WHAT MAKES A QUANTUM PHYSICS BELIEF BELIEVABLE? MANY-WORLDS AMONG SIX IMPOSSIBLE THINGS BEFORE BREAKFAST

An extraordinary, if circumscribed, positive shift has occurred since the mid-twentieth century in the perceived status of Hugh Everett III's 1956 theory of the universal wave function of quantum mechanics, now widely called the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI). Everett's starkly new interpretation denied the existence of a separate classical realm, contending that the experimental data can be seen as presenting a state vector for the whole universe. Since there is no state vector collapse, reality as a whole is strictly deterministic. Explained jointly by the dynamical variables and the state vector, “this reality is not the reality we customarily think of, but is a reality composed of many worlds,” wrote Everett's colleague Bryce DeWitt. In this essay, I account briefly for the change of status in conventional scientific terms, yet chiefly in extended terms of three sets of ideas that I argue can be understood to affect believability in both scientific and religious contexts, illuminating helpfully the MWI phenomenon, and its engagement with theology: orthodoxy and heresy, language and reference, and faith and agnosticism. One's orientation relative to the variable content of these dynamic, socially oriented categories helps to make belief in ideas as metaphysically challenging as Everettian Quantum Mechanics, or particular ideas about God, either more or less believable. The categories will have the same function in a theology engaging Everett's theory, and in any theology at all written in a society deeply marked by what I further argue is a subtle, powerful, and pervasive mode of quasi-scientific thinking we can call societal constructive agnosticism, of which anyone doing theology today must be aware.     

Measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states in many-valued logical systems

I will propose an alternative philosophical approach to the representation of uncertain doxastic states. I will argue that the current account of measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states is inadequate for Belnap's four-valued logic. Specifically, a situation can be found in which either an inaccuracy measure returns a completely wrong result or an agent's inaccuracy score is inadequate relative to the mistake in her doxastic attitude. This will motivate an alternative representation of uncertain doxastic states based on ordered pairs. I will describe a possible inaccuracy measure that is suitable for ordered pairs, and I will show that it has all the qualities that are required for an inaccuracy measure to be legitimate. Finally, I will introduce conditions of rationality for uncertain doxastic states represented by ordered pairs.     

Lakatos's criticism of Carnapian inductive logic was mistaken

In [39], Imre Lakatos influentially argued that Carnapian inductive logic was a degenerate research programme. This paper argues that Lakatos's criticism was mistaken and that, according to Lakatos's own standards, Carnapian inductive logic was progressive rather than degenerate.     

Formalization of Reliability Block Diagrams in Higher-order Logic

Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) allow us to model the failure relationships of complex systems and their sub-components and are extensively used for system reliability, availability and maintainability analyses. Traditionally, these RBD-based analyses are done using paper-and-pencil proofs or computer simulations, which cannot ascertain absolute correctness due to their inaccuracy limitations. As a complementary approach, we propose to use the higher-order logic theorem prover HOL to conduct RBD-based analysis. For this purpose, we present a higher-order logic formalization of commonly used RBD configurations, such as series, parallel, parallel-series and series-parallel, and the formal verification of their equivalent mathematical expressions. A distinguishing feature of the proposed RBD formalization is the ability to model nested RBD configurations, which are RBDs having blocks that also represent RBD configurations. This generality allows us to formally analyze the reliability of many real-world systems. For illustration purposes, we formally analyze the reliability of a generic Virtual Data Center (VDC) in a cloud computing infrastructure exhibiting the nested series-parallel RBD configuration.     

反向对抗逻辑范式的创立与证实——人工语法PDP对抗逻辑的改进

人工语法对抗逻辑范式不能排除相似性和辨别力,导致自动反应不纯粹甚至虚假或无法检测到。本研究创立反向对抗逻辑范式,采用单因素(相容/对抗条件)被试间设计:内隐学习阶段将肯定标签与语法A绑定,否定标签与语法B绑定;测量阶段相容条件组对语法A和B做与学习阶段一致的判断,对抗条件组对语法B做与学习阶段对抗的肯定判断。实验证明:(1)外显否定标签可与语法B绑定学习而获得自动化特征,产生内隐联结自动化。(2)内隐否定知识比肯定知识更自动,知识从肯定转为否定易,从否定转为肯定难。(3)反向对抗逻辑范式能有效检测到自动反应,不受语法间形式相似性和辨别力影响。(4)首次析出高概率判断偏向效应,得到纯粹受控反应。     

Rectifying the Mischaracterization of Logic by Mental Model Theorists

Khemlani et al. (2018) mischaracterize logic in the course of seeking to show that mental model theory (MMT) can accommodate a form of inference (, let us label it) they find in a high percentage of their subjects. We reveal their mischaracterization and, in so doing, lay a landscape for future modeling by cognitive scientists who may wonder whether human reasoning is consistent with, or perhaps even capturable by, reasoning in a logic or family thereof. Along the way, we note that the properties touted by Khemlani et al. as innovative aspects of MMT-based modeling (e.g., nonmonotonicity) have for decades been, in logic, acknowledged and rigorously specified by families of (implemented) logics. Khemlani et al. (2018) further declare that is “invalid in any modal logic.” We demonstrate this to be false by our introduction (Appendix A) of a new propositional modal logic (within a family of such logics) in which is provably valid, and by the implementation of this logic. A second appendix, B, partially answers the two-part question, “What is a formal logic, and what is it for one to capture empirical phenomena?”     

An examination of the SEP candidate analogical inference rule within pure inductive logic

Within the framework of (Unary) Pure Inductive Logic we investigate four possible formulations of a probabilistic principle of analogy based on a template considered by Paul Bartha in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [1] and give some characterizations of the probability functions which satisfy them. In addition we investigate an alternative interpretation of analogical support, also considered by Bartha, based not on the enhancement of probability but on the creation of possibility.     

Interpolation and Amalgamation; Pushing the Limits. Part II

This is the second part of the paper [Part I] which appeared in the previous issue of this journal.     

WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS AND HAS IT EVOLVED?

Research into consciousness has now become respectable, and much has been written about it. Is consciousness the exclusive property of human beings, or can it be found also in animals? Can machines become conscious? Is consciousness an illusion, and are all mental states ultimately reducible to the movement of molecules? If consciousness is other than matter, what connection does it have with matter? These and others like them are now serious scientific questions in the West. This article discusses consciousness within the frame of the following assertions: Consciousness has evolved from earlier states of awareness to be found in lower forms of life. The current scientific method is too restrictive for the study of conscience and its evolution. In particular classical logic leads scientists to ignore or reject consciousness as a legitimate field of study. Mind and matter, generalized as knowing and being, have equal status.