become an important field in philosophical studies since the later half of the 20th century. As far as the problem domain of political philosophy is concerned, political philosophy is only a special form of philosophy. The revival of political philosophy, however, indicates that philosophical inspection of political matters has regained legitimacy, and also means the restaging of philosophy as a knowledge type at modern times. In one sense, we can view the newly-revived political philosophy as typical modern philosophy, because its problem domain, its unique angle of looking into the life world and its ideal concern about the actual world make it one of the best ways in which we can reflect the existence of mankind in modern times. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (6) by Teng Jianhui     

Nonfallacious Rhetorical Strategies: Lyndon Johnson’s Daisy Ad

The traditional concepts of rhetorical strategy and argumentative fallacy cannot be readily reconciled. Doing so requires escaping the following argument: All argumentation involves rhetorical strategies. All rhetorical strategies are violations of logical or dialectical ideals. All violations of logical or dialectical ideals are fallacies. Normative pragmatics provides a perspective in which rhetorical strategies can be seen to have the potential for constructive contributions to argumentation and in which fallacies are not simply violations of ideals. One kind of constructive contribution, framing moves, is illustrated with the case of Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 TV campaign commercial known as the Daisy ad.     

Can Character Traits Be Based on Brute Psychological Facts?

Some of our largely unchosen first‐order reactions, such as disgust, can underwrite morally‐laden character traits. This observation is in tension with the plausible idea that virtues and vices are based on reasons. I propose a way to resolve the tension.     

A model of global citizenship: Antecedents and outcomes

As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, exposure to global cultures affords individuals opportunities to develop global identities. In two studies, we examine the antecedents and outcomes of identifying with a superordinate identity—global citizen. Global citizenship is defined as awareness, caring, and embracing cultural diversity while promoting social justice and sustainability, coupled with a sense of responsibility to act. Prior theory and research suggest that being aware of one's connection with others in the world (global awareness) and embedded in settings that value global citizenship (normative environment) lead to greater identification with global citizens. Furthermore, theory and research suggest that when global citizen identity is salient, greater identification is related to adherence to the group's content (i.e., prosocial values and behaviors). Results of the present set of studies showed that global awareness (knowledge and interconnectedness with others) and one's normative environment (friends and family support global citizenship) predicted identification with global citizens, and global citizenship predicted prosocial values of intergroup empathy, valuing diversity, social justice, environmental sustainability, intergroup helping, and a felt responsibility to act for the betterment of the world. The relationship between antecedents (normative environment and global awareness) and outcomes (prosocial values) was mediated by identification with global citizens. We discuss the relationship between the present results and other research findings in psychology, the implications of global citizenship for other academic domains, and future avenues of research. Global citizenship highlights the unique effect of taking a global perspective on a multitude of topics relevant to the psychology of everyday actions, environments, and identity.     

ADAM SMITH ON THE EMERGENCE OF MORALS: A REPLY TO EUGENE HEATH

In this paper I argue that there is an affinity between Reid and Husserl, or at least between Reid and what I shall call the ‘Austrian’ Husserl as opposed to the ‘German’ Husserl. The first is a realist, the scourge of psychologism, a sober and painstaking analyst of the various kinds of intentional experience, for whom such analysis is just an extension of ontology. The second is a radical idealist, closer to Fichte than to Kant. In describing the structures of ‘transcendental’ consciousness he takes himself to be describing the ‘origin’ of the world and everything in it, including himself as a psychophysical entity. He sees the history of philosophy as being determined by an inner telos, such that it culminates in his own transcendental phenomenology, of which he is the mere instrument.     

From Normative Spheres to Normative Practices: New Prospects for Normative Theory after Habermas

Abstract

In this paper I argue against Jürgen Habermas’s theoretical dualism between ethics and morality. I do this by showing how his account of normativity is vitiated by an unnecessary superposition of a social-evolutionary and a theoretical-linguistic account of normativity, and that this brings about theoretical problems that in the end cannot be overcome. I also show that Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s distinction is equally doomed to failure, but that his attempt nevertheless invites new and more fruitful avenues for normative theory that are worth exploring. The conclusion of this paper is that traditional notions of ethics and morality can be preserved provided we heavily redefine their meanings and release them from some of the theoretical work they have been expected to accomplish, but that to complete this transition we also need to supersede Forst’s pluralization of normative contexts toward a theory of normative practices that in the end makes the distinction between ethics and morality workable but useless. I begin by first locating the debate about ethics and morality within the context of recent normative theory (§1), and proceed to examine the two main strategies through which Habermas has elaborated his idea of a sharp dualism between ethics and morality (§2). I then introduce a theoretical distinction between what I call a horizontal and a vertical integration of ethics and morality (§3) and contend that whilst only the horizontal is viable, Habermas decidedly prefers the idea of a vertical integration (§4). With this work done, I proceed to complete my critique of Habermas’s argument and show how, by recovering the pragmatist roots of his thought, an alternative solution based on a functionalist understanding of morality could be envisaged (§5). I then conclude by examining Rainer Forst’s attempt at salvaging Habermas’s account, and show that the failure of Forst’s attempts opens the way for new and more fruitful approaches to normative theory which are more likely to recover the pragmatist roots of Habermas’s thought (§6).     

Situationism and the problem of moral improvement

A wealth of research in social psychology indicates that various ethically arbitrary situational factors exert a surprisingly powerful influence on moral conduct. Empirically-minded philosophers have argued over the last two decades that this evidence challenges Aristotelian virtue ethics. John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt have argued that situationist moral psychology – as opposed to Aristotelian moral psychology – is better suited to the practical aim of helping agents act better. The Aristotelian account, with its emphasis on individual factors, invites too much risk of morally bad conduct insofar as it ignores the power of situational factors which lead us astray. Moral agents are often better off detecting and intervening on situational factors to help themselves act better. This paper offers an argument against the claim that situationism enjoys practical advantages over Aristotelian virtue ethics. There is empirical evidence suggesting that people can improve their behavior via Aristotelian strategies of deliberate self-improvement. This evidence also suggests that focusing our ethical attention on morally trivial factors may result in worse overall conduct. Accordingly, Aristotelianism may fare better than situationism on the practical issue of moral improvement.